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Robert	  Penn	  Warren	  and	  Wendell	  Berry	  share	  more	  than	  a	  home	  state.	  	  Both	  have	  
produced	  prodigious	  and	  varied	  literary	  oeuvres	  that	  include	  accomplished	  fiction,	  
nonfiction,	  and	  poetry,	  and	  both	  have	  written	  extensively	  on	  literature’s	  indispensable	  
function	  within	  a	  healthy	  culture.	  	  This	  latter	  shared	  vision	  is	  not	  unanimously	  held	  in	  
academic	  literary	  scholarship.	  	  In	  fact,	  many	  contemporary	  critics,	  who	  often	  see	  literature	  
as	  a	  mere	  material	  participant	  in	  potentially	  oppressive	  power	  structures,	  oppose	  the	  idea	  
that	  literature	  serves	  a	  valid	  and	  definable	  social	  function,	  or	  at	  least	  regard	  it	  with	  
skepticism.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  views	  of	  literature’s	  proper	  function	  
provide	  a	  productive	  counterpoint	  to	  much	  contemporary	  literary	  criticism.	  
	  Indeed,	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  visions	  of	  the	  function	  of	  literature	  make	  their	  
respective	  approaches	  to	  literary	  criticism	  both	  highly	  coherent	  and	  eminently	  practical	  
not	  only	  to	  scholars	  but	  also	  to	  unspecialized	  readers	  of	  literature.	  	  Their	  work	  achieves	  
such	  usefulness	  because	  each	  writer	  forthrightly	  deals	  with	  the	  teleological	  and,	  ultimately,	  
metaphysical	  questions	  that	  necessarily	  follow	  from	  the	  question	  of	  literature’s	  cultural	  
function.	  	  That	  both	  of	  them	  connect	  metaphysics,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  a	  rigorous	  and	  convincing	  
account	  of	  truth,	  to	  literary	  criticism	  is	  what	  ultimately	  sets	  them	  off	  from	  many	  
contemporary	  strands	  of	  literary	  theory	  and	  makes	  their	  work	  so	  useful.	  	  Furthermore,	  that	  
Warren,	  an	  agnostic,	  and	  Berry,	  a	  Christian,	  can	  produce	  metaphysically-­‐informed	  
philosophies	  of	  literature	  that	  agree	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  demonstrates	  the	  possibility	  and	  
desirability	  of	  productive	  conversations	  that	  do	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  metaphysical	  questions,	  
even	  in	  a	  time	  when	  there	  is	  no	  unanimous	  view	  as	  to	  the	  truth.	  	  An	  examination	  of	  each	  
writer’s	  work,	  then,	  demonstrates	  the	  value	  of	  metaphysics	  in	  writing	  on	  literature,	  both	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“Tell	  me	  a	  story,”	  pleads	  the	  speaker	  in	  the	  final	  poem	  of	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren’s	  
Audubon:	  A	  Vision,	  “In	  this	  century,	  and	  moment,	  of	  mania,	  /	  Tell	  me	  a	  story”	  (267).	  	  “Tell	  
Me	  a	  Story,”	  at	  first	  blush,	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strange	  way	  to	  end	  Audubon,	  a	  meditation	  on	  the	  
inseparable	  good	  and	  evil	  propensities	  of	  human	  nature	  that	  takes	  the	  life	  and	  work	  of	  a	  
nineteenth-­‐century	  naturalist	  as	  its	  subject.	  	  However,	  a	  consideration	  of	  Warren’s	  
commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  literature,	  along	  with	  historical	  knowledge,	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  of	  
knowing	  and	  evaluating	  ourselves	  and	  our	  time	  may	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  this	  choice.	  	  In	  
“The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past,”	  he	  writes	  that	  “literature—and	  in	  another	  mode,	  history”	  is	  useful	  in	  
that	  “the	  truths	  it	  presents	  come	  in	  the	  images	  of	  experience,	  and	  the	  images	  tease	  us	  out	  of	  
thought	  toward	  truth	  as	  experience.	  	  The	  truth	  we	  want	  to	  come	  to	  is	  the	  truth	  of	  ourselves,	  
of	  our	  common	  humanity,	  available	  in	  the	  projected	  self	  of	  art”	  (New	  48).	  	  In	  “Tell	  Me	  a	  
Story,”	  then,	  the	  titular	  imperative	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  poem	  examining	  the	  life	  of	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  
Audubon	  points	  to	  Warren’s	  emphasis	  on	  literature—the	  telling	  of	  stories—as	  a	  way	  of	  
restoring	  our	  sense	  of	  “common	  humanity”	  in	  a	  “century,	  and	  moment,	  of	  mania.”	  	  	  
That	  “moment”—or	  at	  least	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  poem’s	  publication—was,	  of	  course,	  
1969,	  which	  was	  indeed	  a	  moment	  of	  mania	  for	  many	  reasons,	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  was	  
the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Throughout	  his	  work,	  Warren	  holds	  up	  the	  forces	  of	  modernity—the	  
unbridled	  proliferation	  of	  industrial	  technology,	  the	  resulting	  consumer	  culture,	  and,	  of	  
course,	  the	  horrors	  of	  modern	  warfare—as	  dehumanizing	  influences,	  as	  forces	  that	  
distance	  us	  from	  our	  human	  selves	  by	  destroying	  the	  individual’s	  connection	  with	  his	  or	  her	  
	  
	  2	  
community	  and	  by	  severing	  his	  or	  her	  ties	  with	  the	  past1.	  	  The	  “mania”	  Audubon’s	  narrator	  
speaks	  of,	  then,	  is	  the	  frantic,	  multifarious	  fracturing	  of	  modernization.	  	  This	  means	  that	  his	  
plea	  for	  a	  story	  perhaps	  comes	  from	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  restored	  to	  his	  self,	  to	  experience	  a	  
common	  humanity	  that	  he	  shares	  with	  people	  across	  time.	  
In	  a	  similar	  way,	  Hannah	  Coulter,	  the	  narrator	  and	  protagonist	  of	  Wendell	  Berry’s	  
2004	  novel	  named	  for	  her,	  turns	  to	  literature	  during	  that	  same	  century,	  but	  in	  a	  different	  
moment	  of	  mania.	  	  Hannah	  speaks	  of	  the	  “pleasures”	  that	  keep	  her	  sane	  during	  a	  period	  
when	  her	  husband	  is	  serving	  (and	  eventually	  dies)	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  literature	  is	  among	  
them:	  
Books	  were	  a	  dependable	  pleasure.	  	  .	  .	  .	  Back	  then	  I	  read	  .	  .	  .	  books	  from	  Mr.	  
Feltner's	  mother’s	  library	  that	  was	  still	  in	  her	  bookcases	  in	  the	  living	  room.	  	  
She	  had	  been	  a	  reader	  .	  .	  .	  and	  had	  bought	  good	  books—classics,	  some	  of	  
them:	  Mark	  Twain’s	  river	  books	  and	  The	  Scarlet	  Letter	  and	  several	  thick	  
novels	  by	  Sir	  Walter	  Scott	  and	  Dickens.	  	  I	  read	  Old	  Mortality	  and	  thought	  
more	  than	  I	  wanted	  to	  of	  the	  horrible	  deeds	  people	  have	  done	  because	  they	  
loved	  God,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  good	  story.	  	  (44-­‐5)	  
For	  Hannah,	  literature	  is	  perhaps	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  horror	  of	  the	  war	  her	  husband	  is	  
fighting,	  but	  it	  is	  also,	  it	  seems,	  a	  way	  to	  reckon	  with	  that	  horror.	  	  At	  least	  in	  reading	  Old	  
Mortality,	  she	  takes	  “pleasure”	  in	  it	  as	  “a	  good	  story”	  but	  also	  concedes	  that	  the	  novel	  took	  
her	  through	  the	  unpleasant	  task	  of	  meditating	  on	  the	  human	  propensity	  toward	  doing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  shall	  have	  plenty	  of	  time	  to	  discuss	  Warren’s	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  later,	  as	  it	  figures	  
prominently	  in	  his	  later	  writing	  on	  literature.	  	  For	  now,	  though,	  I	  want	  to	  merely	  gesture	  
toward	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  where	  Warren	  remarks	  that	  the	  “true	  self”	  is	  both	  “the	  
result	  of	  a	  vital	  relation	  with	  a	  community”	  as	  well	  as	  a	  “development	  in	  time”	  that	  
necessitates	  a	  respect	  for	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  past	  (56).	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“horrible	  deeds”	  in	  the	  name	  of	  God,	  or,	  in	  more	  general	  terms,	  pursuing	  immoral	  and	  
damaging	  means	  for	  presumably	  good	  or	  just	  ends.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  literature	  on	  her,	  then,	  is	  
something	  similar	  to	  what	  Warren	  describes	  in	  “The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past.”	  	  It	  allows	  her	  to	  
confront,	  to	  see	  fully,	  the	  possibility	  and	  danger	  of	  human	  error	  and,	  perhaps,	  the	  
alternative	  possibility	  of	  human	  good,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  she	  is	  experiencing	  firsthand	  the	  
horror	  of	  war	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  was	  hitherto	  unimaginable.	  	  She	  turns	  to	  a	  story,	  then,	  in	  much	  
the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  narrator	  of	  Audubon	  does.	  
	   I	  bring	  up	  these	  two	  examples	  not	  only	  to	  introduce	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  work,	  
which	  will	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  project,	  but	  also	  to	  point	  to	  a	  foundational	  assumption	  that	  
underlies	  both	  writers’	  thinking	  on	  literature,	  an	  assumption	  that	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  given	  in	  
the	  current	  atmosphere	  of	  academic	  literary	  studies—namely,	  that	  literature	  serves	  a	  
legitimate	  and	  definable	  purpose.	  	  Indeed,	  throughout	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  critical	  work,	  
we	  see	  both	  writers	  wrestling	  with	  and	  giving	  answers	  to	  the	  question,	  so	  seldom	  asked	  
any	  more,	  “what	  is	  literature	  for?”	  	  One	  reason	  this	  question	  may	  have	  fallen	  out	  of	  fashion	  
is	  that	  critics,	  especially	  of	  the	  New	  Critical	  persuasion,	  began	  to	  feel	  that	  they	  already	  
knew	  its	  answer	  and	  that	  ink	  was	  therefore	  more	  profitably	  spilled	  over	  what	  a	  given	  piece	  
of	  literature	  means.	  	  A	  more	  important—and	  more	  contemporary—explanation,	  though,	  is	  
that	  critics	  now	  may	  think,	  in	  a	  time	  when	  intellectuals	  have	  supposedly	  abandoned	  
metanarratives,	  that	  the	  question	  is	  meaningless.	  	  And	  in	  the	  current	  politicized	  
atmosphere	  of	  literary	  criticism,	  many	  might	  feel	  that	  accounts	  of	  literature’s	  function	  
occlude	  understandings	  of	  how	  literature	  participates	  in	  ever-­‐fluctuating	  structures	  of	  
power.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  critic	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  what	  literature	  does—with	  giving	  
an	  account	  of	  which	  power	  structures	  a	  “text”	  challenges	  and	  which	  ones	  it	  reinforces—as	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opposed	  to	  what	  literature	  is	  for—what	  unique	  value	  and	  use	  it	  may	  have	  for	  us.	  	  The	  fact	  
that	  both	  Warren	  and	  Berry	  concern	  themselves	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  literature	  is	  for,	  
then,	  puts	  them	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  zeitgeist	  of	  professional	  literary	  criticism	  as	  of	  2013,	  as	  do	  
their	  answers	  to	  the	  question.	  	  Though	  often	  different	  in	  their	  particulars,	  these	  answers	  
can	  be	  summarized	  by	  saying	  that	  they	  both	  believe	  that	  the	  function	  of	  literature	  is	  the	  
edification	  of	  the	  human.	  
	   I	  find	  that	  Warren,	  a	  critic	  who	  strayed	  in	  important	  ways	  from	  the	  New	  Critical	  
camp	  during	  that	  camp’s	  heyday,	  and	  Berry,	  a	  critic	  still	  writing	  today,	  offer	  helpful	  
approaches	  to	  understanding	  literature	  precisely	  because	  they	  ask	  what	  literature	  is	  for	  
and	  give	  the	  answers	  that	  they	  do.	  	  As	  I	  have	  already	  hinted,	  I	  find	  that	  their	  views	  are	  in	  
many	  ways	  contrary	  to	  current	  critical	  perspectives	  primarily	  because	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  
fashionable	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  acceptable	  for	  literary	  study	  to	  be	  informed	  by	  an	  
avowed	  metaphysics.	  	  Because	  literature	  is	  a	  human	  enterprise,	  giving	  a	  satisfying	  answer	  
to	  the	  question	  “what	  is	  literature	  for?”	  probably	  requires	  also	  having	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  
question	  “what	  are	  humans	  for2?”	  	  Thus,	  thinking	  about	  literature	  in	  this	  way	  presupposes	  
thinking	  in	  teleological	  terms,	  which	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  questions	  that	  can	  only	  be	  
answered	  by	  metaphysics.	  	  	  
Giving	  a	  philosophically	  rigorous	  demonstration	  of	  my	  own	  metaphysics	  is	  beyond	  
the	  scope	  of	  my	  project.	  	  I	  am	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  showing	  that	  literary	  theory	  that	  
embraces	  metaphysical	  questions—questions	  of	  what	  is	  true—give	  a	  more	  useful	  account	  
of	  the	  function	  of	  literature	  than	  theory	  that	  avoids	  such	  questions.	  	  In	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  
satisfying	  definition	  of	  “metaphysics,”	  especially	  in	  relationship	  to	  literature,	  I	  find	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  is	  an	  especially	  important	  question	  for	  Berry—so	  much	  so,	  in	  fact,	  that	  he	  titled	  a	  
1990	  collection	  of	  essays	  What	  Are	  People	  For?	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helpful	  to	  turn	  to	  John	  Gardner’s	  On	  Moral	  Fiction.	  	  Gardner	  offers	  an	  inclusive	  definition	  of	  
“metaphysics”	  (adapted	  from	  Alfred	  North	  Whitehead’s)	  which	  defines	  the	  term	  as	  “a	  
coherent,	  convincing,	  necessary	  system	  of	  general	  ideas	  and	  feelings	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  every	  
element	  of	  our	  experience	  is	  illuminated”	  (171).	  	  Such	  a	  definition	  includes	  theistic,	  atheistic,	  
and	  agnostic	  systems	  of	  belief,	  insofar	  as	  those	  systems	  claim	  a	  relatively	  certain,	  although	  
not	  necessarily	  complete	  or	  final,	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  world	  works.	  	  And,	  thus,	  
Gardner	  is	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  how	  one	  can	  conceive	  of	  art	  as	  serving	  a	  moral	  function	  even	  
in	  an	  age	  of	  skepticism,	  noting	  that	  one	  can	  answer	  the	  skeptic’s	  objection	  that	  “the	  
universe	  has	  no	  moral	  laws”	  by	  understanding	  “universe”	  not	  to	  mean	  “planets	  and	  stars”	  
but	  instead	  “humanity	  grandiosely	  conceived”	  (23-­‐4).	  	  And	  indeed,	  we	  know	  that	  people	  
are	  able	  to	  found	  more	  or	  less	  satisfying	  ethical	  frameworks	  on	  comprehensive	  systems	  of	  
belief	  about	  the	  world	  that	  deny	  or	  conscientiously	  doubt	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  divine	  order	  to	  
the	  natural	  world.	  	  The	  point,	  I	  think,	  is	  that	  even	  if	  the	  larger	  questions	  surrounding	  the	  
origins	  and	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  universe	  remain	  unanswered,	  workably	  certain	  
metaphysical	  systems—conceptions	  of	  human	  truth	  “grandiosely	  conceived”—are	  still	  
both	  available	  and	  valid.	  	  	  
This	  inclusive	  conception	  of	  metaphysics	  is	  important	  to	  my	  project	  because	  my	  
argument	  is	  that	  both	  Warren,	  an	  agnostic,	  and	  Berry,	  a	  Christian,	  offer	  approaches	  to	  
literature	  that,	  because	  they	  are	  built	  on	  metaphysics,	  are	  useful	  not	  only	  to	  academics	  
specializing	  in	  literary	  studies	  but	  also	  to	  the	  general	  reading	  public.	  	  I	  believe,	  along	  with	  
Warren	  and	  Berry,	  that	  this	  general	  reading	  public,	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  thoughtful	  people	  who	  
value	  literature	  but	  do	  not	  specialize	  in	  the	  study	  of	  it,	  read	  literature	  because	  it	  helps	  
them,	  in	  a	  way	  characteristic	  to	  itself,	  understand	  themselves	  and	  the	  world.	  	  In	  Warren’s	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words,	  literature	  explores	  metaphysical	  “truths”	  through	  the	  “images	  of	  experience”	  in	  
order	  to	  steer	  its	  readers	  away	  from	  abstract	  concepts	  and	  toward	  “truth	  as	  experience.”	  	  
Thus,	  literature	  is	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  and	  exploring	  the	  implications	  of	  metaphysics,	  and,	  as	  I	  
hope	  my	  examination	  of	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  work	  will	  show,	  only	  literary	  theory	  that	  
takes	  metaphysics	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  literature	  seriously	  is	  apt	  to	  be	  highly	  
profitable	  for	  both	  critic	  and	  reader.	  
Of	  course,	  one	  potential	  danger	  of	  talking	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  literature	  
and	  metaphysics	  is	  the	  temptation	  to	  conflate	  the	  two.	  	  I	  see	  this	  temptation	  as	  leading	  to	  
serious	  error	  because	  I	  take	  seriously	  the	  fact	  that	  providing	  a	  satisfying	  account	  of	  what	  
literature	  is	  for	  also	  involves	  a	  corollary	  account	  of	  what	  literature	  is	  not	  for.	  	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  
to	  argue	  that	  literature	  and	  metaphysics	  are	  the	  same	  thing,	  or	  even	  that	  literature	  is	  
necessarily	  the	  best	  medium	  of	  metaphysical	  truth.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  a	  believing	  Christian,	  I	  
cannot	  make	  such	  a	  statement,	  as	  valuable	  as	  I	  think	  literature	  is3.	  	  Furthermore,	  one	  
helpful	  aspect	  of	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  work	  is	  their	  careful	  refusal	  to	  claim	  too	  much	  for	  
literature.	  	  In	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
metaphysics	  and	  literature,	  then,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  situate	  Warren	  and	  Berry	  as	  figures	  in	  a	  
continuing	  debate	  over	  what	  this	  proper	  understanding	  is,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  briefly	  examine	  
its	  history	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  work	  as	  a	  discussion	  between	  
two	  camps	  defined	  by	  two	  figures	  who	  tower	  over	  modern	  literary	  theory:	  Matthew	  Arnold	  
and	  T.S.	  Eliot.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  I	  take	  Christian	  doctrine,	  founded	  on	  the	  Bible,	  to	  be	  the	  best	  and	  most	  
comprehensive	  (which	  is	  not	  to	  say	  perfect	  or	  complete)	  way	  to	  know	  metaphysical	  Truth.	  
While	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  Bible	  was	  indeed	  written	  by	  humans	  and	  can	  certainly	  be	  
profitably	  thought	  of	  as	  literary,	  I	  also	  take	  it	  to	  be	  divinely	  inspired	  and,	  thus,	  authoritative	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  literature	  cannot	  be.	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Many	  would	  say	  that	  Matthew	  Arnold	  made	  the	  error	  of	  conflating	  metaphysics	  with	  
literature,	  and	  I	  would	  agree.	  	  Poetry	  was	  the	  governing	  force	  of	  his	  private	  metaphysical	  
vision,	  and	  he	  is	  a	  test	  case	  for	  why	  seeing	  literature	  as	  a	  surrogate	  metaphysics	  or	  
surrogate	  religion	  can	  be	  of	  only	  limited	  use	  to	  a	  broader	  community	  because	  of	  its	  
necessary	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  reader	  or	  critic.	  	  Arnold	  is	  known,	  of	  course,	  for	  
purveying	  the	  idea	  that,	  in	  an	  era	  when	  religion	  has	  been	  discredited,	  literature	  offers	  a	  
surrogate	  for	  what	  religion	  has	  tried,	  and	  failed,	  to	  give	  people.	  	  One	  strain	  of	  his	  argument	  
in	  Culture	  and	  Anarchy	  is	  that	  poetry,	  instead	  of	  religion,	  should	  be	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  
culture.	  	  He	  claims	  that	  culture	  “is	  of	  like	  spirit	  with	  poetry”	  in	  that	  poetry’s	  “dominant	  
idea”	  is	  “the	  idea	  of	  beauty	  and	  of	  a	  human	  nature	  perfect	  on	  all	  sides,”	  whereas	  the	  
dominant	  idea	  of	  religion	  is	  mere	  moral	  perfection	  (50-­‐1).	  	  The	  vision	  of	  poetry,	  then,	  ought	  
to	  “to	  transform	  and	  govern”	  the	  areas	  of	  perfection	  formerly	  presided	  over	  by	  religion	  and	  
thus	  act	  as	  a	  guiding	  force	  for	  culture	  (51).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Good	  in	  Arnold’s	  view	  
becomes	  a	  subset	  of	  and	  subservient	  to	  the	  Beautiful.	  
Poetry,	  then,	  replaces	  religion	  for	  Arnold,	  and	  thus	  becomes	  culture’s	  ultimate	  guide.	  	  
The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that,	  as	  Arnold	  certainly	  knew,	  not	  all	  poetry	  is	  created	  equal,	  and	  
not	  all	  poets	  are	  to	  be	  trusted.	  	  So	  the	  ultimate	  arbiter	  of	  what	  constitutes	  “perfection	  on	  all	  
sides”	  is	  not	  the	  poet	  but	  the	  individual	  reader,	  or,	  to	  be	  fair	  to	  Arnold,	  the	  well-­‐informed	  
but	  still	  individual	  critic.	  	  Granted,	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  such	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  all	  one	  can	  
hope	  for	  if	  one	  rejects	  the	  claims	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  If	  we	  allow	  that	  truth	  is	  a	  necessary	  
quality	  of	  perfection,	  and	  if	  we	  hold	  that	  truth	  as	  such	  does	  not	  exist	  or	  is	  unavailable,	  the	  
only	  possible	  reference	  for	  perfection	  is	  a	  private,	  provisional	  truth,	  and	  poetry	  is	  as	  good	  a	  
source	  for	  it	  as	  any.	  	  It	  is	  on	  precisely	  this	  point,	  however,	  that	  T.S.	  Eliot	  challenges	  Arnold	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and	  shows	  how	  an	  account	  of	  literature	  that	  takes	  metaphysical	  truth	  as	  a	  necessary	  point	  
of	  reference	  escapes	  such	  solipsistic	  limitations.	  	  In	  After	  Strange	  Gods4,	  Eliot	  remarks	  that	  
“the	  kinds	  of	  criticism	  which	  assumed	  that	  the	  function	  of	  poetry	  was	  to	  replace	  religion”	  
ultimately	  result	  in	  an	  “extreme	  individualism	  in	  views,	  and	  no	  accepted	  rules	  or	  opinions	  
as	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  literary	  job.”	  	  “When	  one	  man’s	  ‘view	  of	  life’	  is	  as	  good	  as	  
another’s,”	  he	  argues,	  “all	  the	  more	  enterprising	  spirits	  will	  naturally	  evolve	  their	  own;	  and	  
where	  there	  is	  no	  custom	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  task	  of	  literature	  is,	  every	  writer	  will	  
determine	  for	  himself,	  and	  the	  more	  enterprising	  will	  range	  as	  far	  afield	  as	  possible”	  (34).	  	  
Eliot	  thus	  challenges	  the	  Arnoldian	  view	  by	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  how	  it	  is	  destined	  for	  
futility,	  and	  this	  account	  is	  more	  or	  less	  based	  in	  the	  traditional	  idea	  that	  in	  order	  to	  know	  
either	  the	  Good	  or	  the	  Beautiful,	  one	  must	  first	  know	  the	  True.	  	  Judgments	  of	  ethical	  and	  
aesthetic	  value,	  in	  other	  words,	  depend	  on	  metaphysics.	  	  	  So	  it	  is	  not	  only	  wrong	  but	  also	  
strange	  that	  Arnold	  would	  suggest	  that	  Beauty,	  epitomized	  in	  poetry,	  should	  be	  humanity’s	  
ultimate	  guide	  in	  all	  questions	  of	  perfection.	  	  As	  Eliot	  argues,	  when	  the	  poet	  or	  the	  critic	  is	  
charged	  with	  the	  task	  of	  dreaming	  up	  a	  vision	  of	  what	  human	  perfection	  ought	  to	  look	  like	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Of	  course,	  I	  recognize	  the	  danger	  of	  aligning	  myself	  with	  anything	  Eliot	  says	  in	  After	  
Strange	  Gods.	  	  Allow	  me	  to	  say	  that	  I	  find	  his	  grossly	  anti-­‐Semitic	  remark	  that	  “reasons	  of	  
race	  and	  religion	  combine	  to	  make	  any	  large	  number	  of	  free-­‐thinking	  Jews	  undesirable”	  
incredibly	  offensive	  and	  morally	  reprehensible	  (20).	  	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  count	  the	  racial	  
content	  of	  this	  statement	  as	  necessary	  to	  the	  main	  thrust	  of	  Eliot’s	  argument,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  
view	  Eliot’s	  thought	  in	  After	  Strange	  Gods,	  or	  elsewhere,	  as	  dismissable	  because	  of	  it.	  	  
Furthermore,	  what	  he	  has	  to	  say	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  remark—namely,	  that	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  healthy	  tradition	  depends	  on	  communities	  of	  like-­‐minded	  people	  living	  in	  
the	  same	  place	  continuously—suggests	  that	  his	  main	  emphasis	  here	  is	  on	  “free	  thinking”	  as	  
opposed	  to	  “Jews.”	  	  What	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  issue	  in	  Eliot’s	  remark,	  aside	  from	  the	  regrettable	  
racial	  content,	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  freedom	  from	  metaphysics	  is	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  the	  
individual	  or	  for	  the	  community,	  or	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  freedom	  is	  even	  possible	  in	  the	  
first	  place,	  as	  claims	  of	  metaphysical	  Truth	  hold	  that	  such	  Truth	  exists	  regardless	  of	  an	  
individual’s	  presumed	  freedom	  from	  it.	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without	  reference	  to	  a	  metaphysics	  (and	  Arnold	  does	  not	  give	  such	  a	  reference)	  he	  or	  she	  
runs	  the	  risk	  of	  ending	  up	  with	  a	  view	  that	  is	  of	  use	  perhaps	  only	  to	  him-­‐	  or	  herself.	  
Alternatively,	  Eliot	  insists	  in	  Notes	  Towards	  the	  Definition	  of	  Culture	  that	  culture	  
(which	  certainly	  includes	  literature)	  ought	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  and	  subservient	  to	  a	  
metaphysics,	  which	  for	  him	  is	  necessarily	  a	  religious	  metaphysics.	  	  He	  states	  that	  
understanding	  the	  proper	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  culture	  involves	  avoiding	  “two	  
alternative	  errors:	  that	  of	  regarding	  religion	  and	  culture	  as	  two	  separate	  things	  between	  
which	  there	  is	  a	  relation,	  and	  that	  of	  identifying	  religion	  and	  culture.”	  	  The	  way	  to	  do	  this,	  he	  
says,	  is	  to	  think	  of	  “the	  culture	  of	  a	  people	  as	  an	  incarnation	  of	  its	  religion,”	  or,	  we	  could	  say,	  
of	  its	  metaphysics	  (105).	  	  Thus,	  the	  Good	  and	  the	  Beautiful,	  which	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  
the	  province	  of	  culture,	  are	  in	  Eliot’s	  view	  embodiments	  of	  the	  Truth	  that	  transcends	  and	  
yet	  sustains	  them.	  	  And	  while	  on	  one	  level	  there	  is	  a	  much	  clearer	  and	  healthier	  distinction	  
between	  the	  Good	  and	  the	  Beautiful	  and	  the	  True	  than	  in	  Arnold’s	  view,	  there	  are	  also	  more	  
legitimate	  grounds	  for	  giving	  a	  coherent	  account	  of	  how,	  exactly,	  the	  Good	  and	  the	  Beautiful	  
can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  aspects	  of	  the	  True.	  	  So	  while	  Eliot	  does	  knock	  literature	  down	  a	  peg	  
from	  its	  position	  in	  Arnold’s	  view	  by	  highlighting	  the	  need	  for	  metaphysical	  grounding,	  he	  
also	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  a	  more	  practical	  form	  of	  criticism.	  
In	  Eliot’s	  view,	  literature,	  as	  an	  element	  of	  culture,	  imaginatively	  embodies	  a	  
metaphysics	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  poem,	  novel,	  short	  story,	  or	  play.	  	  Thus,	  literature	  is	  beautiful	  
to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  embodies	  metaphysical	  truth	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  judged,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  on	  
how	  well	  it	  accomplishes	  this	  embodiment.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  After	  Strange	  Gods	  Eliot	  takes	  a	  line	  
that	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  John	  Gardner’s	  view	  when	  he	  insists	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
criticize	  literature	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  “orthodoxy”	  or	  “heresy”	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  accepted	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religion	  (and,	  again,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  replace	  ‘religion’	  here	  with	  ‘metaphysics’	  to	  
broaden	  the	  relevance	  of	  Eliot’s	  view)	  as	  opposed	  to	  in	  terms	  of	  “the	  pair	  classicism—
romanticism	  which	  is	  frequently	  used”	  (22).	  	  Discussions	  of	  literature	  should,	  in	  Eliot’s	  
view,	  actively	  deal	  with	  its	  relationship	  to	  metaphysical	  truth	  instead	  of	  stopping	  at	  
discussions	  of	  novelty	  of	  style,	  which	  is	  exactly	  what	  Gardner	  suggests	  when	  he	  holds	  up	  
what	  he	  calls	  “moral	  criticism”	  as	  the	  “true	  criticism”	  (133).	  	  “Ideals	  are	  art’s	  ends;	  the	  rest	  
is	  methodology,”	  he	  writes,	  going	  on	  to	  spell	  out	  what	  I	  find	  to	  be	  the	  logical	  implications	  of	  
Eliot’s	  view	  that	  culture	  is	  the	  incarnation	  of	  a	  metaphysics	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  literary	  
criticism:	  	  “Truth,	  Goodness,	  and	  Beauty	  are	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  in	  varying	  degrees,	  the	  fundamental	  
concerns	  of	  art	  and	  therefore	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  fundamental	  concerns	  of	  criticism”	  (133,	  
144).	  	  	  
I	  take	  Eliot’s	  and	  position,	  and	  Gardner’s	  elaboration	  of	  it,	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  metaphysics	  and	  literature	  to	  be	  a	  satisfying	  correction	  of	  Arnold’s,	  and	  I	  will	  have	  
an	  opportunity	  to	  discuss	  it	  at	  greater	  length	  later,	  as	  Eliot	  is	  an	  important	  intellectual	  
forebear	  to	  both	  Warren	  and	  Berry.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  their	  particular	  applications	  of	  Eliot’s	  
thought	  that	  I	  believe	  make	  their	  work	  of	  great	  practical	  use	  to	  the	  general	  reading	  public.	  	  
And	  I	  also	  believe	  that	  their	  views	  can	  be	  usefully	  contrasted	  to	  the	  errors	  of	  other	  disciples	  
of	  Eliot.	  
Cleanth	  Brooks	  is	  one	  such	  disciple.	  	  While	  I	  believe	  that	  much	  of	  the	  invective	  that	  
has	  been	  hurled	  at	  Brooks	  over	  the	  years	  has	  been	  immoderate	  (because	  fashionable),	  and	  
while	  I	  do	  find	  much	  to	  agree	  with	  in	  his	  writing,	  I	  wish	  here	  to	  argue	  that	  while	  Brooks	  is	  
certainly	  an	  ideological	  descendant	  of	  Eliot,	  his	  brand	  of	  formalism	  places	  an	  undue	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  specialization	  of	  literary	  criticism	  and	  thus	  exhibits	  a	  debt	  to	  Arnold.	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Indeed,	  while	  he	  agrees	  with	  Eliot	  that	  “poetry	  needs	  religion”	  and	  that	  we	  should	  “be	  wary	  
of	  conceptions	  that	  would	  turn	  literature	  into	  an	  ersatz	  religion,”	  I	  find	  that	  his	  definition	  of	  
the	  job	  of	  literary	  criticism	  demonstrates	  that	  he	  falls	  into	  the	  Arnoldian	  trap	  of	  ascribing	  
literature	  too	  high	  of	  a	  place	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  makes	  literary	  criticism	  less	  useful	  than	  it	  
should	  be	  to	  the	  general	  reading	  public	  (“Religion”	  53,	  62).	  	  In	  “The	  Formalist	  Critics,”	  
Brooks	  argues	  that	  though	  “the	  formalist	  critic	  knows	  as	  well	  as	  anyone	  that	  literary	  works	  
are	  merely	  potential	  until	  they	  are	  read”	  by	  real	  readers	  who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  literary	  
specialists,	  that	  critic	  is	  necessarily	  “concerned	  primarily	  with	  the	  work	  itself”	  and	  thus	  his	  
or	  her	  job	  involves	  nothing	  more	  than	  “indicating	  to	  an	  interested	  reader	  what	  the	  work	  is	  
and	  how	  the	  parts	  of	  it	  are	  related”	  (74-­‐6).	  	  While	  Brooks	  agrees	  that	  “Literature	  has	  many	  
‘uses,’”	  he	  staunchly	  maintains	  that	  the	  critic’s	  job	  is	  not	  primarily	  to	  discuss	  these	  uses	  but	  
to	  “[know]	  what	  a	  given	  work	  ‘means’”	  (81).	  	  	  
While	  Brooks,	  as	  a	  believing	  Christian,	  certainly	  holds	  religion	  and,	  therefore,	  
metaphysics	  in	  high	  regard,	  this	  devotion	  to	  shutting	  out	  all	  concerns	  but	  those	  of	  literary	  
meaning	  divined	  from	  formal	  analysis	  demonstrates	  his	  intellectual	  debt	  to	  Arnold.	  	  Arnold,	  
because	  he	  holds	  poetry	  in	  such	  high	  esteem,	  holds	  criticism	  in	  almost	  an	  equally	  high	  
place.	  	  What	  is	  troubling	  about	  Arnold’s	  account	  of	  criticism	  is	  that	  he	  asserts	  that	  it	  should	  
follow	  the	  rule	  of	  “disinterestedness”	  and	  should	  thus	  go	  about	  its	  work	  by	  “steadily	  
refusing	  to	  lend	  itself	  to	  any	  of	  those	  ulterior,	  political,	  practical	  considerations	  about	  
ideas.”	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  critic’s	  role	  is	  “simply	  to	  know	  the	  best	  that	  is	  known	  and	  thought	  
in	  the	  world,	  and	  by	  in	  its	  turn	  making	  this	  known,	  to	  create	  a	  current	  of	  true	  and	  fresh	  
ideas”	  (“Function”	  45-­‐6).	  	  Clearly,	  Arnold	  pictures	  some	  kind	  of	  conduit	  between	  the	  “true	  
and	  fresh	  ideas”	  that	  the	  disinterested	  thinker	  of	  beautiful	  thoughts	  comes	  up	  with	  and	  the	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“practical	  considerations”	  of	  the	  lowly	  layperson,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  that	  
conduit	  is.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  completely	  up	  to	  the	  layperson	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  critic’s	  
“sweetness	  and	  light”	  bears	  a	  relationship	  to	  the	  ruck	  of	  ordinary	  living.	  	  There	  is,	  in	  other	  
words,	  no	  priesthood	  in	  place	  to	  ready	  the	  sacrament	  for	  the	  masses.	  	  	  Arnold’s	  rule	  of	  
disinterestedness	  and	  Brooks’s	  adoption	  of	  it,	  then,	  are	  completely	  at	  odds	  with	  Eliot’s	  
conception	  of	  culture	  as	  the	  incarnation	  of	  metaphysics	  in	  that	  disinterested	  criticism	  is	  
entirely	  concerned	  with	  “true	  and	  fresh	  ideas”	  or	  with	  literary	  “meaning”	  in	  the	  abstract,	  
which	  we	  might	  align	  with	  the	  word,	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  “practical	  considerations,”	  which	  
we	  might	  align	  with	  the	  flesh.	  	  In	  the	  incarnation,	  the	  word	  becomes	  flesh,	  meaning	  that	  the	  
two	  are	  inseparable,	  if	  not	  indistinguishable.	  	  To	  avoid,	  as	  a	  rule,	  practical	  considerations	  of	  
literature—considerations	  of	  its	  “uses”	  by	  the	  general	  reading	  public—is	  to	  deny	  its	  proper	  
cultural	  function	  as	  a	  means	  of	  making	  metaphysics	  immediate	  to	  a	  reader.	  	  So	  while	  
Brooks	  does	  reject	  the	  Arnoldian	  line	  that	  literature	  can	  and	  should	  replace	  religion	  and	  
govern	  culture,	  his	  view	  of	  the	  disinterested	  critic	  searching	  for	  literary	  meaning	  alone	  
risks	  impracticality	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Arnold’s	  approach	  does.	  
Of	  course,	  I	  am	  hardly	  the	  first	  to	  challenge	  Brooks	  on	  this	  point.	  	  John	  Guillory,	  for	  
one,	  offers	  a	  compelling	  argument	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  Brooks’s	  insistence	  on	  a	  
disinterested	  formalist	  approach	  to	  criticism.	  	  Guillory	  argues	  that	  Brooks’s	  strict	  
formalism	  was	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  assert	  literature’s	  position	  as	  apart	  from	  and	  as	  an	  
antidote	  to	  two	  perceived	  evils	  of	  modernity:	  the	  epistemological	  supremacy	  of	  positivism	  
and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  mass	  culture.	  	  To	  support	  this	  argument,	  Guillory	  points	  to	  Brooks’s	  
insistence	  that	  the	  task	  of	  reading	  good	  literature	  is	  inherently	  “difficult”	  and,	  thus,	  
requires	  that	  the	  reader	  undergo	  institutional	  training	  in	  the	  methods	  of	  close	  reading	  at	  
	  
	  13	  
the	  university	  level.	  	  “The	  argument	  for	  the	  linguistic	  difficulty	  of	  literature	  .	  .	  .	  revalued	  
literature	  as	  the	  cultural	  capital	  of	  the	  university	  by	  reading	  it	  in	  a	  new	  way,”	  Guillory	  
argues,	  pointing	  out	  the	  obvious	  implication	  that	  this	  specialization	  of	  literature	  effectively	  
seals	  the	  reading	  of	  it	  within	  the	  university	  English	  department,	  making	  the	  academic	  
institution	  a	  “space	  of	  deliberate	  and	  strategic	  withdrawal”	  that	  involves	  “the	  withdrawal	  of	  
literary	  culture	  from	  ‘the	  world’”	  (172,	  165).	  	  Far	  from	  achieving	  his	  goals,	  then,	  Guillory	  
argues	  that	  Brooks’s	  project	  failed	  in	  that	  while	  the	  New	  Criticism	  trained	  students	  to	  
“recognize	  the	  superiority	  of	  literature	  to	  mass	  cultural	  artifacts,”	  it	  gave	  them	  no	  reason	  
not	  to	  “consume	  both	  kinds	  of	  artifacts	  in	  the	  distinct	  spheres	  of	  their	  consumption”	  (174).	  	  
	   Brooks’s	  approach	  to	  literary	  criticism,	  then,	  was	  perhaps	  able	  to	  teach	  large	  
quantities	  of	  college	  students	  how	  to	  read	  literature	  and	  understand	  its	  formal	  techniques,	  
but	  it	  did	  so	  by	  fetishizing	  literature	  as	  culture	  that	  is	  to	  be	  consumed	  in	  an	  institutional	  
setting	  and,	  thus,	  as	  something	  that	  exists	  apart	  from	  everyday	  life.	  	  So,	  as	  I	  trust	  it	  has	  
already	  become	  apparent,	  while	  I	  do	  not	  share	  Guillory’s	  qualms	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  Brooks’s	  
project,	  I	  do	  nevertheless	  agree	  with	  his	  assessment	  of	  that	  project’s	  failure.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  
find	  that,	  like	  Arnold’s,	  Brooks’s	  error	  involves	  failing	  to	  recognize	  that	  literature	  can	  only	  
be	  understood	  as	  operating	  in	  reference	  to	  an	  external	  metaphysical	  reality.	  	  His	  formalism	  
thus	  constitutes	  what	  I	  think	  can	  helpfully	  be	  called	  an	  idolatrous	  approach	  to	  literature	  in	  
that	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  critic	  should	  only	  pay	  attention	  to	  questions	  of	  form,	  it	  removes	  
literature	  from	  its	  proper	  contact	  with	  the	  frameworks	  within	  which	  we	  judge	  all	  human	  
actions.	  	  The	  well-­‐wrought	  urn	  is	  thus	  a	  graven	  image	  for	  the	  pure	  formalist,	  who	  abandons	  
contact	  with	  the	  important	  plane	  on	  which	  people	  conduct	  their	  everyday	  lives	  for	  a	  
pursuit	  of	  purely	  literary	  meaning.	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It	  is	  precisely	  here—the	  idolatrous	  purity	  of	  Brooks’s	  formalism—where	  I	  find	  that	  
his	  friend	  and	  collaborator	  on	  such	  foundational	  New	  Critical	  texts	  as	  Understanding	  Poetry	  
offers	  an	  important	  correction	  to	  Brooks’s	  error.	  	  Warren’s	  formalism	  differs	  from	  Brooks’s	  
in	  that	  it	  recognizes	  and	  pursues	  the	  connection	  between	  literary	  form	  and	  the	  plane	  of	  
everyday	  living.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  I	  shall	  discuss	  at	  length	  later,	  Warren	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  
idea	  of	  literary	  “purity”	  throughout	  his	  career,	  as	  one	  can	  see	  even	  from	  the	  title	  of	  his	  1943	  
essay	  “Pure	  and	  Impure	  Poetry.”	  
I	  should	  at	  this	  point	  recognize	  that,	  on	  the	  surface,	  holding	  up	  Warren’s	  work	  as	  a	  
solution	  to	  the	  problem	  created	  by	  Brooks,	  a	  figure	  with	  whom	  he	  is	  so	  closely	  associated,	  
may	  seem	  like	  an	  odd	  move.	  	  However,	  as	  Charlotte	  Beck	  has	  shown,	  a	  good	  number	  of	  
critics	  have	  located	  significant	  distinctions	  between	  Warren’s	  and	  Brooks’s	  work5.	  	  Monroe	  
Spears,	  for	  one,	  argues	  that	  “[n]obody	  was	  ever	  farther	  from	  being	  a	  mandarin	  or	  a	  pure	  
aesthete”	  than	  Warren	  because	  “his	  primary	  concerns	  have	  always	  and	  undisguisedly	  been	  
moral,	  historical,	  and	  even	  patriotic”	  (99).	  	  Spears	  here	  recognizes	  that	  Warren’s	  writing	  on	  
literature	  does	  violate	  Brooks’s	  strict	  sense	  of	  formalism	  that	  in	  theory	  would	  refuse	  to	  
address	  moral	  or	  historical	  concerns	  that	  exist	  outside	  of	  a	  text,	  but	  I	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  
stress,	  as	  I	  touched	  on	  briefly	  above,	  that	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Warren	  was	  not	  a	  
formalist	  in	  a	  broader	  sense.	  	  As	  Spears	  later	  points	  out	  in	  reference	  to	  “A	  Poem	  of	  Pure	  
Imagination,”	  Warren’s	  long	  essay	  on	  Coleridge’s	  “Rime	  of	  the	  Ancient	  Mariner,”	  Warren’s	  
approach	  to	  criticism	  always	  involves	  	  “[arguing]	  against	  any	  division	  between	  moral,	  
aesthetic,	  and	  social”	  concerns	  (110).	  	  Indeed,	  in	  Warren’s	  view,	  examinations	  of	  aesthetic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  her	  2006	  book	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren,	  Critic,	  Beck	  traces	  a	  critical	  tradition	  since	  the	  
1970s	  that	  has	  been	  much	  more	  charitable	  to	  Warren	  than	  Brooks,	  mentioning	  figures	  such	  




form	  not	  only	  lead	  us	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  poem’s	  meaning	  but	  also	  to	  that	  poem’s	  
relationship	  with	  the	  actual	  world	  of	  experience.	  	  “If	  poetry	  does	  anything	  for	  us,”	  Warren	  
remarks	  at	  the	  end	  of	  “A	  Poem	  of	  Pure	  Imagination,”	  	  “it	  reconciles,	  by	  its	  symbolical	  
reading	  of	  experience	  (for	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  it	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  myth	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  being),	  the	  
self-­‐devisive	  [sic]	  internecine	  malices	  which	  arise	  at	  the	  superficial	  level	  on	  which	  we	  
conduct	  most	  of	  our	  living”	  (New	  399).	  	  Whether	  Warren	  means	  by	  the	  “myth	  of	  the	  unity	  
of	  being”	  that	  there	  actually	  is	  such	  a	  unity	  or	  that	  this	  unity	  is	  a	  human	  construction	  that	  
nevertheless	  is	  worth	  seeking—“humanity	  grandiosely	  conceived,”	  as	  Gardner	  would	  have	  
it—is	  a	  subject	  I	  shall	  have	  ample	  time	  to	  address	  later.	  	  The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  in	  
Warren’s	  formalism,	  poetry	  is	  valuable	  because	  the	  formal	  unity	  of	  a	  poem	  allows	  the	  
reader	  to	  experience,	  however	  dimly,	  this	  “unity	  of	  being,”	  which	  is	  necessarily	  a	  unity	  
beyond	  the	  poem	  which	  the	  poem	  seeks	  to	  imitate	  or	  to	  embody.	  	  Indeed,	  I	  see	  Warren	  here	  
following	  Eliot’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  poem	  is	  the	  incarnation	  of	  a	  metaphysical	  truth.	  	  This	  
application	  of	  Eliot’s	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  metaphysics	  and	  poetry,	  then,	  allows	  
the	  reader	  to	  go	  beyond	  close	  reading	  to	  find	  the	  hidden	  treasure	  of	  “meaning”	  toward	  a	  
recognition	  that	  such	  “meaning”	  has	  an	  actual	  bearing	  on	  his	  or	  her	  daily	  experience.	  	  Far	  
from	  merely	  providing	  fodder	  for	  academics,	  literature	  for	  Warren	  is	  an	  important	  cultural	  
means	  of	  relating	  otherwise	  abstract	  metaphysical	  truth	  with	  an	  individual’s	  daily	  life.	  	  
Granted,	  Warren	  does	  not	  explicitly	  speak	  out	  against	  the	  error	  of	  seeing	  literature	  as	  the	  
exclusive	  province	  of	  the	  academic	  institution	  and	  thus	  removing	  it	  from	  its	  primary	  place	  
in	  the	  experience	  of	  its	  wider	  readership,	  but	  one	  can	  see	  how	  such	  a	  proposition	  is	  implicit	  
in	  his	  criticism.	  	  	  
	  
	  16	  
Such	  a	  proposition	  is	  explicit,	  however,	  in	  Wendell	  Berry’s	  writing.	  	  Consider	  this	  
passage	  from	  his	  1987	  essay	  “Writer	  and	  Region”:	  
To	  assume	  that	  the	  context	  of	  literature	  is	  ‘the	  literary	  world’	  is,	  I	  believe,	  
simply	  wrong.	  	  That	  its	  real	  habitat	  is	  the	  household	  and	  the	  community—
that	  it	  can	  and	  does	  affect,	  even	  in	  practical	  ways,	  the	  life	  of	  a	  place—may	  not	  
be	  recognized	  by	  most	  theorists	  and	  critics	  for	  a	  while	  yet.	  	  But	  they	  will	  
finally	  come	  to	  it,	  because	  finally	  they	  will	  have	  to.	  	  And	  when	  they	  do,	  they	  
will	  renew	  the	  study	  of	  literature	  and	  restore	  it	  to	  importance.	  	  (What	  84)	  
While	  these	  statements	  do	  come	  from	  a	  time	  when	  the	  New	  Historicism	  was	  gaining	  
prominence	  in	  the	  academy,	  Berry’s	  remarks	  here	  seem	  to	  be	  aimed	  at	  the	  New	  Critical	  
establishment.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  New	  Historicist	  claim,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  standardized,	  is	  that	  
literature	  has	  political	  implications	  outside	  of	  the	  “literary	  world”	  of	  the	  New	  Critical	  
establishment,	  and	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  literary	  scholarship	  should	  be	  to	  examine	  these	  
implications.	  	  
But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  Berry	  is	  up	  to	  something	  very	  different	  here	  
than	  the	  New	  Historicists.	  	  The	  New	  Historicists,	  at	  first	  glance	  at	  least,	  may	  agree	  that	  
literature	  “can	  and	  does	  affect,	  even	  in	  practical	  ways,	  the	  life	  of	  a	  place”	  if	  such	  a	  statement	  
can	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  literature,	  like	  all	  other	  material	  artifacts	  or	  “texts,”	  participates	  
in	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  complex	  of	  human	  power	  structures	  and	  is	  on	  those	  grounds	  a	  worthy	  
subject	  for	  study.	  	  In	  this	  view,	  literature	  either	  affects	  the	  life	  of	  a	  place	  in	  ways	  that	  
rehearse	  or	  reinforce	  oppressive	  power	  structures	  or	  in	  ways	  that	  challenge	  those	  power	  
structures.	  	  As	  I	  shall	  explore	  in	  depth	  later,	  though,	  in	  Berry’s	  view	  the	  word	  place	  has	  
definite	  teleological	  implications.	  	  This	  means	  that	  when	  he	  says	  that	  literature	  “can	  and	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does	  affect,	  even	  in	  practical	  ways,	  the	  life	  of	  a	  place”	  he	  means	  that	  literature	  helps	  
humans	  understand	  their	  role(s)	  within	  their	  place(s).	  	  For	  Berry	  these	  roles	  and	  these	  
places	  may	  indeed	  have	  political	  implications,	  but	  beyond	  that	  they	  have	  metaphysical	  
implications,	  implications	  which	  the	  New	  Historicists	  are	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  discuss.	  
Of	  course,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Berry	  and	  the	  party-­‐line	  
materialist	  New	  Historicist	  could	  quickly	  devolve	  into	  a	  chicken-­‐or-­‐the-­‐egg	  scenario.	  	  Berry	  
is	  apt	  to	  be	  as	  unsatisfied	  with	  limiting	  discussions	  of	  literature	  to	  what	  it	  tells	  us	  about	  
existing	  power	  structures	  as	  he	  is	  with	  limiting	  discussions	  of	  literary	  form	  to	  the	  
conventions	  of	  literary	  form.	  	  And	  what	  Berry	  sees	  as	  a	  metaphysical	  grounding	  for	  his	  
thought	  about	  the	  teleology	  of	  the	  human	  and	  the	  role	  of	  literature	  the	  New	  Historicist	  
would	  mark	  as	  yet	  another	  potentially	  or	  actually	  oppressive	  human	  power	  structure.	  	  To	  
escape	  such	  a	  frustrating	  and	  seemingly	  insoluble	  tension,	  or	  perhaps	  to	  look	  at	  it	  in	  a	  
different	  light,	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  question:	  which	  approach	  to	  literary	  study	  is	  practically	  
better?	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  which	  approach—the	  current	  politicized	  materialist	  approach	  or	  
Warren’s	  and	  Berry’s	  metaphysics-­‐based	  approach—most	  successfully	  illuminates	  
literature’s	  relevance	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  general	  reading	  public?	  	  	  
I	  assert	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  more	  satisfying	  approach	  and	  that	  examining	  Warren’s	  
and	  Berry’s	  approaches	  to	  literary	  scholarship	  will	  show	  how.	  	  While	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  
Cleanth	  Brooks	  and	  his	  fellow	  party-­‐line	  New	  Critics	  may	  have	  intended	  their	  close-­‐
reading-­‐only	  approach	  as	  a	  way	  to	  give	  the	  general	  reading	  public	  a	  way	  to	  understand	  and	  
apply	  literary	  “meaning”	  to	  their	  individual	  lives,	  they	  only	  get	  half	  of	  the	  way	  toward	  truly	  
useful	  criticism	  by	  refusing	  to	  highlight	  the	  necessary	  relationship	  between	  literary	  
meaning	  and	  metaphysical	  truth	  and	  by	  avoiding	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  that	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relationship.	  	  Warren	  and	  Berry,	  then,	  succeed	  where	  the	  New	  Critics	  fail	  by	  refusing	  to	  
view	  literature	  as	  something	  separate	  from	  truth	  or	  practical	  consequence.	  	  	  
In	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow,	  I	  examine	  each	  writer’s	  work	  individually,	  tracing	  first	  
his	  metaphysical	  vision,	  then	  showing	  how	  his	  view	  of	  literature	  builds	  off	  of	  his	  
metaphysics,	  and	  finally	  examining	  his	  own	  fiction	  and	  poetry	  in	  light	  of	  his	  metaphysical	  
and	  literary	  theory.	  	  The	  first	  chapter	  on	  Warren	  shows	  how	  his	  humanistic	  metaphysics	  
centers	  around	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  human	  self	  in	  relation	  to	  history,	  Warren’s	  version	  
of	  Gardner’s	  “humanity	  grandiosely	  conceived,”	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  human	  community	  
based	  on	  shared	  values.	  	  It	  then	  traces	  the	  maturation	  of	  his	  literary	  theory	  toward	  a	  
practical	  view	  of	  form	  as	  an	  aid	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  authentic	  self	  and	  examines	  Warren’s	  
famous	  novel	  All	  the	  King’s	  Men	  and	  his	  acclaimed	  poem	  “The	  Leaf”	  as	  exemplars	  of	  this	  
metaphysically-­‐minded	  formalism.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  on	  Berry	  discusses	  his	  embrace	  
of	  a	  religious	  metaphysics	  that	  views	  creation	  as	  divinely	  ordered	  and	  humans	  as	  
accountable	  to	  their	  place	  within	  that	  order.	  	  It	  then	  gives	  his	  view	  of	  literature	  as	  an	  
element	  of	  culture	  meant	  to	  preserve	  the	  human	  place,	  both	  in	  a	  divinely-­‐ordered	  
hierarchy	  and	  within	  a	  physical	  geography,	  and	  demonstrates	  Berry’s	  own	  practice	  of	  this	  
function	  in	  his	  novel	  Remembering	  and	  collection	  of	  poems	  titled	  The	  Wheel.	  	  My	  aim	  in	  
presenting	  these	  writers	  in	  this	  light	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  conversations	  
about	  literature	  that	  take	  questions	  of	  metaphysics	  seriously.	  	  Such	  conversations,	  I	  argue,	  
will	  sharpen	  our	  sense	  of	  why	  we	  read	  literature,	  what	  it	  has	  to	  offer,	  and,	  therefore,	  why	  
and	  how	  we	  should	  study	  it.	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Chapter	  1:	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren’s	  Humanistic	  Literary	  Vision	  
In	  a	  1975	  interview	  titled	  “A	  Conversation	  with	  Cleanth	  Brooks,”	  Robert	  Penn	  
Warren	  and	  his	  long-­‐time	  friend	  engage	  in	  a	  poignant	  exchange	  over	  both	  men’s	  deep	  
concern	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  human	  community,	  which	  they	  differentiate	  from	  “mere	  
society,”	  in	  the	  thoroughly	  modernized	  late	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Both	  seem	  to	  agree	  that,	  at	  
least	  historically,	  all	  thriving	  communities	  have	  had	  the	  benefit	  of	  unifying	  “common	  loves	  
and	  hates,”	  or	  shared	  values,	  which	  grow	  out	  of,	  in	  the	  terms	  I	  have	  laid	  out	  so	  far,	  a	  
metaphysics—a	  shared	  vision	  of	  what	  is	  true.	  	  But	  the	  men	  come	  to	  a	  point	  where,	  despite	  
their	  obvious	  agreement	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  ideas,	  they	  must	  acknowledge	  an	  important	  
disagreement	  between	  them—namely,	  that	  Brooks	  is,	  in	  Warren’s	  words,	  “a	  [Christian]	  
communicant	  and	  a	  believer,”	  and	  that	  Warren	  is	  not	  (72).	  
“A	  person	  like	  me,	  who	  is	  not	  [a	  believer]	  but	  who	  finds	  in	  Christianity	  the	  deepest	  
and	  widest	  metaphor	  for	  life,	  might	  be	  described	  as	  a	  yearner,”	  Warren	  says,	  later	  
elaborating	  by	  admitting,	  “my	  whole	  instinct	  is	  to	  try	  to	  find,	  I	  suppose,	  the	  Christian	  values	  
in	  terms	  of	  humanistic	  action,	  or	  action	  based	  on	  humanistic	  means,	  even	  naturalistic	  
means.”	  	  Warren	  here	  puts	  himself	  in	  a	  camp	  of	  intellectuals	  that	  he	  has	  described	  as	  
believing	  “that	  we	  must	  find	  some	  equivalent	  to	  Christianity,	  some	  sense	  of	  mission	  that	  
rests	  upon	  a	  naturalistic	  and	  humanistic	  base.	  	  Unified	  by	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  mission,	  modern	  
men	  might	  attain	  to	  community	  once	  more	  and	  be,	  not	  a	  mere	  society,	  but	  a	  functioning	  
community”	  (72).	  	  Warren	  demonstrates	  here,	  as	  he	  states	  later,	  that	  the	  line	  between	  the	  
believer	  and	  the	  skeptic	  need	  not	  be	  as	  strongly	  drawn	  as	  some	  might	  think.	  	  “There	  are	  
many	  people	  whose	  religious	  sense	  is	  so	  absorbed	  in	  their	  lives	  that	  it’s	  not	  visible	  to	  the	  
naked	  eye,	  yet	  the	  behavior	  of	  such	  people	  may	  be	  totally	  that	  of	  a	  religious	  man.	  	  Such	  a	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person	  recognizes	  values	  that	  can	  only	  be	  arrived	  at	  by	  faith—cosmic	  values,	  shall	  we	  say”	  
(81).	  
	   Thus,	  Warren,	  the	  agnostic,	  acknowledges	  that,	  while	  he	  cannot	  admit	  belief	  in	  a	  
divine	  reality,	  he	  does	  believe	  in	  a	  human	  reality	  that	  he	  finds	  is	  not	  incommensurable	  with	  
the	  claims	  of	  the	  Christian	  religion.	  	  He	  even	  seems	  to	  go	  so	  far	  to	  say	  that	  he	  finds	  that	  his	  
humanistic	  metaphysics,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  thinking	  about	  human	  action,	  are	  very	  
similar	  to	  Christian	  metaphysics.	  	  This	  becomes	  clear	  when,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  above	  cited	  
passage,	  he	  remarks	  to	  Brooks	  that	  “you	  and	  I	  might	  go	  very	  different	  ways	  at	  this	  point”	  
but	  then	  quickly	  backtracks,	  saying,	  “Well,	  probably	  not	  different	  ways	  in	  action,	  though	  
that	  is	  possible.	  	  I’m	  not	  even	  sure	  that	  we	  would	  go	  such	  different	  ways	  in	  our	  thinking”	  
(72).	  
	   All	  of	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  though	  Warren	  is	  careful	  to	  qualify	  and	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  
metaphysical	  vision,	  such	  a	  vision	  is	  still	  present	  and	  is	  evident	  throughout	  his	  writing.	  	  I	  
take	  his	  comment	  that	  he	  finds	  Christianity	  to	  provide	  “the	  deepest	  and	  widest	  metaphor	  
for	  life”	  to	  suggest	  that	  he	  finds	  much	  common	  ground	  with	  Christianity,	  on	  a	  metaphorical	  
level,	  as,	  to	  again	  borrow	  John	  Gardner’s	  definition	  of	  metaphysics,	  “a	  coherent,	  convincing,	  
necessary	  system	  of	  general	  ideas	  and	  feelings	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  every	  element	  of	  our	  
experience	  is	  illuminated”	  (171).	  	  It	  only	  makes	  sense,	  after	  all,	  that	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  there	  
is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  truth—or	  Truth,	  as	  Warren	  often	  speaks	  of	  it	  in	  his	  poetic	  voice—
divergent	  perspectives	  on	  it,	  such	  as	  Warren’s	  and	  Brooks’s,	  may	  agree	  to	  some—and	  
perhaps	  a	  large—degree.	  	  And	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  Warren’s	  unmistakable	  devotion	  to	  
truth	  as	  such	  in	  his	  work	  leads	  him	  to	  conclusions	  about	  humanity	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  
Christianity’s	  and	  other	  religions’	  teachings.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  throughout	  his	  work	  he	  maintains	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a	  principled	  doubt	  in	  the	  compatibility	  of	  traditional	  religion	  with	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  But	  
his	  thought	  does	  maintain	  some,	  though	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  force	  and	  robustness	  of	  a	  religious	  
metaphysics	  in	  its	  tireless	  devotion	  to	  connecting	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  truth	  to	  human	  action,	  to	  
connecting	  abstract	  theory	  with	  concrete	  practice.	  	  
Community,	  History,	  and	  the	  Self:	  Warren’s	  Humanistic	  Metaphysics	  
Indeed,	  one	  result	  of	  Warren’s	  yearning	  towards	  metaphysics	  is	  that	  good	  and	  evil,	  
though	  certainly	  not	  as	  neatly	  definable	  to	  him	  as	  they	  are	  to	  many	  religious	  people,	  are	  
nevertheless,	  like	  truth,	  real—and	  not	  merely	  relative—categories	  for	  him.	  	  Harold	  Bloom	  
has	  rightly	  noted	  that	  “[a]	  secularized	  conviction	  of	  sin,	  guilt,	  and	  error	  is	  an	  obsessive	  
strand	  in	  all	  of	  Warren’s	  work,	  and	  for	  him	  it	  helps	  constitute	  a	  stance	  which	  is	  more	  than	  
rhetorical”	  (Introduction	  10).	  	  Along	  these	  lines,	  I	  see	  Warren	  finding	  much	  to	  agree	  with	  
John	  Gardner’s	  statement	  that	  “To	  say	  that	  by	  the	  Good	  a	  human	  being	  can	  mean	  only	  the	  
human	  good	  .	  .	  .	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Good	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  opinion”	  (137).	  	  Indeed,	  as	  T.R.	  
Hummer	  has	  noted,	  even	  if	  Warren	  rejects	  the	  “hand-­‐me-­‐me-­‐down	  morality”	  that	  he	  
praises	  Katherine	  Anne	  Porter	  for	  eschewing	  in	  his	  essay	  “Irony	  with	  a	  Center,”	  he	  still	  
believes	  that	  humans	  are	  capable	  of	  ethical	  knowledge	  through	  intellectual	  
“discrimination”	  that	  takes	  a	  “dialectical	  approach”	  and,	  thus,	  “[exercises]	  as	  much	  of	  the	  
human	  faculty	  as	  possible”	  (qtd.	  in	  Hummer	  168).	  	  This	  “dialectical	  approach,”	  as	  I	  shall	  
discuss	  at	  length	  later,	  involves	  the	  individual	  acting	  out	  of	  a	  deep	  and	  ongoing	  engagement	  
with	  his	  or	  her	  place	  in	  the	  human	  community	  across	  time.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  Democracy	  and	  
Poetry	  (1975),	  the	  expanded	  version	  of	  his	  1974	  Jefferson	  Lecture,	  Warren	  argues	  against	  
the	  idea	  that	  individual	  “authenticity”	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  supreme	  ethical	  reference	  point,	  
saying,	  “‘Authenticity’	  is	  merely	  one	  of	  the	  two	  poles	  of	  action,	  and	  the	  other	  pole	  is	  a	  sense	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of	  objective	  standards”	  (47).	  	  Good	  and	  evil	  for	  Warren,	  while	  not	  absolute	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
carrying	  the	  ultimate	  authority	  of	  divine	  revelation,	  are	  objective	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  humans	  
are,	  in	  fact,	  capable	  of	  arriving	  at	  ethical	  judgments	  that	  transcend	  the	  individual’s	  
propensities	  by	  engaging	  in	  a	  rigorous	  pursuit	  of	  the	  truth	  that	  judges	  particular	  situations	  
against	  the	  whole	  of	  human	  experience.	  	  	  
	   This	  is	  why	  history—the	  human	  attempt	  to	  grapple	  with	  and	  understand	  the	  sum	  
total	  of	  human	  action—is	  ultimately	  Warren’s	  metaphysical	  and,	  consequently,	  ethical	  
authority.	  	  In	  “The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past”	  (1977),	  Warren	  argues	  that	  instead	  of	  evaluating	  
ourselves	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  	  “progress,”	  which	  he	  asserts	  that	  we	  too	  often	  view	  as	  an	  
“objective,	  self-­‐propelling	  power,	  which	  we	  then	  take	  to	  be	  automatically	  beneficient—or,	  if	  
we	  need	  an	  alibi,	  maleficent,”	  Warren	  insists	  that	  the	  best	  principle	  for	  judgment	  is	  the	  past.	  	  
For	  Warren,	  the	  past,	  by	  which	  he	  means	  the	  human	  past,	  is	  “a	  sort	  of	  measuring	  rod	  for	  
our	  achievements—how	  great	  and	  how	  little”	  (New	  45).	  	  Indeed,	  Warren	  asserts	  that	  
proper	  judgments	  of	  human	  action—even	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual—should	  involve	  a	  
consideration	  of	  human	  action	  in	  the	  past.	  	  “The	  past	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	  great	  pantheon	  where	  
we	  can	  all	  find	  the	  bearers	  of	  the	  values	  by	  which	  we	  could	  live,”	  he	  says	  (50).	  
	   He	  is	  quick	  to	  acknowledge,	  though,	  that	  our	  relationship	  with	  the	  past	  should	  not	  
involve	  mere	  unquestioning	  acceptance	  of	  the	  beliefs	  of	  forebears—mere	  “hand-­‐me-­‐down	  
morality.”	  	  Instead,	  the	  past	  is	  a	  mass	  of	  examples	  toward	  which	  and	  against	  which	  we	  must	  
define	  ourselves.	  	  And	  this	  definition	  is	  what	  Warren	  calls	  history:	  	  
[I]n	  a	  way,	  [the	  past]	  ‘gives’	  us	  nothing.	  	  We	  must	  earn	  what	  we	  get	  there.	  	  
The	  past	  must	  be	  studied,	  worked	  at—in	  short,	  created.	  	  For	  the	  past,	  like	  the	  
present,	  is	  fluid.	  	  History,	  the	  articulated	  past	  .	  .	  .	  is	  forever	  being	  rethought,	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refelt,	  rewritten,	  not	  merely	  as	  rigor	  or	  luck	  turns	  up	  new	  facts	  but	  as	  new	  
patterns	  emerge,	  as	  new	  understandings	  develop,	  and	  as	  we	  experience	  new	  
needs	  and	  new	  questions.	  	  There	  is	  no	  absolute,	  positive	  past	  available	  to	  us,	  
no	  matter	  how	  rigorously	  we	  strive	  to	  determine	  it—as	  strive	  we	  must.	  	  
Inevitably,	  the	  past,	  so	  far	  as	  we	  know	  it,	  is	  an	  inference,	  a	  creation,	  and	  this,	  
without	  being	  paradoxical,	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  its	  chief	  value	  for	  us.	  	  In	  creating	  
an	  image	  of	  the	  past,	  we	  create	  ourselves,	  and	  without	  that	  task	  of	  creating	  
the	  past	  we	  might	  be	  said	  scarcely	  to	  exist.	  	  Without	  it,	  we	  sink	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
a	  protoplasmic	  swarm.	  	  (New	  51)	  
To	  say	  that	  any	  understanding	  of	  the	  past—any	  “history”—is	  necessarily	  “created”	  and	  
therefore	  that	  “no	  positive,	  absolute	  past”	  is	  available	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  past	  is	  merely	  
relative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  no	  serious	  or	  enduring	  conclusions	  regarding	  human	  good	  can	  be	  
arrived	  at	  by	  careful	  study.	  	  After	  all,	  while	  he	  admits	  that	  “new	  patterns”	  and	  “new	  
understandings”	  of	  the	  past	  may	  emerge	  in	  response	  to	  “new	  needs	  and	  new	  questions,”	  
Warren	  still	  insists	  that	  deriving	  value	  from	  the	  past	  is	  something	  earned,	  not	  merely	  taken	  
out	  of	  convenience.	  	  Choosing	  from	  the	  pantheon	  of	  the	  past	  involves	  a	  rigorous	  search	  for	  
the	  truth	  of	  the	  past—the	  whole	  truth	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  admirable	  and	  
reprehensible	  elements	  of	  individuals	  and	  whole	  societies—and	  not	  a	  mere	  choice	  of	  a	  
great	  figure	  for	  convenience’s	  sake.	  	  That	  the	  absolute	  truth	  of	  the	  past	  as	  such	  is	  ultimately	  
out	  of	  the	  reach	  of	  humans	  is	  not	  a	  relativistic	  stance	  for	  Warren,	  for	  he	  holds	  that	  humans	  
ought	  to	  seek	  it	  anyway,	  and	  that	  they	  can,	  in	  fact,	  reach	  it	  partially.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  he	  is	  very	  
much	  like	  the	  orthodox	  Christian	  (and	  no	  doubt	  the	  believer	  of	  numerous	  other	  faiths)	  that	  
holds	  that	  God—the	  ultimate	  Truth—is	  transcendent	  and	  ineffable	  and,	  therefore,	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knowable	  only	  in	  a	  limited	  sense.	  	  Indeed,	  one	  could	  find	  much	  common	  ground	  between	  
Warren’s	  view	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  past	  and	  Eliot’s	  insistence	  (and	  Berry’s	  later	  adoption	  of	  
it6)	  that	  “You	  must	  go	  by	  a	  way	  which	  is	  the	  way	  of	  ignorance”	  (Four	  29).	  	  In	  short,	  the	  past	  
for	  Warren	  is,	  in	  fact,	  absolute,	  for	  it	  happened.	  	  History,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  not	  absolute	  
in	  that	  it	  is	  human	  understanding	  of	  the	  past.	  	  It	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  capacity	  of	  human	  
understanding	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  evidence,	  which	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  useless	  or	  that	  
we	  cannot	  draw	  efficacious	  and	  lasting	  conclusions	  from	  it.	  
	   Warren’s	  view	  of	  history	  thus	  constitutes	  a	  humanistic	  metaphysics	  in	  that	  it	  posits	  
history	  as	  a	  legitimate	  means	  of	  understanding	  human	  truth.	  	  And	  this	  view	  is	  not	  
idiosyncratic.	  	  John	  Lukács,	  in	  Historical	  Consciousness,	  written	  not	  ten	  years	  before	  “The	  
Use	  of	  the	  Past,”	  argues	  that	  historical	  thought	  can	  and	  should	  replace	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
positivist	  science	  as	  the	  Western	  world’s	  guiding	  philosophy.	  	  Like	  Warren,	  Lukács	  defines	  
history	  as	  the	  “remembered	  past”	  and	  notes	  that,	  as	  such,	  it	  is	  necessarily	  limited	  by	  the	  
capacity	  of	  human	  memory	  and,	  therefore,	  necessarily	  “incomplete	  and	  unsystematic”	  (9,	  
264).	  	  Still,	  he	  insists,	  history	  can	  and	  should	  serve	  as	  “a	  kind	  of	  philosophy	  made	  up	  by	  
examples”—examples	  of	  “ever	  recurrent	  human	  problems	  incarnated	  by	  ever	  different	  
human	  beings”	  (268,	  35).	  	  By	  engaging	  in	  “the	  constant,	  the	  frequent	  rethinking	  of	  the	  past,”	  
Lukács	  argues,	  we	  can	  arrive	  at	  a	  qualitative,	  human	  truth	  that	  both	  different	  from	  and	  
better	  than	  the	  abstract,	  quantitative	  truth	  offered	  by	  positivist	  science	  (35).	  	  	  Indeed,	  he	  
claims	  that	  a	  historical	  philosophy	  “concenrat[es]	  on	  the	  historicity	  of	  problems	  and	  events,	  
assuming	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  human	  nature	  anew,	  presenting	  no	  new	  definitions,	  no	  freshly	  
jigsawed	  categories,	  emphasizing	  the	  existential—and	  not	  merely	  philosophical—primacy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  cf.	  The	  Way	  of	  Ignorance.	  	  Berkeley:	  Counterpoint,	  2005.	  
	  
	  25	  
of	  truth”	  (267).	  	  Like	  Warren,	  Lukács	  argues	  that	  by	  viewing	  human	  thought	  and	  behavior	  
and	  achievement	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  historicity—their	  relation	  to	  examples	  of	  past	  thought,	  
behavior,	  achievement—one	  can	  know	  human	  truth	  and	  determine	  a	  sound	  human	  ethics.	  	  
Indeed,	  Lukács,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  Gardner’s	  humanistic	  concept	  of	  the	  “universe”	  as	  
“humanity	  grandiosely	  conceived,”	  argues	  that	  historical	  thinking	  gives	  us	  a	  “historical	  
cosmology”	  that	  recognizes	  that	  while	  “the	  earth	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  at	  the	  mathematical	  
center	  of	  some	  universe	  .	  .	  .	  it	  is	  the	  center	  of	  our	  universe”	  (269).	  	  And	  our	  universe—the	  
human	  universe—is	  knowable	  through	  history:	  “Aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  human	  
intellect	  but	  aware,	  too,	  of	  the	  superb	  imaginative	  powers	  of	  mind,	  knowing	  our	  smallness	  
and	  yet	  our	  situation	  in	  the	  center	  of	  our	  historical	  universe,	  understanding	  our	  inevitable	  
participation	  in	  this	  universe,	  we	  are	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  conscious	  of	  the	  historical	  
reality	  of	  our	  existence	  in	  the	  world”	  (267).	  	  	  
	   While	  Warren’s	  view	  of	  the	  prospect	  of	  history	  as	  a	  humanistic	  metaphysics	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  may	  not	  be	  as	  optimistic	  as	  Lukács’s,	  he	  nevertheless	  shares	  
many	  of	  Lukács’s	  assumptions	  about	  the	  ability	  to	  find	  human	  truth	  through	  historical	  
thinking.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  his	  later	  works,	  he	  works	  out	  the	  teleological	  implications	  of	  Lukács’s	  
recognition	  of	  “our	  situation	  in	  the	  center	  of	  our	  historical	  universe”	  and	  our	  resulting	  
“inevitable	  participation	  in	  this	  universe.”	  	  When	  Warren	  calls	  the	  past	  the	  “great	  
pantheon”	  of	  “the	  bearers	  of	  the	  values	  by	  which	  we	  could	  live,”	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  elaborate	  by	  
saying	  that	  the	  past	  “gives	  us	  the	  image	  of	  a	  community	  and	  of	  a	  role,	  an	  identity,	  within	  
that	  community,	  the	  image	  of	  a	  self	  to	  be	  achieved”	  (New	  50).	  	  And	  the	  term	  “self”	  for	  
Warren,	  as	  I	  hinted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  to	  understanding	  both	  
his	  metaphysics	  and	  his	  literary	  criticism.	  	  It	  is	  the	  term	  he	  uses	  for	  the	  human	  individual	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living	  what	  might	  be	  called,	  in	  old-­‐fashioned	  terms,	  “the	  good	  life.”	  	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  
human	  thinking,	  living,	  and	  acting	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  a	  human	  should	  think,	  live,	  and	  act—
fulfilling	  the	  telos	  of	  the	  human.	  	  	  
	   Warren	  gives	  his	  most	  thorough	  definition	  of	  “the	  self”	  in	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  
which	  he	  revised	  into	  two	  essays:	  “America	  and	  the	  Diminished	  Self”	  and	  “Poetry	  and	  
Selfhood.”	  	  In	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	  book,	  he	  succinctly	  defines	  the	  “self”	  as	  “in	  
individuation,	  the	  felt	  principle	  of	  significant	  unity,”	  elaborating	  as	  follows:	  
By	  felt	  I	  mean	  that	  I	  am	  here	  concerned,	  not	  with	  a	  theoretical	  analysis	  as	  
such,	  but	  with	  what	  a	  more	  or	  less	  aware	  individual	  may	  experience	  as	  his	  
own	  self-­‐hood,	  and	  what	  he	  assumes	  about	  other	  individuals.	  	  By	  significant	  I	  
mean	  two	  things:	  continuity—the	  self	  as	  a	  development	  in	  time,	  with	  a	  past	  
and	  a	  future;	  and	  responsibility—the	  self	  as	  a	  moral	  identity,	  recognizing	  
itself	  as	  capable	  of	  action	  worthy	  of	  praise	  or	  blame.	  	  (xii-­‐xiii)	  
As	  I	  mentioned	  early	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  self	  for	  Warren	  is	  a	  human	  individual	  who	  
maintains	  a	  coherent	  relationship	  with	  the	  human	  past—history—and	  the	  human	  
present—his	  or	  her	  relation	  to	  other	  human	  selves,	  or,	  community.	  	  A	  relationship	  with	  the	  
past	  shows	  the	  self	  that	  humans	  have	  acted	  in	  ways	  “worthy	  of	  praise	  or	  blame”—judged	  
by	  actual	  ethical	  categories—and	  that,	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  too	  is	  capable	  of	  such	  action	  in	  its	  
community	  with	  other	  selves.	  	  Indeed,	  he	  later	  remarks	  that	  “if	  there	  is	  no	  past	  there	  can	  be	  
no	  self,”	  for	  “a	  society	  with	  no	  sense	  of	  the	  past,	  with	  no	  sense	  of	  the	  human	  role	  as	  
significant	  not	  merely	  in	  experiencing	  history	  but	  in	  creating	  it	  can	  have	  no	  sense	  of	  
destiny”	  (56).	  	  A	  sense	  of	  the	  past—a	  “historical	  consciousness,”	  in	  Lukács’s	  terms—gives	  
the	  individual	  a	  coherent	  sense	  of	  its	  own	  teleological	  significance	  and	  turns	  its	  attention	  to	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how	  its	  actions	  are	  fitting	  in	  its	  community.	  	  Thus,	  Warren’s	  concept	  of	  “selfhood,”	  although	  
it	  does	  deal	  with	  humans	  in	  “individuation”	  is	  drastically	  different	  from	  individualism.	  	  
Indeed,	  he	  makes	  this	  distinction	  himself:	  “the	  prime	  example	  of	  individualism,	  the	  man	  of	  
will	  who	  says	  ‘I	  please	  myself,’	  is	  the	  victim	  of	  the	  last	  illusion:	  he	  can	  have	  no	  self.	  	  Why?	  	  
Because	  the	  true	  self,	  among	  the	  many	  varieties	  of	  fictive	  selves,	  can	  develop	  only	  in	  a	  vital	  
relation	  between	  the	  unitary	  person	  and	  the	  group”	  (25).	  	  So	  the	  term	  “self”	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  
conflated	  with	  the	  term	  “individual.”	  Indeed,	  Warren	  later	  asserts,	  in	  analogy	  to	  his	  claim	  
that	  authenticity	  and	  objective	  standards	  are	  two	  poles	  of	  human	  action,	  that	  “the	  
individual	  is	  one	  pole	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  the	  other,	  society,	  or	  more	  specifically,	  
community”	  (47).	  	  	  
In	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  Warren	  thus	  delivers	  on	  the	  mission	  he	  states	  in	  “A	  
Conversation	  with	  Cleanth	  Brooks”	  (not	  coincidentally,	  I	  think,	  published	  in	  the	  same	  year),	  
namely,	  a	  way	  to	  assert	  a	  set	  of	  values	  on	  which	  community	  can	  be	  built,	  previously	  given	  
in	  religious	  terms,	  in	  humanistic	  terms.	  	  Indeed,	  Warren	  succinctly	  notes	  that	  what	  he	  
envisions—and	  what	  he	  acknowledges	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  in	  contemporary	  
society—is	  “a	  community	  of	  individual	  selves	  bound	  together	  by	  common	  feelings,	  ideals,	  
and	  conceptions	  of	  responsibility”	  (45).	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  issue	  that	  arises	  here	  is	  how	  this	  
conception	  of	  community	  would	  account	  for	  diversity	  of	  thought.	  	  What	  about	  those	  who	  
do	  not	  share	  the	  “feelings,	  ideals,	  and	  conceptions	  of	  responsibility”	  of	  the	  community?	  	  We	  
can	  begin	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  by	  noting	  that	  Warren’s	  view	  of	  community	  is	  a	  
democratic	  one.	  	  He	  remarks,	  referencing	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  that	  the	  “basis	  of	  liberty”	  is	  “a	  
variety	  of	  character	  and	  the	  chance	  for	  human	  nature	  to	  expand	  in	  different	  and	  even	  
contradictory	  directions”	  (45).	  	  So	  there	  is	  latitude,	  in	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  communally-­‐
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coherent	  and	  morally-­‐responsible	  self,	  for	  differences	  of	  opinion	  that	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  
violation	  of	  selfhood.	  	  One	  could	  imagine	  members	  of	  multiple	  religious,	  philosophical,	  or	  
ethnic	  groups	  fitting	  in	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  community.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  Warren	  is	  working	  against	  
is	  not	  a	  diverse	  populace	  but	  rather	  a	  “society	  that	  is	  merely	  a	  mechanism	  for	  satisfying	  
man’s	  physical	  needs	  and	  keeping	  order”	  (45).	  	  Still,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  kind	  of	  
consensus	  Warren	  insists	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  society	  to	  become	  a	  community	  is	  possible	  
given	  the	  level	  of	  multifarious	  disagreement	  even	  just	  within	  the	  United	  States	  remains	  
open.	  	  The	  only	  answer	  Warren’s	  view	  can	  give	  is	  that	  if	  humans	  should	  devote	  themselves	  
to	  knowing	  the	  truth—at	  least	  the	  human	  truth	  we	  know	  from	  history	  and	  the	  apparent	  
moral	  responsibility	  of	  human	  action—we	  have	  reason	  to	  hope	  that	  a	  meaningful	  
consensus	  may	  develop.	  	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  position	  of	  faith.	  
Still,	  even	  those	  who	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  community	  as	  Warren	  describes	  it	  is	  the	  
teleological	  goal	  of	  human	  selfhood	  may	  have	  problems	  with	  its	  presentation	  in	  Democracy	  
and	  Poetry.	  	  Since	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry	  is	  specifically	  directed	  at	  American	  society	  and	  
American	  poetry,	  the	  objection	  could	  be	  raised	  that	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  society	  is	  far	  too	  
large	  to	  act	  as	  a	  community.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  smaller	  communities	  based	  
around	  more	  immediate	  commitments,	  such	  as	  religion,	  politics,	  or	  place,	  may	  help	  foster	  
the	  “common	  feelings,	  ideals,	  and	  conceptions	  of	  responsibility”	  Warren	  is	  after	  more	  
effectively.	  	  Wendell	  Berry,	  as	  I	  shall	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  would	  certainly	  be	  of	  this	  
mind.	  	  Nevertheless,	  while	  Warren	  does	  not	  address	  a	  need	  for	  smaller,	  more	  organic,	  or	  
more	  focused	  communities	  in	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  he	  does	  indicate	  that	  he	  values	  them	  
elsewhere.	  	  His	  1964	  novel	  Flood,	  for	  instance,	  centers	  around	  its	  protagonist	  Bradwell	  
Tolliver’s	  return	  to	  his	  hometown	  of	  Fiddlersburg,	  which	  is	  set	  to	  be	  flooded	  as	  part	  of	  a	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hydroelectric	  dam	  project,	  and	  thus	  explores	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  responsible	  self	  in	  a	  
small	  community	  being	  swallowed	  up	  by	  the	  larger	  society.	  	  I	  suggest,	  then,	  that	  while	  
Warren	  does	  think	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  societies	  as	  large	  as	  the	  United	  States	  to	  function	  as	  
communities,	  he	  does	  not	  see	  such	  larger	  communities	  as	  obviating	  the	  need	  for	  smaller,	  
localized	  communities.	  	  
All	  of	  this	  to	  say	  that	  Warren’s	  concept	  of	  the	  self—the	  human	  individual	  
responsible	  both	  to	  history	  and	  to	  community—is	  certainly	  not	  uncontroversial.	  	  Of	  course,	  
it	  may	  be	  that	  any	  teleological	  claim	  is	  unlikely	  to	  avoid	  controversy.	  	  I	  have	  argued,	  though,	  
that	  it	  is	  in	  answering	  the	  question	  “what	  are	  humans	  for?”	  that	  we	  may	  begin	  to	  answer	  
the	  question	  “what	  is	  literature	  for?”	  	  Perhaps	  unsurprisingly,	  Warren	  writes	  in	  the	  
Foreword	  to	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  that	  this	  second	  question	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  
concern	  of	  his	  career.	  	  “For	  all	  my	  adult	  years,	  my	  central	  and	  obsessive	  concern	  has	  been	  
with	  ‘poetry,’”	  he	  writes,	  “and	  I	  scarcely	  find	  it	  strange	  that	  I	  should	  seek	  some	  connection	  
between	  that	  concern	  and	  the	  ‘real’	  world”	  (xvi).	  	  Indeed,	  in	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry	  and,	  I	  
would	  argue	  throughout	  his	  critical	  and	  literary	  work,	  Warren’s	  project	  is	  often	  to	  define	  
the	  purpose	  of	  poetry	  in	  “real”	  life,	  which	  he	  does	  by	  connecting	  it	  to	  his	  humanistic	  
metaphysics.	  
Form	  and	  the	  Self:	  Warren’s	  Practical	  Aesthetics	  
	   Indeed,	  Warren’s	  career	  as	  a	  literary	  critic,	  or	  what	  Charlotte	  Beck	  I	  think	  rightly	  
calls	  a	  “philosopher	  of	  literature”	  (61)	  to	  me	  seems	  to	  center	  around	  various	  attempts,	  
which	  over	  time	  become	  clearer	  and	  more	  concerted,	  toward	  explaining	  the	  relation	  of	  
poetry,	  by	  which	  he	  often	  means	  literature	  as	  a	  whole	  (and	  sometimes	  expands	  to	  other	  
activities),	  to	  the	  real	  world.	  
	  
	  30	  
	   Perhaps	  his	  first	  important	  attempt	  to	  do	  this	  was	  his	  1943	  essay	  “Pure	  and	  Impure	  
Poetry,”	  where	  he	  argues	  that	  “nothing	  that	  is	  available	  in	  human	  experience	  is	  to	  be	  
legislated	  out	  of	  poetry”	  (New	  24).	  	  The	  impurities	  that	  he	  argues	  might,	  by	  one	  or	  another	  
definition	  of	  “pure	  poetry,”	  be	  legislated	  out	  of	  poetry	  include	  (but	  are	  not	  limited	  to)	  
“cacophonies,	  jagged	  rhythms,	  ugly	  words	  and	  ugly	  thoughts,	  colloquialisms,	  clichés,	  sterile	  
technical	  terms,	  headwork	  and	  argument,	  self	  contradictions,	  clevernesses,	  irony,	  
realism”—in	  short,	  he	  says,	  “all	  things	  which	  call	  us	  back	  to	  the	  world	  of	  prose	  and	  
imperfection,”	  which	  we	  might	  also	  call	  the	  “real”	  world.	  (4).	  	  Warren	  argues	  that	  the	  
mistake	  of	  the	  many	  doctrines	  of	  pure	  poetry,	  which	  he	  attributes	  to	  figures	  from	  Ben	  
Jonson	  to	  Edgar	  Allan	  Poe	  to	  the	  Symbolists,	  is	  that	  they	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  “poetry	  does	  
not	  inhere	  in	  any	  particular	  element	  but	  depends	  upon	  the	  set	  of	  relationships,	  the	  
structure,	  which	  we	  call	  the	  poem”	  (24).	  	  Warren	  is,	  of	  course,	  arguing	  the	  New	  Critical	  line	  
of	  the	  primacy	  of	  form	  in	  poetry.	  	  But	  it’s	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  here,	  and	  increasingly	  in	  
the	  work	  that	  was	  to	  follow,	  form	  for	  Warren	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  poetry	  makes	  sense,	  
for	  poet	  and	  reader	  alike,	  of	  the	  “real	  world.”	  	  	  
Indeed,	  Warren	  argues	  against	  poetry	  that	  “tries	  to	  be	  pure	  by	  excluding,	  more	  or	  
less	  rigidly,	  certain	  elements	  which	  might	  qualify	  or	  contradict	  its	  original	  impulse”	  by	  
holding	  up	  writers	  like	  Proust,	  Dreiser,	  Faulkner,	  and	  Eliot.	  	  These	  writers,	  he	  says,	  instead	  
of	  peddling	  “hand-­‐me-­‐down	  faith”	  or	  “hand-­‐me-­‐down	  ideals,”	  “have	  tried	  .	  .	  .	  to	  remain	  
faithful	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  which	  they	  are	  dealing”	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  	  
“have	  tried	  to	  define	  the	  context	  in	  which,	  and	  the	  terms	  by	  which,	  faith	  and	  ideals	  may	  be	  
earned.”	  (27-­‐8).	  	  By	  ordering	  the	  “complexities	  and	  problems”	  of	  the	  real	  world	  into	  a	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“structure”—into	  a	  form—the	  good	  poet	  makes	  faith	  and	  ideals,	  the	  province	  of	  
metaphysics,	  believable.	  	  	  
Just	  how	  form	  relates	  to	  the	  real	  world	  in	  Warren’s	  view	  is	  somewhat	  unclear	  in	  
“Pure	  and	  Impure	  Poetry”	  but	  begins	  to	  come	  into	  focus	  in	  “Knowledge	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  
Man,”	  originally	  a	  lecture	  given	  at	  a	  Columbia	  University	  conference	  on	  the	  “Unity	  of	  
Knowledge”	  in	  1954	  but	  subsequently	  published	  in	  the	  Sewanee	  Review	  in	  1955.	  	  In	  the	  
essay,	  he	  claims	  that	  “Poetry—that	  is,	  literature	  as	  a	  dimension	  of	  the	  creative	  
imagination—is	  knowledge,”	  and	  this	  knowledge,	  he	  says,	  is	  “knowledge	  of	  form”	  (190-­‐1).	  	  
He	  goes	  on	  to	  elaborate:	  
By	  this	  I	  mean	  the	  furthest	  thing	  possible	  from	  any	  doctrine	  that	  might	  go	  as	  
sheer	  formalism.	  	  I	  mean	  the	  organic	  relation	  among	  all	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  
work,	  including,	  most	  emphatically,	  those	  elements	  drawn	  from	  the	  actual	  
world	  and	  charged	  with	  all	  the	  urgencies	  of	  actuality,	  urgencies	  not	  to	  be	  
denied	  or	  transmuted	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  The	  form	  is	  a	  vision	  of	  experience,	  but	  of	  
experience	  fulfilled	  and	  redeemed	  in	  knowledge	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  thing	  
detached	  from	  the	  world	  but	  a	  thing	  springing	  from	  the	  deep	  engagement	  of	  
spirit	  with	  the	  world.	  	  (190-­‐1)	  	  
Form,	  then,	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  aesthetically	  pleasing	  arrangement	  of	  content	  from	  the	  “actual	  
world.”	  	  It	  is	  an	  ordering	  of	  experience—by	  which	  Warren	  seems	  to	  mean	  the	  individual’s	  
life	  in	  the	  “actual	  world”	  and	  all	  the	  problems,	  confusions,	  pleasure,	  pain,	  and	  joy	  that	  
comes	  with	  it—in	  a	  way	  that	  either	  gives	  meaning	  to	  or	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  latent	  within	  
that	  experience.	  	  This	  ordering	  is	  not	  arbitrary,	  if	  the	  poem	  is	  a	  good	  one,	  but	  comes	  from	  
“the	  deep	  engagement	  of	  the	  spirit	  with	  the	  world”	  and	  thus	  ultimately	  demonstrates	  the	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poet’s	  vision	  of	  the	  truth.	  	  And	  both	  the	  poet	  and	  the	  reader,	  Warren	  claims,	  have	  
everything	  to	  gain	  from	  this.	  	  	  
“[T]he	  form	  is	  known,	  by	  creator	  or	  appreciator,	  only	  by	  experiencing	  it,	  by	  
submitting	  to	  its	  characteristic	  rhythm,	  ”	  (192).	  	  The	  “rhythm”	  Warren	  speaks	  of	  is	  the	  
order	  that	  the	  poet	  achieves,	  by	  which	  “knowledge	  of	  form	  give[s]	  man	  an	  image	  of	  
himself”:	  	  
It	  does	  so	  insofar	  as	  it	  gives	  the	  image	  of	  experience	  being	  brought	  to	  order	  
and	  harmony	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  The	  rhythm	  is,	  as	  it	  were,	  a	  myth	  of	  order,	  or	  fulfillment,	  an	  
affirmation	  that	  our	  being	  may	  move	  in	  its	  totality	  toward	  meaning.	  	  The	  soul	  
faces	  some	  potentiality	  of	  experience,	  drawn	  from	  actuality,	  and	  the	  form	  is	  .	  .	  
.	  the	  abstraction	  of	  experience	  by	  imagination.	  	  The	  form	  gives	  man	  an	  image	  
of	  himself,	  for	  it	  gives	  him	  his	  mode	  of	  experiencing,	  a	  paradigm	  of	  his	  inner	  
life	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  	  And	  this	  evocation,	  confrontation,	  and	  definition	  of	  our	  deepest	  life,	  
gives	  us,	  in	  new	  self-­‐awareness,	  a	  yet	  deeper	  life	  to	  live.	  (192)	  
By	  putting	  his	  or	  her	  experience	  or	  some	  “potentiality	  of	  experience”	  into	  the	  poem,	  the	  
poet	  gives	  the	  reader	  an	  instance	  of	  experience	  rightly	  ordered,	  rightly	  understood.	  	  
Presumably,	  if,	  as	  he	  said	  in	  “Pure	  and	  Impure	  Poetry,”	  the	  poetic	  act	  done	  properly	  tries	  to	  
“define	  the	  context	  in	  which,	  and	  the	  terms	  by	  which,	  faith	  and	  ideals	  may	  be	  earned,”	  the	  
way	  of	  ordering	  life	  the	  reader	  experiences	  in	  the	  poem	  may	  be	  valuable	  precisely	  because	  
it	  references	  an	  actual,	  if	  not	  completely	  immediate,	  order	  that	  exists	  beyond	  the	  poet’s	  
experience.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ordering	  of	  experience	  in	  form	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  writer’s	  
“worldview”	  but	  something	  deeper—something	  on	  the	  level	  of	  teleology	  and	  metaphysics	  
toward	  which	  the	  poet	  strives.	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And	  through	  this	  striving	  in	  the	  forming	  of	  experience,	  poetry	  makes	  one’s	  (the	  
poet’s	  and	  the	  reader’s)	  life	  a	  “deeper	  life	  to	  live,”	  Warren	  claims,	  because	  it	  leads	  one	  
toward	  a	  life	  that	  is	  “not	  merely	  the	  life	  of	  contemplation”	  but	  a	  life	  of	  contemplation	  that	  
“prepares	  for	  the	  moment	  of	  action,	  of	  creation,	  in	  our	  world	  of	  contingency”	  (192).	  	  Poetry,	  
through	  form,	  allows	  us	  to	  get	  at	  the	  deeper	  order	  underneath	  the	  “world	  of	  contingency,”	  
which	  is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  right	  action.	  	  Thus,	  far	  from	  being	  the	  province	  of	  
admiration	  by	  aesthetes,	  poetry	  relates	  directly	  to	  action	  in	  a	  world	  of	  contingency,	  i.e.,	  the	  
“real”	  world	  we	  all	  live	  in.	  	  It	  is	  ultimately	  practical.	  
	   This	  becomes	  even	  more	  clear	  in	  Warren’s	  1962	  contribution	  to	  the	  Saturday	  
Evening	  Post,	  “Why	  Do	  We	  Read	  Fiction?”	  	  In	  fiction	  as	  in	  poetry,	  Warren	  argues,	  experience	  
of	  a	  work’s	  form	  allows	  the	  reader	  to	  exercise	  and	  develop	  the	  sympathetic	  imagination	  
through	  a	  more	  mature	  process	  of	  the	  “role	  taking”	  that	  began	  in	  childhood.	  	  This	  
imagination,	  he	  says,	  allows	  us	  to	  “know	  ‘inwardly’	  in	  the	  only	  way	  that	  finally	  counts,	  that	  
other	  people	  really	  exist	  and	  are,	  in	  fact,	  persons	  with	  needs,	  hopes,	  fears,	  and	  even	  rights”	  
(New	  59).	  	  Clearly,	  such	  a	  sympathetic	  imagination	  is	  central	  to	  practical	  ethical	  concerns,	  
and	  Warren	  says	  as	  much:	  “this	  discipline	  in	  sympathy,	  through	  the	  imaginative	  enactment	  
of	  role-­‐taking,	  gratifies	  .	  .	  .	  our	  yearning	  to	  enter	  and	  feel	  at	  ease	  in	  the	  human	  community”	  
(59).	  
But	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  “role	  taking”	  of	  reading	  fiction	  also	  contributes	  to	  
the	  reader’s	  necessary	  process	  of	  creating	  the	  “self,”	  Warren’s	  notion	  of	  the	  individual	  
reconciled	  to	  the	  responsibility	  of	  continuity	  both	  with	  the	  past	  and	  with	  the	  human	  
community	  of	  the	  present.	  	  By	  imaginatively	  taking	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  fictional	  characters,	  
Warren	  argues,	  the	  reader	  more	  or	  less	  tries	  on	  possible	  selves,	  and	  by	  experiencing	  the	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logic	  of	  those	  possible	  selves	  and	  their	  actions,	  arrives	  eventually	  at	  a	  more	  coherent	  vision	  
of	  “the	  dominant	  self,	  the	  ringmaster	  self”	  (59).	  	  “In	  having	  some	  awareness	  of	  the	  
complexity	  of	  self	  we	  are	  better	  prepared	  to	  deal	  with	  that	  self.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  our	  
entering	  into	  the	  fictional	  process	  helps	  to	  redefine	  the	  dominant	  self,	  even,	  as	  it	  were,	  to	  
re-­‐create,	  on	  a	  sounder	  basis—sounder	  because	  better	  understood—the	  dominant	  self,	  the	  
official	  ‘I,’”	  he	  writes	  (60).	  
In	  this	  entrance	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  into	  Warren’s	  thought	  on	  literature,	  I	  
argue,	  his	  claims	  before	  about	  the	  “rhythm”	  of	  the	  “spirit”	  in	  its	  “deep	  connection	  with	  the	  
world”	  come	  into	  sharper	  focus.	  	  It	  allows	  him	  to	  say	  lucidly	  later	  in	  the	  article	  that	  “[i]f	  
fiction	  begins	  in	  daydream,	  if	  it	  relieves	  us	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  being	  ourselves,	  it	  ends,	  if	  it	  
is	  good	  fiction	  and	  we	  are	  good	  readers,	  by	  returning	  us	  to	  the	  world	  and	  to	  ourselves.	  	  It	  
reconciles	  us	  with	  reality,	  or	  helps	  us	  deal	  with	  reality”	  (64).	  	  By	  giving	  us	  the	  image	  of	  
another	  person’s	  definition	  of	  his	  or	  her	  self	  against	  reality,	  including	  the	  consequences	  of	  
that	  definition,	  fiction	  in	  particular	  or	  literature	  more	  broadly	  helps	  us	  “reconcile”	  or	  “deal	  
with”	  reality	  in	  our	  own	  lives.	  	  A	  different	  way	  Warren	  puts	  it	  is	  to	  say	  that	  fiction	  gives	  the	  
reader	  a	  new	  experience	  of	  “values”:	  	  “the	  reader	  has,	  by	  imaginative	  enactment,	  lived	  
through	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  values	  become	  valuable.	  	  What	  might	  have	  been	  merely	  
an	  abstraction	  has	  become	  vital,	  has	  been	  lived,	  and	  is,	  therefore,	  ‘new’—new	  because	  
newly	  experienced.	  	  We	  can	  now	  rest	  in	  the	  value	  as	  experienced;	  we	  are	  reconciled	  in	  it;	  
and	  that	  is	  what	  counts”	  (63).	  	  I	  take	  Warren	  to	  be	  talking	  here	  about	  “values”	  that	  stem	  
from	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  from	  metaphysical	  understanding.	  	  Literature,	  then,	  
serves	  to	  make	  metaphysics	  immediate	  to	  the	  reader.	  	  Though	  metaphysical	  understanding	  
may	  be	  discursively	  given	  in	  a	  necessarily	  abstract	  way,	  the	  value	  of	  literature	  is	  that	  it	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allows	  the	  reader	  to	  experience	  it,	  though	  at	  second-­‐hand,	  in	  a	  convincingly	  ordered	  
rendering	  by	  the	  author.	  
In	  his	  later	  years,	  Warren	  continued	  to	  develop	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  and	  
literature’s	  role	  in	  relation	  to	  it	  in	  two	  important	  texts:	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry	  and	  in	  “The	  
Use	  of	  the	  Past,”	  originally	  a	  lecture	  given	  as	  a	  meditation	  on	  the	  United	  States’	  bicentennial	  
and	  subsequently	  published	  in	  1976.	  	  In	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  Warren	  expands	  his	  
argument	  that	  literature	  serves	  as	  an	  aid	  to	  self	  creation	  by	  arguing	  that	  both	  the	  content	  
and	  form	  of	  literary	  work	  lead	  the	  reader	  toward	  selfhood	  on	  different	  levels,	  with	  obvious	  
precedence	  given	  to	  the	  latter.	  	  On	  the	  level	  of	  content,	  he	  argues,	  the	  reader	  finds	  a	  
“‘model’	  of	  self	  in	  its	  adventures	  of	  selfhood”	  in	  a	  character	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  lyric	  poetry,	  
the	  speaker	  of	  a	  poem	  (70).	  	  On	  the	  level	  of	  form,	  however,	  the	  reader	  encounters	  “a	  story	  
behind	  the	  objective	  story,”	  namely,	  “the	  author’s	  adventure	  in	  selfhood,”	  a	  view	  certainly	  
prefigured	  by	  the	  one	  given	  in	  “Knowledge	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  Man”	  (71).	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  
reader,	  experiencing	  “adventures	  in	  selfhood”	  at	  the	  level	  of	  content	  and	  form	  embarks	  on	  
his	  or	  her	  own	  adventure,	  Warren	  says,	  in	  a	  process	  that	  gives	  the	  reader	  “echo	  upon	  echo,	  
mirror	  facing	  mirror”	  that	  ultimately	  “wakes	  us	  up	  to	  our	  own	  life”	  (71).	  
This	  construction,	  along	  with	  its	  earlier	  iterations	  in	  previous	  works,	  gives	  us,	  I	  
think,	  a	  workable	  image	  of	  how	  literature,	  in	  a	  way	  particular	  to	  itself,	  might	  be	  said	  to	  
edify	  the	  human,	  if	  we	  accept	  Warren’s	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  valid	  understanding	  of	  the	  
ethically	  centered	  human,	  the	  human	  living	  the	  good	  life.	  	  Certainly,	  if	  in	  literature	  the	  
reader	  finds	  the	  self	  (the	  character’s	  or	  the	  author’s)	  creating	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  hard-­‐won	  
values	  taken	  from	  experience	  of	  the	  actual	  world,	  one	  can	  see	  how	  the	  reader	  might	  be	  led	  
to	  contemplate	  how	  to	  create	  his	  or	  her	  self	  in	  his	  or	  her	  present	  situation	  within	  a	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community.	  	  But	  what	  about	  the	  sense	  of	  continuity	  with	  the	  past	  which	  serves	  as	  the	  other	  
axis	  of	  Warren’s	  self?	  	  The	  question	  of	  how	  literature	  gives	  us	  this	  continuity,	  of	  course,	  
remains.	  	  	  
He	  addresses	  exactly	  this	  question	  in	  “The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past”:	  if	  literature	  “returns	  us	  
to	  ourselves,”	  he	  asks,	  “why	  should	  not	  the	  literature	  that	  gives	  us	  images	  contemporary	  
with	  our	  own	  facing	  up	  to	  contemporary	  problems	  be	  better	  than	  the	  literature	  of	  times	  
and	  cultures	  different	  from	  our	  own?”	  (New	  46).	  	  His	  answer	  is	  that	  both	  contemporary	  
literature	  and	  that	  of	  the	  past	  are	  valuable	  in	  that	  they	  participate	  in	  an	  ongoing	  dialectic,	  
“a	  vital	  and	  continuing	  process”	  (47).	  	  Participating	  in	  this	  process	  by	  reading	  both	  kinds	  of	  
literature,	  Warren	  argues,	  properly	  orients	  the	  self	  of	  both	  reader	  and	  writer	  to	  the	  past.	  	  
To	  explain	  this,	  he	  references	  Harold	  Bloom’s	  Axiety	  of	  Influence,	  which	  he	  says	  
“describe[es]	  the	  struggle	  of	  a	  poet	  with	  the	  past	  as	  the	  dynamic	  of	  literary	  tradition.”	  	  
Warren	  adds	  his	  own	  metaphor	  of	  Jacob	  wrestling	  the	  angel	  as	  illustrative	  of	  this	  
“dynamic,”	  noting:	  “the	  self,	  by	  such	  a	  view,	  can	  be	  discovered	  only	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  assert	  
it	  against	  a	  powerful	  opponent	  from	  the	  past.	  	  Tradition,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  formula,	  bars	  the	  
future.	  	  In	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  dynamic,	  it	  unbars	  the	  future”	  (47).	  	  Thus,	  reading	  the	  literature	  of	  
both	  the	  past	  and	  the	  present	  gives	  the	  reader	  entre	  into	  this	  dialectical	  process	  necessary	  
to	  true	  selfhood.	  	  “And	  what	  may	  be	  said	  of	  the	  poet	  wrestling	  with	  his	  angel	  may	  also	  be	  
said	  for	  us	  all,	  as	  we	  confront	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  past—or	  merely	  the	  past	  itself,”	  he	  
argues	  (47).	  	  Literature,	  in	  other	  words,	  both	  connects	  us	  to	  the	  past	  if	  it	  is	  from	  the	  past,	  
but	  also,	  by	  dramatizing	  the	  author’s	  creation	  of	  self,	  shows	  us	  the	  dialectic	  that	  is	  the	  
author’s	  struggle	  with	  the	  past,	  a	  dialectic	  in	  which	  we	  too	  must	  participate.	  	  Reading	  
Hawthorne,	  then,	  shows	  us	  an	  author’s	  “wrestling	  with	  that	  necessary	  angel”	  of	  his	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“ancestral	  New	  England	  past,”	  which	  results	  in	  “an	  art	  that	  speaks	  to	  us	  profoundly	  a	  
century	  and	  a	  half	  later	  and	  is	  part	  of	  our	  usable	  American	  past”	  (48).	  
“The	  drama	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  self	  is	  timeless,”	  Warren	  argues.	  	  “In	  it,	  the	  past	  
becomes	  our	  present—no,	  it	  becomes	  our	  future.	  	  So	  far	  as	  we	  understand	  ourselves,	  that	  
is,	  we	  may	  move	  freely	  into	  a	  future	  and	  need	  not	  be	  merely	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  next	  event	  in	  
time	  that	  happens	  to	  come	  along.	  	  The	  dynamic	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  gives	  us	  the	  
possibility	  of	  a	  future”	  (48).	  	  Literature,	  then,	  gives	  the	  reader	  a	  meaningful	  understanding	  
of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  past	  becomes	  present	  and,	  in	  turn,	  makes	  us	  responsible	  for	  the	  
future.	  	  It	  aids	  the	  creation	  of	  selfhood	  both	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  community	  of	  the	  present	  
and	  the	  totality	  of	  human	  action	  comprehended	  in	  the	  past.	  
Literature,	  then,	  edifies	  the	  individual	  by	  aiding	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  self.	  	  A	  
question	  that	  understandably	  arises,	  though,	  is	  “what	  does	  literature	  do	  for	  a	  society	  as	  a	  
whole?”	  	  This	  question,	  though	  its	  answer	  certainly	  depends	  on	  an	  account	  of	  what	  
literature	  does	  for	  the	  individual,	  is	  actually	  at	  the	  center	  of	  both	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry	  and	  
“The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past,”	  although	  more	  prominently	  in	  the	  former.	  	  Warren’s	  project,	  which	  
he	  approaches	  similarly	  in	  both	  texts,	  is	  indeed	  to	  argue	  that	  literature	  can	  perhaps	  serve	  a	  
positive	  function	  in	  contemporary	  American	  society—a	  society	  that,	  in	  Warren’s	  view,	  is	  
makes	  selfhood	  hard	  to	  come	  by.	  	  
Although,	  as	  Charlotte	  Beck	  has	  shown,	  Warren	  did	  much	  over	  his	  career	  to	  distance	  
himself	  from	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  Nashville	  Agrarian	  group	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  from	  “The	  
Briar	  Patch,”	  his	  contribution	  to	  I’ll	  Take	  My	  Stand	  which	  Beck	  calls	  “a	  halfhearted	  defense	  
of	  segregation	  that	  Warren	  never	  ceased	  to	  regret”	  (3),	  something	  of	  his	  Agrarian	  roots	  
come	  out	  in	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry’s	  estimation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  modernization	  on	  society.	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Indeed,	  Beck	  argues	  that	  the	  lecture	  which	  became	  the	  book	  was	  “energized	  by	  the	  aging	  
poet’s	  dismay	  at	  the	  turbulent	  1960s	  and	  ‘70s	  and	  reinforced	  by	  his	  Agrarian	  distrust	  of	  
science	  and	  technology,”	  and	  while	  she	  does	  cast	  a	  somewhat	  skeptical	  eye	  on	  Warren’s	  
Agrarian	  influence	  by	  calling	  him	  “something	  of	  a	  luddite,”	  she	  nevertheless	  allows	  that	  “no	  
one,	  either	  then	  or	  now,	  could	  discount	  Warren’s	  gloomy	  prognosis	  entirely”	  (158).	  	  That	  
prognosis,	  essentially,	  is	  that	  the	  assumptions	  of	  a	  techno-­‐centric	  society	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  
large	  organizations	  driven	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  business	  under	  industrial	  capitalism	  is	  inimical	  to	  
selfhood	  and	  therefore	  doomed,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  to	  deprive	  its	  members	  of	  a	  coherent,	  
healthy	  human	  existence.	  	  	  
To	  explain	  his	  vision	  of	  modernity	  as	  of	  1975,	  Warren	  constructs	  what	  he	  calls	  “a	  
little	  fairy	  tale”	  in	  which	  Science,	  “a	  bumbling	  and	  kind-­‐hearted	  old	  father,”	  begets	  a	  “smart,	  
brawny	  son”	  named	  Technology,	  who	  “found	  the	  father’s	  way	  of	  life	  dull	  and	  so	  set	  forth	  to	  
make	  his	  fortune”:	  
Not	  far	  on	  his	  journey	  het	  met	  a	  beautiful	  gold-­‐haired	  lady	  with	  a	  bewitching	  
smile.	  	  Her	  name	  was	  Money.	  	  Now	  Money	  had	  a	  bad	  reputation	  in	  certain	  
quarters,	  especially	  among	  old,	  stuffy	  folk,	  and	  it	  was	  even	  rumored	  that	  she	  
had	  borne	  several	  bastards.	  	  .	  .	  .	  Of	  course	  this	  young	  fellow,	  having	  been	  
raised	  in	  so	  retired	  a	  way,	  knew	  nothing	  of	  the	  gossip	  about	  the	  lady.	  	  So	  they	  
got	  married	  and	  lived	  happily	  ever	  after—at	  least,	  until	  right	  now—for	  he	  
was	  blind	  to	  her	  little	  private	  diversions	  and	  was	  wrapped	  up	  in	  a	  beautiful,	  
thriving	  little	  son	  who	  grew	  as	  fast	  as	  a	  beanstalk	  and	  whose	  name	  was	  
Business	  Culture.	  	  (52)	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It	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  both	  in	  Warren’s	  fable	  and	  in	  his	  serious	  discourse	  neither	  
science	  as	  such,	  nor,	  notably,	  technology	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  are	  labeled	  as	  the	  root	  of	  
modernity’s	  ills.	  	  Indeed,	  Warren	  writes	  with	  great	  reverence	  of	  quantum	  physics	  only	  a	  
page	  earlier,	  noting	  that	  with	  its	  emergence	  “the	  big	  machine	  model	  of	  the	  universe	  blew	  
up,”	  causing,	  he	  claims,	  some	  scientists	  to	  “refer	  to	  artists	  as	  brother	  symbolists	  with	  
merely	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  net	  for	  snaring	  ‘reality’”	  (51).	  	  Still,	  the	  point	  of	  the	  “fairy	  tale”	  is	  
to	  show	  that,	  because	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  technology	  coincides	  with	  the	  
development	  of	  capitalism	  (though	  this	  term	  is	  absent	  in	  his	  discourse,	  I	  should	  point	  out),	  
modern	  society’s	  use	  and	  understanding	  of	  technology	  are	  misguided.	  	  “Our	  reigning	  
variety	  of	  technology,”	  he	  says,	  “seems	  to	  have	  branched	  off	  from	  science	  in	  the	  age	  of	  
machine	  as	  model,	  and	  that	  gave	  the	  image	  that	  has	  been	  carried	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  man.	  	  It	  is	  
the	  image	  that	  still	  affects	  his	  relation	  to	  nature,	  to	  other	  men,	  and	  to	  himself”	  (52-­‐3).	  	  And,	  
of	  course,	  coupled	  with	  money	  and	  now	  enamored	  of	  the	  modern	  business	  culture	  and	  its	  
promise	  of	  endless	  progress,	  the	  modern	  vision	  of	  technology	  is	  hard	  to	  change	  and	  all	  too	  
often	  taken	  as	  gospel.	  
	   And	  here	  we	  return	  to	  the	  self.	  	  The	  state	  of	  affairs	  Warren	  describes,	  which	  he	  later	  
succinctly	  marks	  as	  “the	  dominant	  business-­‐managerial-­‐technological	  culture,”	  from	  its	  
inception,	  constituted	  a	  “constantly	  accelerating	  system	  which	  undercut	  inherited	  
sanctions	  and	  values	  in	  a	  progressive	  disorientation	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  time	  and	  a	  rupture	  of	  all	  
aspects	  of	  human	  continuity”	  (77,	  53-­‐4).	  	  “With	  all	  this	  disorientation,”	  he	  remarks,	  “the	  
self,	  in	  a	  strange	  new	  loneliness,	  fell	  sick”	  (54).	  	  The	  self	  falls	  sick	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  
modernity	  as	  he	  describes	  them	  because	  they	  alienate	  the	  individual	  from	  both	  axes	  of	  the	  
self—the	  past	  and	  community.	  	  As	  for	  modernity’s	  rupture	  with	  the	  past,	  Warren	  cites	  both	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the	  United	  States’	  founders’	  optimism	  in	  the	  American	  project	  to	  become	  a	  “City	  set	  on	  a	  
Hill”	  and	  Henry	  Ford’s	  infamous	  proclamation	  that	  “History	  is	  bunk”	  (54-­‐5).	  	  More	  
importantly,	  he	  refers	  to	  The	  Death	  of	  the	  Past	  by	  J.H.	  Plumb,	  which	  Warren	  interprets	  as	  
suggesting	  that	  “the	  ideal	  of	  understanding	  men	  and	  telling	  their	  story,	  noble	  or	  vicious,	  
will	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  study	  of	  statistics	  or	  nonideographic	  units	  of	  an	  infinite	  series,	  and	  
computers	  will	  dictate	  how	  such	  units,	  which	  do	  breathe	  and	  move,	  can	  best	  be	  
manipulated	  for	  their	  own	  good”	  (56).	  	  Obviously,	  if	  such	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  were	  to	  be	  
completely	  realized,	  it	  would	  theoretically	  obviate	  the	  individual’s	  need	  to	  know	  and	  react	  
to	  the	  past	  in	  meaningful	  ways.	  
	   As	  for	  modernity’s	  effect	  on	  the	  possibilities	  of	  human	  community,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  
to	  anticipate	  Warren’s	  take	  from	  his	  speculation	  that	  a	  purely	  technological	  approach	  
toward	  the	  social	  good	  involves	  “manipulating”	  human	  beings	  as	  “units,	  which	  do	  breathe	  
and	  move.”	  	  Indeed,	  he	  turns	  aptly	  to	  Martin	  Buber’s	  concepts	  of	  “It”	  and	  “Thou”	  to	  highlight	  
how	  a	  technocratic	  society	  can	  reduce	  human	  beings	  to	  abstract	  units	  in	  the	  “machine	  
model”	  and,	  thus,	  deprive	  them	  of	  their	  common	  humanity	  and	  hope	  for	  authentic	  
community.	  	  While	  he	  does	  acknowledge	  that	  “in	  all	  times	  and	  places	  man	  has	  necessarily	  
lived	  a	  large	  part	  of	  his	  life	  in	  .	  .	  .	  the	  realm	  of	  It—the	  realm	  of	  economics,	  politics,	  science,	  
military	  activity,	  labor,	  and	  so	  on—as	  contrasted	  with	  the	  realm	  of	  Thou,	  in	  which	  massive	  
relations	  of	  recognition	  and	  reverence	  may	  prevail,”	  he	  nevertheless	  worries	  that	  in	  
contemporary	  society	  “the	  realm	  of	  It	  has	  become	  progressively	  enlarged”	  to	  the	  point	  that	  
“in	  our	  contact	  with	  technology	  and	  big	  organization,”	  which	  is	  increasingly	  inevitable,	  “the	  
individual	  is	  necessarily	  regarded	  as	  an	  expendable,	  because	  replaceable,	  part”	  (57).	  	  
Community,	  obviously,	  cannot	  exist	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  “realm	  of	  Thou,”	  so	  the	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individual	  in	  contemporary	  society,	  for	  Warren,	  is	  as	  alienated	  from	  community	  as	  it	  is	  
from	  the	  past.	  
	   It	  seems	  that	  we	  are	  quite	  far	  from	  Warren’s	  view	  of	  the	  function	  of	  literature	  in	  
contemporary	  society,	  so	  let	  us	  go	  ahead	  and	  ask,	  “where	  does	  literature	  fit	  into	  all	  of	  this?”	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  and	  most	  obviously,	  in	  all	  the	  ways	  Warren	  describes,	  he	  sees	  it	  as	  offering,	  by	  
its	  nature,	  an	  aid	  in	  the	  individual’s	  process	  of	  achieving	  selfhood.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  always	  served	  
this	  function,	  but	  in	  Warren’s	  view	  there	  is	  a	  dire	  need	  for	  it	  in	  these	  latter	  days.	  	  The	  
cultivation	  of	  selfhood,	  even	  on	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  readers,	  is	  a	  way	  of	  keeping	  alive	  the	  
idea	  of	  a	  community	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  mechanistic	  and	  dehumanizing	  society.	  
	   Secondly	  and	  perhaps	  merely	  in	  a	  different	  register,	  Warren	  argues	  that	  insofar	  as	  
literature	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  in	  both	  content	  and	  form	  strives	  toward	  the	  establishment	  of	  
selfhood,	  it	  stands	  as	  an	  element	  of	  culture,	  however	  marginalized,	  to	  oppose	  those	  other	  
elements	  that	  work	  against	  selfhood.	  	  In	  explaining	  the	  potential	  benefit	  of	  literature	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  society,	  Warren	  begins	  by	  remarking,	  “Assuming	  that	  man	  will	  resist	  the	  total	  
transformation	  that	  some	  technologists	  promise,	  then	  it	  may	  be	  pertinent	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  
fact	  that	  historically	  a	  strong	  and	  high	  art	  is	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  societies	  of	  challenging	  
vigor7”	  (Democracy	  75).	  	  Art,	  including	  literature,	  Warren	  claims,	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  mere	  
“by-­‐product	  or	  waste	  product”	  of	  healthy	  societies	  but,	  rather,	  as	  “an	  element	  in	  a	  vital	  
dialectic	  .	  .	  .	  by	  which,	  in	  imagining	  itself	  and	  the	  relation	  of	  individuals	  to	  one	  another	  and	  
to	  it,	  a	  society	  comes	  to	  understand	  itself,	  and	  by	  understanding,	  discover	  its	  possibilities	  
for	  growth”	  (76).	  	  And,	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  literature	  as	  an	  element	  of	  culture	  may	  reach	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Warren	  does	  not	  give	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  which	  societies	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  here.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  
Foreword,	  he	  mentions	  ancient	  Greece	  and	  the	  Roman	  Republic	  as	  evincing	  a	  strong	  notion	  
of	  the	  self	  and,	  therefore,	  a	  strong	  poetic	  art,	  conceding	  that	  “[t]here	  was	  in	  neither	  case	  a	  
democracy	  we	  would	  recognize	  as	  such,	  merely	  a	  democracy	  of	  aristocrats”	  (xiv-­‐xv).	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relatively	  few	  members	  of	  society,	  Warren	  argues	  that	  “[t]he	  value	  of	  an	  institution	  [within	  
the	  broader	  culture]	  lies	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which,	  by	  massive	  or	  subtle	  interpenetration	  and	  
vital	  relations,	  that	  institution	  combines	  with	  others	  to	  sustain	  and	  foster	  the	  individual	  in	  
his	  various	  potentialities,	  even	  though	  .	  .	  .	  such	  beneficiaries	  may	  be	  unaware	  of	  the	  
process”	  (76).	  	  Literature,	  then,	  working	  as	  part	  of	  a	  whole	  culture	  may	  exert	  an	  influence	  
in	  favor	  of	  selfhood	  where	  other	  institutions	  may	  have	  forgotten	  this	  end.	  	  In	  response	  to	  
what	  he	  no	  doubt	  sees	  as	  the	  inevitable	  charge	  of	  elitism	  in	  claiming	  a	  role	  for	  “high”	  art,	  he	  
argues	  that	  poetry	  is	  no	  different	  than	  science	  with	  respect	  to	  presumed	  elitism	  in	  that,	  like	  
science,	  art	  “draws	  not	  only	  those	  who	  make	  it	  but	  also	  those	  who	  understand	  and	  
appreciate	  it,	  from	  all	  sorts	  of	  groups,	  classes,	  and	  races”	  (77).	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  argues	  that	  
if	  there	  is,	  in	  fact,	  an	  “elitism”	  involved	  in	  championing	  the	  arts,	  this	  particular	  elitism	  is	  in	  
fact	  a	  marginalized	  elitism	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  elitism	  of	  science	  because	  science,	  to	  
society	  at	  large	  “is	  recognized	  as	  a	  giver—though	  at	  second	  hand,	  through	  technology—of	  
practical	  benefits”	  whereas,	  “The	  elitism	  of	  the	  arts	  .	  .	  .	  receives	  no	  such	  acceptance,	  even	  at	  
second	  hand.”	  	  “Its	  values,”	  Warren	  stresses,	  “truly	  run	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  the	  dominant	  
business-­‐managerial-­‐technological	  culture;	  and	  in	  this	  fact	  it	  tends	  to	  undercut	  other	  
elitisms,	  to	  work	  against	  all	  the	  established	  patterns	  of	  prestige”	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  “the	  
effect	  of	  this	  special	  elitism	  of	  the	  arts	  on	  social,	  financial,	  and	  technological	  elitisms	  will	  
become	  more	  marked—and	  more	  significant,	  one	  is	  tempted	  to	  say,	  by	  reason,	  
paradoxically,	  of	  its	  very	  alienation,	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  democracy”	  (77-­‐8).	  	  If	  the	  arts	  are,	  in	  
fact,	  elitist,	  their	  elitism,	  we	  might	  say,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  selfhood.	  	  If	  the	  arts	  
promote	  selfhood,	  are	  they	  not	  more	  healthy	  and	  venerable	  than	  other	  principles	  of	  
hierarchy,	  such	  as	  social,	  economic,	  or	  technological	  status?	  	  To	  appropriate	  Nietzsche’s	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turn	  of	  phrase,	  the	  arts	  seek	  to	  transvaluate	  the	  values	  of	  contemporary	  society,	  replacing	  
the	  pernicious	  ones	  inherent	  in	  “dominant	  business-­‐managerial-­‐technological	  culture”	  with	  
the	  idea	  of	  selfhood,	  which	  is	  democratic	  in	  that	  it	  suggests	  that	  every	  human	  individual	  
has	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  a	  healthy	  self.	  
	   Still,	  despite	  his	  high	  view	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  literature	  in	  contemporary	  society,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  literature	  is	  far	  from	  an	  absolute	  panacea	  in	  Warren’s	  view.	  	  
Toward	  the	  end	  of	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry,	  he	  gives	  a	  sane	  perspective	  on	  just	  how	  much	  
one	  should	  claim	  in	  the	  name	  of	  literature.	  	  “It	  is	  sentimental,”	  he	  says,	  “to	  try	  to	  retrace	  our	  
steps,	  to	  try	  to	  demote	  science,	  the	  purest	  expression	  of	  the	  love	  of	  intellectual	  beauty,	  to	  
the	  role	  of	  scullery	  maid	  or	  to	  deny	  the	  special,	  and	  in	  an	  economic	  sense	  primary,	  role	  of	  
technology”	  (91).	  	  Begrudgingly	  and	  yet	  conscientiously,	  it	  seems,	  Warren	  does	  see	  the	  
need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  solution	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  technology’s	  deep	  
enmeshment	  in	  the	  structures	  of	  modern	  society.	  	  For	  all	  his	  Agrarian	  leanings,	  he	  is	  no	  
purist.	  	  He	  continues:	  “And	  I	  flinch,	  also,	  from	  those	  who	  like	  Henry	  James,	  would	  assume	  
art	  to	  be	  the	  justification	  of	  all	  life,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  all	  others	  .	  .	  .	  who	  refuse	  to	  recognize	  the	  
hard	  costs	  of	  mere	  survival	  for	  many	  millions	  of	  human	  beings,	  the	  cost	  in	  grinding	  effort	  
and	  irremediable	  pain”	  (91).	  	  Indeed,	  Warren’s	  social	  consciousness	  prevents	  him	  from	  
glorifying	  aesthetics	  as	  the	  ultimate	  end	  of	  life	  when	  real	  injustice	  and	  real	  suffering	  persist	  
in	  the	  world.	  	  “How	  can	  anybody	  who	  has	  lived	  through	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  or	  even	  
walked	  through	  parts	  of	  Appalachia	  or	  a	  slum,	  feel	  otherwise?”	  he	  asks,	  I	  think	  rightly	  (91).	  
	   And	  yet,	  he	  also	  claims,	  as	  he	  must,	  that	  it	  is	  likewise	  an	  error	  to	  assume	  that	  
literature	  is	  therefore	  of	  no	  consequence,	  given	  its	  supposed	  impracticality:	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I	  must	  confess	  that	  I	  flinch,	  too,	  from	  the	  view	  of	  W.	  H.	  Auden,	  .	  .	  .	  who,	  in	  an	  
essay	  on	  Yeats,	  implies	  that	  art	  is	  merely	  a	  “product	  of	  history’”	  and,	  unlike	  
other	  products,	  such	  as	  technical	  inventions,	  never	  a	  “cause,”	  an	  “effective	  
agent”;	  and	  who	  adds	  that,	  “if	  not	  a	  poem	  had	  been	  written,	  not	  a	  picture	  
painted,	  not	  a	  bar	  of	  music	  composed,	  the	  history	  of	  man	  would	  be	  materially	  
unchanged.”	  (91)	  
Warren	  argues	  against	  Auden’s	  view	  of	  the	  necessary	  impracticality	  of	  art	  by	  charging	  it	  
with	  the	  error	  of	  dualism:	  	  “It	  would	  seem	  that,	  granting	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  value	  
distinguishable	  from	  other	  aspects	  of	  experience,	  this	  value	  has	  both	  its	  origins	  in,	  and	  its	  
effects	  on,	  the	  massive	  texture	  of	  human	  needs	  and	  human	  life.	  	  Can	  we	  totally	  separate	  the	  
‘material’	  world,	  as	  Auden	  here	  does,	  from	  what	  we	  may	  call,	  generally,	  the	  ‘spiritual’	  
world”	  (92)?	  	  The	  answer	  for	  Warren,	  of	  course,	  is	  “no.”	  	  His	  humanistic	  metaphysics,	  the	  
center	  of	  which	  is	  the	  self	  and	  its	  morally	  charged	  relationship	  to	  the	  human	  past	  and	  
present,	  prevent	  this	  easy	  dualism.	  	  True,	  the	  spiritual	  self	  and	  the	  material	  processes	  of	  
modernity	  may	  be	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another,	  but	  reconciliation	  is	  clearly	  what	  Warren	  
is	  after.	  	  Toward	  that	  end,	  literature	  is	  an	  “effective	  agent”	  and	  does	  bring	  about	  health,	  
both	  spiritually	  and	  physically.	  
Theory	  of	  the	  Self	  in	  Practice:	  Warren’s	  Literary	  Aesthetic	  
So	  far	  I	  have	  only	  been	  addressing	  Warren’s	  attempts	  to	  lay	  out	  his	  philosophy	  of	  
literature	  in	  his	  nonfiction	  work.	  	  Warren,	  of	  course,	  was	  also	  an	  acclaimed	  novelist	  and	  
poet.	  	  Looking	  briefly	  at	  some	  of	  Warren’s	  own	  literary	  work,	  then,	  will	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  
his	  ideas	  about	  literature’s	  function	  flesh	  themselves	  out,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  a	  different	  
window	  into	  Warren’s	  metaphysical	  vision.	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   I	  can	  think	  of	  no	  better	  place	  to	  start	  than	  his	  fictional	  magnum	  opus,	  the	  1946	  novel	  
All	  the	  King’s	  Men.	  	  Warren’s	  ideas	  about	  literature’s	  role	  in	  the	  cultivation	  of	  selfhood	  
figure	  prominently	  in	  this	  novel,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  published	  before	  Warren	  began	  using	  
the	  term	  “self”	  prominently	  in	  his	  critical	  writing.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  novel	  acts	  as	  a	  multilayered	  
study	  in	  the	  movement	  toward	  selfhood	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  content	  and	  form,	  which,	  in	  
Warren’s	  view,	  has	  implications	  for	  both	  author	  and	  reader.	  	  	  
	   On	  the	  level	  of	  content,	  the	  reader	  finds	  the	  development	  of	  the	  character	  Willie	  
Stark,	  the	  populist-­‐reformer-­‐turned-­‐Machiavellian-­‐demagogue	  governor	  of	  Louisiana,	  
modeled	  loosely	  on	  Huey	  Long.	  	  Willie	  begins	  as	  a	  country	  lawyer	  and	  small-­‐time	  local	  
politician	  bent	  on	  reforming	  the	  corrupt	  ways	  of	  a	  small-­‐town	  government	  run	  on	  the	  
good-­‐ole-­‐boy	  system.	  	  When	  he	  eventually	  becomes	  governor,	  however,	  he	  resorts	  to	  
corruption	  himself,	  dealing	  in	  blackmail	  and	  bribery	  to	  maintain	  a	  chokehold	  on	  the	  state	  
legislature.	  	  He	  explains	  his	  position	  on	  corruption	  to	  Adam	  Stanton,	  a	  dogmatically	  
moralistic	  doctor	  he	  convinces	  to	  head	  up	  a	  new	  state	  hospital,	  like	  this:	  “When	  your	  great-­‐
great-­‐grandpappy	  climbed	  down	  out	  of	  the	  tree,	  he	  didn’t	  have	  any	  more	  notion	  of	  good	  or	  
bad,	  or	  right	  and	  wrong,	  than	  the	  hoot	  owl	  that	  stayed	  up	  in	  the	  tree.	  	  Well,	  he	  climbed	  
down	  and	  he	  began	  to	  make	  Good	  up	  as	  he	  went	  along.	  	  He	  made	  up	  what	  he	  needed	  to	  do	  
business,	  Doc”	  (387-­‐8).	  	  Willie’s	  ethics,	  then,	  are	  both	  relativist	  and	  pragmatic.	  	  He	  exists	  as	  
a	  possible	  “self”	  that	  the	  reader,	  along	  with	  the	  narrator	  (about	  whom	  I	  shall	  have	  much	  to	  
say)	  may	  “try	  on”—a	  possible	  self	  that	  deliberately	  cuts	  himself	  off	  from	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  
the	  past.	  	  How	  can	  he,	  as	  Warren	  suggests	  the	  true	  self	  should,	  view	  the	  past	  as	  evocative	  of	  
“objective	  standards”	  if	  the	  good	  is	  something	  to	  be	  “made	  up”	  to	  “do	  business?”	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   Another	  possible	  self	  is	  Adam	  Stanton,	  the	  dogmatic	  moralist.	  	  Jack	  Burden,	  the	  
novel’s	  narrator	  and	  arguably	  its	  protagonist	  as	  well,	  describes	  Adam’s	  relation	  to	  the	  past	  
in	  this	  way:	  “[H]e	  has	  lived	  all	  his	  life	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  was	  a	  long	  time	  back	  when	  
everything	  was	  run	  by	  high-­‐minded,	  handsome	  men	  wearing	  knee	  breeches	  and	  silver	  
buckles”	  (370).	  	  Adam’s	  “tidy”	  ethics,	  as	  Jack	  describes	  them,	  are	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  “hand-­‐me-­‐
down	  morality”	  based	  on	  a	  superficial	  understanding	  of	  the	  past.	  	  Predictably,	  this	  leads	  
Adam,	  as	  a	  possible	  self,	  to	  look	  with	  disdain	  on	  the	  people	  in	  his	  life	  who	  show	  evidences	  
of	  lacking	  a	  “high-­‐minded”	  moral	  code	  (373).	  	  “He	  has	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  in	  his	  head,”	  
Jack	  remarks,	  “and	  when	  the	  world	  doesn’t	  conform	  .	  .	  .	  to	  the	  picture,	  he	  wants	  to	  throw	  
the	  world	  away.	  	  Even	  if	  that	  means	  throwing	  the	  baby	  out	  with	  the	  bath.	  	  Which	  .	  .	  .	  it	  
always	  does	  mean”	  (370-­‐1).	  	  This	  becomes	  painfully	  clear	  when	  Adam	  kills	  Willie	  for	  
having	  an	  affair	  with	  his	  sister	  Anne	  and	  dies	  in	  the	  process.	  	  Adam’s	  unbalanced	  self,	  like	  
Willie’s,	  is	  exposed	  as	  dangerously	  flawed.	  	  	  
Jack	  Burden,	  in	  his	  narration,	  meditates	  on	  how	  their	  deaths	  highlight	  such	  flaws:	  
Each	  had	  been	  the	  doom	  of	  the	  other.	  	  As	  a	  student	  of	  history,	  Jack	  Burden	  
could	  see	  that	  Adam	  Stanton,	  whom	  he	  came	  to	  call	  the	  man	  of	  idea,	  and	  
Willie	  Stark,	  whom	  he	  came	  to	  call	  the	  man	  of	  fact,	  were	  doomed	  to	  destroy	  
each	  other,	  just	  as	  each	  was	  doomed	  to	  try	  to	  use	  the	  other	  and	  to	  yearn	  
toward	  and	  try	  to	  become	  the	  other,	  because	  each	  was	  incomplete	  with	  the	  
terrible	  division	  of	  their	  age.	  (657)	  
This	  “division	  of	  their	  age,”	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  Warren’s	  later	  writings,	  marks	  a	  failure	  of	  true	  
selfhood	  in	  that	  both	  a	  reductive	  “hand-­‐me-­‐down	  morality”	  and	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  ethical	  
truth	  of	  the	  past	  all	  together	  end	  in	  tragic	  destruction.	  	  Adam	  and	  Willie	  exhibit	  opposing	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monomaniacal	  devotions,	  Adam	  to	  the	  “idea”	  and	  Willie	  to	  the	  material	  “fact,”	  that	  prevent	  
either	  character	  from	  developing	  a	  coherent,	  communal	  self	  and,	  indeed,	  necessarily	  ends	  
in	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  self.	  	  
	   While	  Adam	  and	  Willie	  serve	  as	  examples	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  selfhood,	  Warren	  also	  
presents	  the	  reader	  with	  Jack	  Burden’s	  journey	  toward	  authentic	  selfhood.	  	  Jack’s	  
achievement	  of	  a	  communal	  and	  historical	  self	  is	  present	  on	  the	  level	  of	  content	  along	  with	  
Adam’s	  and	  Willie’s	  failures.	  	  However,	  it	  also	  includes	  and	  transcends	  Adam’s	  and	  Willie’s	  
abortive	  selves	  because	  Jack	  Burden	  is,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  the	  novel’s	  narrator,	  which	  means	  
that	  his	  cultivation	  of	  a	  self	  takes	  place	  on	  the	  level	  of	  form	  as	  well.	  	  In	  a	  1968	  panel	  
discussion	  moderated	  by	  C.	  Vann	  Woodward,	  Warren	  admitted	  that	  Jack	  Burden	  was,	  in	  
fact,	  a	  “technical	  accident,	  a	  way	  to	  tell	  the	  story”—the	  story,	  presumably,	  of	  Willie	  Stark	  
and	  his	  death	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Adam	  Stanton	  (Woodward	  108).	  	  But	  it	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  
passage	  quoted	  above,	  as	  it	  is	  throughout	  the	  novel,	  that	  “the	  story”	  also	  involves	  Jack	  
Burden’s	  attempts	  to	  find	  meaning	  in	  the	  events	  he	  narrates	  and	  in	  which	  he	  also	  
participates—his	  creation,	  in	  other	  words,	  of	  a	  self.	  	  	  
Jack	  Burden,	  the	  reader	  learns	  about	  halfway	  through	  the	  novel,	  is	  a	  failed	  historian.	  	  
He	  decided	  to	  stop	  pursuing	  his	  Ph.D.	  in	  history,	  he	  tells	  us,	  because	  the	  implications	  of	  his	  
dissertation,	  a	  study	  of	  his	  great	  uncle	  Cass	  Mastern’s	  hard-­‐won	  moral	  regeneration,	  began	  
to	  disturb	  him	  profoundly.	  	  “[I]n	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  process	  I	  tried	  to	  discover	  the	  truth	  and	  
not	  the	  facts.	  	  Then,	  when	  the	  truth	  was	  not	  to	  be	  discovered,	  or	  discovered	  could	  not	  be	  
understood	  by	  me,	  I	  could	  not	  live	  with	  the	  cold-­‐eyed	  reproach	  of	  the	  facts,”	  he	  says	  (236).	  	  
Jack	  is	  unwilling,	  in	  John	  Lukács’s	  terms,	  to	  see	  history	  as	  a	  philosophy	  made	  up	  of	  
examples	  that	  exhibit	  “ever	  recurrent	  human	  problems	  incarnated	  by	  ever	  different	  human	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beings.”	  	  The	  “facts”	  are	  a	  reproach	  to	  Jack	  because	  they	  suggest,	  by	  example,	  a	  human	  truth	  
that	  he	  cannot	  bear	  to	  understand.	  
These	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  which	  Jack	  learns	  from	  Cass	  Mastern’s	  journals,	  are	  that	  
Mastern,	  a	  plantation	  owner	  in	  the	  antebellum	  South,	  after	  experiencing	  the	  suicide	  of	  his	  
best	  friend	  due	  to	  the	  revelation	  that	  he,	  Mastern,	  had	  been	  having	  an	  affair	  with	  that	  
friend’s	  wife,	  commits	  himself	  to	  moral	  reform	  and	  seeks	  redemption	  in	  Christianity.	  	  This	  
new	  commitment	  leads	  Mastern	  to	  become	  an	  abolitionist	  and	  free	  his	  slaves,	  and	  also	  to	  
join	  the	  Confederate	  army	  while	  vowing	  privately	  never	  to	  fire	  his	  weapon,	  a	  decision	  
which	  leads	  to	  his	  death8.	  	  The	  “truth”	  of	  the	  case,	  which	  Jack	  Burden	  at	  the	  time	  could	  not	  
understand	  or,	  as	  he	  says,	  “was	  afraid	  to	  understand	  for	  what	  might	  be	  understood	  there	  
was	  a	  reproach	  to	  him”	  (284),	  he	  is	  later	  able	  to	  describe	  in	  these	  terms:	  
Cass	  Mastern	  lived	  for	  a	  few	  years	  and	  in	  that	  time	  he	  learned	  that	  the	  world	  
is	  all	  of	  one	  piece.	  	  He	  learned	  that	  the	  world	  is	  like	  an	  enormous	  spider	  web	  
and	  if	  you	  touch	  it,	  however	  lightly,	  at	  any	  point,	  the	  vibration	  ripples	  to	  the	  
remotest	  perimeter	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  It	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  meant	  to	  
brush	  the	  web	  of	  things.	  	  Your	  happy	  foot	  or	  your	  gay	  wing	  may	  have	  
brushed	  it	  ever	  so	  lightly,	  but	  what	  happens	  always	  happens	  and	  there	  is	  the	  
spider,	  bearded	  black	  and	  with	  his	  great	  faceted	  eyes	  glittering	  like	  mirrors	  
in	  the	  sun,	  or	  like	  God’s	  eye,	  and	  the	  fangs	  dripping.	  	  (283)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  There	  is	  certainly	  a	  quixotic	  element	  to	  Mastern’s	  self-­‐imposed	  penance—especially	  his	  
quasi-­‐suicidal	  decision	  “in	  anguish	  of	  spirit	  and	  in	  hope	  of	  expiation”	  to	  march	  in	  the	  Civil	  
War	  without	  shooting	  (280).	  	  Surely,	  from	  a	  Christian	  perspective,	  Mastern	  did	  not	  need	  to	  
risk	  his	  life	  to	  earn	  God’s	  forgiveness.	  	  To	  a	  degree,	  this	  may	  qualify	  the	  moral	  efficacy	  of	  
Mastern’s	  example	  for	  Jack,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  nullify	  it.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  may	  present	  a	  useful	  
example	  of	  human	  behavior	  from	  the	  past	  that	  does	  not	  suggest	  a	  simplistic	  “hand-­‐me-­‐
down	  morality”	  but	  instead,	  as	  Warren	  says,	  “a	  measuring	  rod”	  for	  human	  achievement.	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Jack’s	  attempt	  to	  create	  history	  thus	  reveals	  to	  him	  an	  ancestor	  who	  discovers	  the	  awful	  
truth	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  due	  to	  the	  interconnectivity	  of	  all	  of	  life.	  	  This	  truth	  is	  a	  hard	  
one	  because	  it	  insists	  that	  the	  “enormous	  spider	  web”	  of	  human	  existence	  means	  that	  the	  
individual’s	  actions—regardless	  of	  the	  intentions	  behind	  them—are	  inescapably	  
meaningful	  and	  therefore	  subject	  to	  moral	  scrutiny.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  truth	  
that	  renders	  it	  wholly	  terrifying	  for	  Jack	  Burden	  and	  precipitates	  his	  elaborate	  attempts,	  
throughout	  the	  novel,	  to	  avoid	  it.	  
	   In	  the	  novel’s	  first	  chapter,	  Jack	  describes	  himself	  (his	  previous	  self)	  as	  a	  “brass-­‐
bound	  Idealist.”	  	  What	  he	  means	  by	  this	  is	  that	  he	  holds	  to	  a	  conveniently	  narrow	  
interpretation	  (or	  misinterpretation)	  of	  Berkeleyan	  Idealism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  the	  
pangs	  of	  moral	  responsibility:	  “What	  you	  don’t	  know	  don’t	  hurt	  you,	  for	  it	  ain’t	  real.”	  	  “I	  had	  
got	  hold	  of	  the	  principle	  out	  of	  a	  book	  when	  I	  was	  in	  college,	  and	  had	  hung	  to	  it	  for	  grim	  
death,”	  he	  says.	  	  “I	  owed	  my	  success	  in	  life	  to	  that	  principle.	  	  It	  had	  put	  me	  where	  I	  was”	  
(45).	  	  Where	  he	  was,	  of	  course,	  was	  at	  the	  right	  hand	  of	  Willie	  Stark,	  serving	  as	  his	  personal	  
“historian,”	  or	  digger	  up	  of	  dirt	  for	  use	  in	  the	  blackmailing	  of	  rival	  politicians	  into	  
submission.	  	  	  
	   Later,	  however,	  Jack	  undergoes	  what	  he	  describes	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  religious	  
conversion	  to	  a	  different	  personal	  philosophy,	  diametrically	  opposed	  to	  and	  yet	  equally	  as	  
morally	  evasive	  as	  his	  Idealism.	  	  This	  new	  philosophy,	  which	  he	  insists	  is	  “the	  dream	  of	  our	  
age,”	  says	  that	  “all	  life	  is	  but	  the	  dark	  heave	  of	  blood	  and	  the	  twitch	  of	  the	  nerve”	  (467).	  	  
Jack	  thus	  adopts	  a	  fatalistically	  deterministic	  materialism,	  a	  self-­‐interested	  version	  of	  
naturalism.	  	  The	  weakness	  of	  his	  Idealism	  was	  that	  sometimes	  he	  could	  not	  keep	  from	  
“knowing”	  things	  that	  might	  hurt	  him,	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  woman	  he	  loved,	  Anne	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Stanton,	  was	  having	  an	  affair	  with	  Willie	  Stark.	  	  His	  new	  naturalism,	  though,	  has	  no	  such	  
weakness,	  for	  if	  “the	  twitch	  is	  all,”	  as	  he	  says,	  “The	  words	  Anne	  Stanton	  were	  simply	  a	  name	  
for	  a	  peculiarly	  complicated	  peace	  of	  mechanism	  which	  should	  mean	  nothing	  whatsoever	  
to	  Jack	  Burden,	  who	  himself	  was	  simply	  another	  rather	  complicated	  piece	  of	  mechanism”	  
(473,	  467-­‐8).	  	  Furthermore,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  “he	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  
nobody	  had	  any	  responsibility	  for	  anything	  and	  there	  was	  no	  god	  but	  the	  Great	  Twitch”	  
(656).	  	  	  
	  	   In	  the	  end,	  however,	  after	  Willie’s	  and	  Adam’s	  deaths,	  Jack’s	  position	  changes.	  	  It	  
changes	  for	  numerous	  reasons,	  including	  the	  responsibility	  Jack	  shares	  in	  his	  friends’	  
deaths.	  	  He	  convinced	  Adam	  to	  work	  for	  Willie,	  in	  part	  by	  exposing	  to	  Adam	  the	  fact	  that	  
Adam’s	  father,	  while	  governor	  of	  Louisiana,	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  corrupt	  practices.	  	  This	  
same	  revelation	  drives	  Anne	  Stanton	  into	  her	  affair	  with	  Willie.	  	  Thus,	  Jack,	  in	  the	  end,	  
cannot	  escape	  responsibility.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  paths	  his	  friends	  take	  toward	  their	  deaths	  
affect	  his	  changing	  ethics	  as	  well:	  	  “[H]e	  woke	  up	  one	  morning	  to	  discover	  that	  he	  did	  not	  
believe	  in	  the	  Great	  Twitch	  anymore.	  	  He	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  it	  because	  he	  had	  seen	  too	  many	  
people	  live	  and	  die.”	  	  The	  ways	  of	  their	  living	  and	  dying,	  he	  suggests,	  pit	  free	  will	  against	  
determinism	  in	  a	  dialectical	  tension	  that	  maintains	  ethical	  responsibility:	  “He	  had	  seen	  his	  
two	  friends,	  Willie	  Stark	  and	  Adam	  Stanton	  live	  and	  die.	  	  .	  .	  .	  Each	  had	  been	  the	  doom	  of	  the	  
other.	  	  	  .	  .	  .	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time	  Jack	  Burden	  came	  to	  see	  that	  his	  friends	  had	  been	  doomed,	  
he	  saw	  that	  though	  doomed	  they	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  any	  doom	  under	  the	  godhead	  of	  
the	  Great	  Twitch.	  	  They	  were	  doomed	  but	  they	  lived	  in	  the	  agony	  of	  will”	  (657).	  	  Adam	  and	  
Willie	  were	  determined	  not	  by	  factors	  completely	  reducible	  to	  material	  processes	  but	  by	  
their	  devotions	  to	  opposing	  and	  yet	  equally	  abortive	  selves—devotions	  they	  put	  into	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practice	  through	  their	  individual	  wills.	  	  The	  “agony	  of	  the	  will,”	  then,	  is	  the	  weight	  of	  
responsibility	  against	  apparent	  deterministic	  forces,	  a	  realization	  to	  which	  Willie	  comes	  in	  
his	  final	  words	  to	  Jack	  Burden:	  “It	  might	  have	  been	  all	  different,	  Jack.	  	  You	  got	  to	  believe	  
that”	  (657).	  	  This	  realization,	  for	  Jack,	  does	  not	  do	  away	  with	  the	  apparent	  deterministic	  
forces	  of	  living	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  it	  does	  assert	  the	  existence	  of	  will	  and	  
	   This	  realization	  amounts	  to	  a	  secular	  or	  humanistic	  affirmation	  of	  the	  tension	  
recognized	  in	  Christianity	  between	  free	  will	  and	  predestination,	  which	  perhaps	  renders	  the	  
truth	  of	  Cass	  Mastern’s	  moral	  knowledge,	  which	  Mastern	  himself	  frames	  in	  Christian	  terms,	  
finally	  understandable	  to	  Jack	  Burden.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novel,	  Jack	  picks	  up	  his	  historical	  
studies	  where	  he	  left	  them,	  returning	  to	  his	  book	  on	  “the	  life	  of	  Cass	  Mastern,	  whom	  once	  I	  
could	  not	  understand	  but	  whom,	  perhaps,	  I	  now	  may	  come	  to	  understand”	  (660).	  	  Jack	  can	  
thus	  acknowledge	  the	  truth	  of	  responsibility	  as	  a	  continuous	  human	  truth	  knowable	  
through	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  past.	  	  Indeed,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novel,	  Jack	  Burden	  is	  a	  
coherent	  self,	  recognizing	  his	  teleological	  place	  along	  the	  axes	  of	  the	  past	  and	  his	  present	  
community.	  	  He	  recognizes,	  in	  the	  novel’s	  concluding	  lines,	  that	  he	  must	  “go	  into	  the	  
convulsion	  of	  the	  world,	  out	  of	  history	  into	  history	  and	  the	  awful	  responsibility	  of	  Time”	  
(661).	  
	   The	  question,	  however,	  of	  how	  Jack’s	  achievement	  of	  selfhood,	  which	  certainly	  
involves	  his	  position	  as	  an	  actor	  in	  the	  novel’s	  plot,	  also	  exists	  on	  the	  level	  of	  form	  remains.	  	  
Indeed,	  from	  Warren’s	  later	  accounts	  of	  writing	  the	  novel,	  one	  gets	  the	  sense	  that	  if	  Jack	  
Burden,	  the	  “technical	  accident,”	  is	  the	  novel’s	  protagonist,	  he	  became	  so	  inadvertently.	  	  In	  
an	  introduction	  to	  a	  1953	  Modern	  Library	  edition	  of	  All	  the	  King’s	  Men,	  Warren	  writes	  that	  
Jack	  was	  born	  out	  of	  “the	  necessity	  for	  a	  character	  of	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  self-­‐consciousness	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than	  my	  politician	  [i.e.,	  Willie],	  a	  character	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  commentator	  and	  
raisonneur	  and	  chorus”	  (226).	  	  One	  reason	  Warren	  cites	  for	  wanting	  this	  kind	  of	  narrator	  is	  
a	  “desire	  to	  avoid	  writing	  a	  straight	  naturalistic	  novel,	  the	  kind	  of	  novel	  that	  the	  material	  so	  
readily	  invited.	  	  The	  impingement	  of	  that	  material,	  I	  thought,	  upon	  a	  special	  temperament	  
would	  allow	  another	  perspective	  than	  the	  reportorial	  one,	  and	  would	  give	  a	  basis	  for	  some	  
range	  of	  style.	  	  So	  Jack	  Burden	  entered	  the	  scene”	  (226-­‐7).	  	  Thus,	  while	  Jack	  Burden’s	  
journey	  toward	  selfhood	  does	  certainly	  take	  place	  on	  the	  level	  of	  content,	  as	  he	  can	  hardly	  
escape	  being	  the	  novel’s	  central	  character,	  he	  is	  also	  part	  of	  the	  form	  that	  Warren	  puts	  on	  
the	  content	  of	  the	  story,	  at	  least	  partially	  to	  strive	  against	  what	  could	  have	  been	  a	  
temptation	  of	  the	  reader,	  and	  perhaps	  Warren	  himself,	  to	  interpret	  the	  story	  as	  embodying	  
a	  naturalistic	  metaphysics—a	  view	  that	  runs	  contrary	  to	  Warren’s	  humanistic	  metaphysics.	  	  
Jack-­‐Burden-­‐as-­‐form,	  then,	  demonstrates	  Warren’s	  claim	  that	  the	  form	  of	  a	  literary	  work	  
illustrates	  the	  author’s	  own	  journey	  toward	  selfhood.	  	  	  
	   Indeed,	  much	  of	  Warren’s	  literary	  work	  clearly	  comes	  out	  of	  his	  idea	  that	  the	  novel,	  
story,	  or	  poem	  exists	  as	  an	  “adventure	  in	  selfhood”	  for	  both	  reader	  and	  writer.	  	  Harold	  
Bloom	  acknowledges	  this	  in	  his	  characteristic	  approach	  to	  Warren’s	  poem	  “The	  Leaf,”	  the	  
culminating	  poem	  in	  the	  Island	  of	  Summer	  cycle	  published	  in	  the	  1968	  collection	  
Incarnations.	  	  “The	  Leaf,”	  Bloom	  argues,	  marks	  a	  crucial	  shift	  in	  Warren’s	  poetry,	  much	  like	  
Ash	  Wednesday	  does	  in	  Eliot’s.	  	  It	  marks	  Warren’s	  achievement	  of	  an	  original	  poetic	  voice,	  
which	  comes	  out	  of	  his	  “agonistic”	  overcoming,	  through	  the	  anxiety	  of	  influence,	  his	  
servitude	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  of	  Eliot	  (“Sunset”	  199).	  	  In	  fact,	  Bloom	  claims	  that	  this	  poem	  is	  so	  
important	  because	  the	  shift	  from	  imitation	  of	  Eliot	  to	  Warren’s	  authentic	  poetic	  voice	  
actually	  occurs	  mid-­‐poem.	  	  Lines	  like	  “I	  wanted	  to	  taste	  what	  the	  world	  is,	  wind	  dried	  up	  /	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The	  live	  saliva	  of	  my	  tongue,	  my	  tongue	  /	  Was	  like	  a	  dry	  leaf	  in	  my	  mouth”	  remind	  Bloom	  of	  
Eliot:	  “We	  recognize	  that	  this	  is	  the	  Waste	  Land”	  (Warren	  26,	  Bloom	  201).	  	  And	  yet,	  Bloom	  
convincingly	  argues	  that	  Warren	  explicitly	  repudiates	  Eliot’s	  voice	  in	  the	  section	  that	  
follows:	  
.	  .	  .	  The	  grape	  
Weakens	  at	  the	  juncture	  of	  the	  stem.	  	  The	  world	  
	  
Is	  fruitful,	  and	  I,	  too,	  
In	  that	  I	  am	  the	  father	  
Of	  my	  father’s	  father’s	  father.	  	  I,	  
Of	  my	  father,	  have	  set	  the	  teeth	  on	  edge.	  	  But	  
By	  what	  grape?	  	  I	  have	  cried	  out	  in	  the	  night.	  
	  
From	  a	  further	  garden,	  from	  the	  shade	  of	  another	  tree,	  
My	  father’s	  voice,	  in	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  cicada	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   Ceases,	  has	  called	  to	  me.	  	  (27).	  
Warren’s	  mention	  of	  the	  cessation	  of	  the	  cicada’s	  sound,	  Bloom	  argues,	  “deliberately	  
alludes	  to	  Eliot’s	  ‘not	  the	  cicada’	  in	  ‘What	  the	  Thunder	  Said’;	  but	  the	  prophetic	  trope	  in	  its	  
reversal,	  overcomes	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  The	  Waste	  Land”	  (202).	  	  This	  prophetic	  trope	  is	  the	  
allusion	  made	  here	  to	  Jeremiah	  31:29:	  “The	  fathers	  have	  eaten	  sour	  grapes,	  /	  And	  the	  
children’s	  teeth	  are	  set	  on	  edge,”	  which	  marks	  the	  belief	  that	  succeeding	  generations	  bear	  
the	  punishment	  for	  their	  ancestors’	  sins9	  (NKJV).	  	  Bloom	  claims	  that	  the	  “father”	  Warren	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  In	  its	  context	  in	  Jeremiah,	  this	  belief	  is	  proclaimed	  erroneous.	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speaks	  of	  here,	  given	  the	  allusion	  to	  The	  Waste	  Land,	  is	  Eliot,	  and	  that,	  coupled	  with	  the	  
markedly	  un-­‐Eliotic	  aesthetic	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  poem,	  these	  lines	  assert	  Warren’s	  
authenticity	  apart	  from	  Eliot,	  setting	  his	  poetic	  father’s	  teeth	  on	  edge	  in	  a	  “reversal	  of	  the	  
influence	  process”	  (202).	  
	   This	  reading	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  in	  light	  of	  Warren’s	  own	  evocation	  of	  Bloom’s	  
anxiety	  of	  influence	  concept	  in	  “The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past”	  to	  describe	  the	  self’s	  necessarily	  
dialectical	  relationship	  with	  the	  figures	  of	  tradition,	  literary	  or	  otherwise.	  	  Bloom,	  
surprisingly	  without	  referencing	  “The	  Use	  of	  the	  Past,”	  gives	  a	  reading	  of	  “The	  Leaf”	  that	  is	  
remarkably	  consistent	  with	  Warren’s	  claims	  that	  a	  work	  of	  literature	  exhibits	  the	  self’s	  
relation	  to	  the	  past	  in	  its	  own	  dynamic	  relationship	  with	  the	  literary	  tradition.	  	  Still,	  I	  would	  
go	  beyond	  Bloom’s	  claim,	  fascinating	  as	  it	  is,	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  proverb	  from	  
Jeremiah	  represents	  an	  achievement	  of	  selfhood	  on	  a	  much	  more	  universal	  scale	  than	  
Warren’s	  personal	  transcendence	  of	  Eliot’s	  influence.	  	  I	  read	  the	  “I	  /	  Of	  my	  father,	  have	  set	  
the	  teeth	  on	  edge”	  as	  a	  New	  Critical	  paradox	  par	  excellence	  representing	  the	  self’s	  
acknowledgement	  of	  the	  ethical	  weight	  of	  the	  past.	  	  The	  poem	  begins	  with	  an	  evocation	  of	  
the	  Fall	  in	  the	  Garden	  of	  Eden;	  “I	  lurk	  /	  In	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  fig,”	  remarks	  the	  speaker,	  
saying	  a	  few	  lines	  later,	  “Human	  grief	  is	  the	  obscenity	  to	  be	  hidden	  by	  the	  leaf”	  (24).	  	  Fig	  
leaves	  are,	  of	  course,	  what	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  use	  to	  hide	  their	  nakedness	  after	  eating	  the	  fruit	  
in	  the	  Genesis	  account,	  so	  the	  “grief”	  here	  has	  the	  connotation	  of	  guilt,	  as	  Bloom	  has	  noted	  
(196).	  	  But	  “The	  Leaf”	  is	  not,	  strictly	  speaking,	  a	  poem	  about	  original	  sin,	  sin	  committed	  by	  
a	  parent	  and	  suffered	  by	  descendents,	  but	  of	  sin	  that	  sets	  the	  teeth	  of	  the	  father	  on	  edge.	  	  
Indeed,	  Warren	  reverses	  the	  direction	  of	  original	  sin,	  not	  to	  discredit	  it	  as	  a	  concept,	  but	  to	  
highlight	  the	  self’s	  responsibility	  as	  a	  moral	  agent	  inseparable	  from	  and	  thus	  responsible	  to	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the	  past.	  	  The	  adventure	  in	  selfhood	  presented	  in	  “The	  Leaf,”	  then,	  is	  an	  adventure	  in	  
selfhood	  not	  only	  for	  Warren	  in	  his	  self-­‐definition	  against	  the	  Eliotic	  tradition,	  but	  also	  for	  
the	  reader	  as	  the	  reader	  confronts	  Warren	  in	  his	  poetic	  self-­‐definition	  and	  the	  speaker	  in	  
his	  universal	  human	  self-­‐definition.	  	  Like	  All	  the	  King’s	  Men,	  “The	  Leaf”	  rehearses	  the	  
process	  of	  self	  creation	  on	  multiple	  levels,	  providing	  the	  reader	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
participate	  in	  this	  teleologically	  necessary	  act.	  
A	  Metaphysics	  Incarnate:	  Conclusions	  
In	  the	  introduction	  I	  remarked	  that	  both	  Warren	  and	  Berry	  are	  sons	  of	  Eliot	  in	  that	  
they	  view	  culture	  in	  general	  and	  literature	  specifically	  as	  an	  incarnation	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  
This	  comparison	  works	  for	  Warren	  because	  literature,	  in	  his	  view,	  presents	  dramas	  of	  self	  
creation,	  the	  teleological	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  human,	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  experience.	  	  The	  reader,	  
therefore,	  finds	  an	  abstract	  metaphysics	  made	  immediate	  in	  a	  form	  imposed	  on	  “elements	  
drawn	  from	  the	  actual	  world	  and	  charged	  with	  all	  the	  urgencies	  of	  actuality.”	  
It	  is	  significant,	  in	  this	  connection,	  that	  Warren	  titled	  the	  collection	  that	  includes	  
“The	  Leaf”	  Incarnations.	  	  While	  Bloom’s	  assertions	  that	  Warren	  departs	  from	  Eliot	  
aesthetically	  in	  this	  collection	  may	  be	  true,	  this	  departure	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  ideological	  
one.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  second	  section	  of	  “The	  Leaf”	  suggests	  a	  similar	  view	  to	  Eliot’s	  claim	  that	  
art	  must	  grow	  out	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  The	  speaker,	  who	  has	  come	  to	  a	  hawk’s	  nest	  at	  the	  top	  
of	  a	  cliff,	  identifies	  with	  the	  hawk	  that	  he	  sees	  flying	  above	  him:	  “I	  saw/	  The	  hawk	  shudder	  
in	  the	  high	  sky,	  he	  shudders/	  To	  hold	  position	  in	  the	  blazing	  wind,	  in	  relation	  to/	  The	  
firmament,	  he	  shudders	  and	  the	  world	  is	  a	  metaphor”	  (Incarnations	  25).	  	  Warren	  returns	  to	  
the	  image	  of	  the	  hawk	  obsessively	  in	  his	  poetry,	  and	  here,	  as	  Bloom	  argues,	  it	  represents	  
“poetic	  vision”	  (6).	  	  The	  hawk’s	  vision	  that	  “the	  world	  is	  a	  metaphor”	  from	  its	  high	  position	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would	  be	  an	  irresponsible	  claim	  of	  an	  escapist	  aesthete	  if	  the	  speaker	  had	  not	  proclaimed	  
earlier10,	  in	  “Riddle	  in	  the	  Garden,”	  that	  “The	  world	  means	  only	  itself”	  (7).	  	  The	  poetic	  vision	  
of	  the	  world	  as	  metaphor	  must	  be	  chastened	  by	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  world	  as	  it	  exists.	  	  Indeed,	  
the	  metaphor—and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  poem	  or	  the	  novel—must	  be	  true	  to	  the	  world;	  the	  
poetic	  vision	  must	  embody	  the	  metaphysical	  vision.	  
	  One	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  for	  Warren	  is	  that	  his	  approach	  to	  literature,	  both	  as	  
a	  poet	  and	  as	  a	  critic,	  is	  anything	  but	  ahistorical.	  	  History	  plays	  such	  an	  important	  role	  in	  his	  
metaphysics	  that,	  as	  Charlotte	  Beck	  has	  said,	  he	  “was	  bent	  toward	  a	  persistent	  historicism	  
in	  everything	  that	  he	  wrote”	  (5).	  	  Indeed,	  in	  “A	  Poem	  of	  Pure	  Imagination,”	  his	  long	  essay	  on	  
Coleridge’s	  Rime	  of	  the	  Ancient	  Mariner	  Warren	  writes	  that	  no	  poem	  can	  be	  completely	  
understood	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  form,	  as	  important	  as	  form	  is	  to	  him.	  	  “The	  application	  of	  
the	  criterion	  of	  internal	  consistency	  cannot	  be	  made	  in	  a	  vacuum,”	  he	  writes,	  arguing	  that	  
the	  critic	  should	  consult	  “the	  intellectual,	  the	  spiritual	  climate	  of	  the	  age	  in	  which	  the	  poem	  
was	  composed,”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  author’s	  other	  literary	  work	  and	  the	  author’s	  thought	  as	  
available	  through	  “nonartistic	  sources”	  (New	  397).	  	  This	  approach	  certainly	  runs	  counter	  to	  
the	  common	  generalizations	  about	  the	  New	  Critics’	  literary	  philosophy,	  and	  it	  legitimizes	  
Warren	  for	  many	  contemporary	  critics,	  as	  Beck’s	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren,	  Critic	  both	  argues	  
and	  evidences	  by	  its	  very	  existence.	  
And	  yet	  Warren’s	  common	  ground	  with	  contemporary	  literary	  studies	  should	  not	  be	  
overemphasized.	  	  While	  it	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  there	  are	  any	  number	  of	  critics	  in	  the	  
academy	  today	  who	  would	  find	  much	  to	  agree	  with	  in	  Warren’s	  approach	  to	  literature,	  
some	  undoubtedly	  would	  not.	  	  Fred	  R.	  Thiemann	  has	  argued	  that	  Warren’s	  concept	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  I	  read	  all	  of	  the	  poems	  in	  the	  Islands	  of	  Summer	  cycle	  as	  having	  the	  same	  speaker	  because	  
of	  a	  preponderance	  of	  recurring	  images	  and	  themes	  between	  them.	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self,	  with	  all	  of	  its	  teleological	  implications,	  especially	  opposes	  the	  poststructuralist	  strain	  
of	  contemporary	  literary	  theory.	  	  He	  argues,	  citing	  examples	  from	  Derrida,	  Foucault,	  
Kristeva,	  Lacan,	  and	  others	  that	  “[w]hatever	  differences	  they	  have	  among	  themselves,	  
poststructuralist	  thinkers	  agree	  that	  the	  human	  self	  is	  an	  illusion	  created	  by	  the	  structure	  
of	  language,	  an	  illusion	  which	  always	  supports	  some	  oppressive	  power	  structure”	  (84).	  	  
Such	  a	  position	  is	  not	  necessarily	  at	  odds	  with	  Warren’s	  linking	  of	  literature	  with	  the	  
creation	  of	  selfhood;	  the	  difference,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  where	  Warren	  sees	  this	  as	  edifying,	  
theorists	  with	  poststructuralist	  leanings	  would	  see	  it	  as	  pernicious.	  	  	  
What	  ultimately	  sets	  Warren	  at	  odds	  with	  this	  influential	  strain	  of	  literary	  theory	  is	  
the	  centrality	  of	  his	  avowed	  humanistic	  metaphysics	  to	  his	  aesthetics,	  and	  this,	  I	  argue,	  is	  
precisely	  what	  makes	  his	  position	  useful,	  both	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  academic	  literary	  
studies	  and	  to	  the	  general	  reading	  public.	  	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  all	  contemporary	  scholars	  of	  
literature	  find	  metaphysics	  to	  be	  a	  completely	  empty	  category,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
general	  reading	  public—non-­‐specialists	  who	  actually	  read	  literature	  as	  opposed	  to	  
avoiding	  it	  as	  potentially	  oppressive—shows	  that	  people	  do	  find	  value	  in	  literature.	  	  The	  
distinction	  that	  Warren’s	  view	  brings	  to	  the	  surface	  here,	  between	  those	  that	  view	  
literature	  as	  necessarily	  oppressive	  and	  those	  who	  view	  it	  as	  at	  least	  potentially	  edifying	  in	  
a	  teleologically	  meaningful	  sense,	  I	  argue,	  is	  an	  important	  one.	  	  Attention	  to	  it	  can	  and	  
should	  begin	  conversations	  over	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  implications	  of	  literature	  
implicit	  in	  much	  of	  contemporary	  literary	  theory.	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Chapter	  2:	  Wendell	  Berry	  and	  the	  Place	  of	  Literature	  
Wendell	  Berry	  is	  not	  widely	  known	  as	  a	  literary	  critic.	  	  Those	  familiar	  with	  his	  work	  
are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  know	  him	  as	  a	  novelist,	  poet,	  and	  essayist	  on	  such	  issues	  as	  
ecology,	  farming,	  and	  conservation.	  	  Still,	  he	  has	  written	  two	  full	  books,	  Standing	  by	  Words	  
(1983)	  and	  The	  Poetry	  of	  William	  Carlos	  Williams	  of	  Rutherford	  (2011),	  along	  with	  
numerous	  other	  essays	  about	  literature.	  	  It	  is	  my	  argument	  here	  that	  his	  work	  on	  literature	  
is	  worthy	  of	  more	  attention	  because	  his	  view	  of	  literature,	  like	  his	  view	  of	  ecology,	  is	  
eminently	  and	  urgently	  practical.	  	  Because	  he	  is	  concerned	  with	  questions	  of	  metaphysics,	  
Berry	  is	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  proper	  function	  of	  literature	  that	  has	  
much	  to	  offer	  the	  general	  reading	  public	  and,	  therefore,	  academic	  literary	  scholars.	  
Religion,	  Propriety,	  and	  Place:	  Berry’s	  Metaphysics	  
Indeed,	  Berry	  rarely	  talks	  about	  poetry	  without	  referring	  to	  metaphysics.	  	  In	  “Poetry	  
and	  Place,”	  the	  long	  central	  essay	  of	  Standing	  by	  Words,	  he	  writes,	  “I	  believe	  that	  at	  the	  
source	  of	  our	  [Western]	  poetry	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  poetry	  must	  be	  used	  for	  something,	  must	  
serve	  something,	  greater	  and	  higher	  than	  itself.	  	  It	  is	  a	  way	  to	  learn,	  know,	  celebrate,	  and	  
remember	  the	  truth—or,	  as	  Yeats	  said,	  to	  ‘Bring	  the	  soul	  of	  man	  to	  God’”	  (112).	  	  In	  no	  
uncertain	  terms,	  Berry	  here	  affirms	  the	  centrality	  of	  metaphysics	  to	  literature,	  and	  
literature’s	  edifying	  role	  of	  making	  metaphysics	  immediate	  to	  the	  reader.	  	  Like	  his	  fellow	  
Kentuckian	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren,	  Berry	  sees	  the	  truth	  as	  the	  ultimate	  concern	  of	  literature.	  	  
For	  Berry,	  however,	  that	  “truth”	  is,	  at	  its	  root,	  a	  religious	  one.	  	  	  
Berry	  identifies	  himself	  as	  a	  Protestant	  Christian,	  and	  in	  essays	  such	  as	  “Christianity	  
and	  the	  Survival	  of	  Creation,”	  he	  argues	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  West,	  a	  revitalized	  Christian	  
tradition	  can	  perhaps	  heal	  the	  destruction	  of	  creation	  and	  the	  indelibly	  linked	  destruction	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of	  human	  community.	  	  He	  vehemently	  opposes	  the	  wide-­‐scale	  complicity	  of	  Christians	  in	  
the	  destructive	  practices	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  and	  thus	  distinguishes	  “biblical	  
instruction”	  and	  “allegedly	  respectable	  Christian	  behavior,”	  taking	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  
Christianity	  is	  “dismissible”	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  obvious	  historical	  discrepancy	  between	  
them:	  
We	  could	  simply	  dismiss	  it,	  along	  with	  the	  twenty	  centuries	  of	  unsatisfactory	  
history	  attached	  to	  it	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  The	  problem	  emerges	  only	  when	  we	  ask,	  Where	  
then	  would	  we	  turn	  for	  instruction?	  	  We	  might	  .	  .	  .	  turn	  to	  another	  religion	  .	  .	  .	  
.	  	  Buddhism,	  for	  example,	  is	  certainly	  a	  religion	  that	  could	  guide	  us	  toward	  a	  
right	  respect	  for	  the	  natural	  world,	  our	  fellow	  humans,	  and	  our	  fellow	  
creatures.	  	  .	  .	  .	  But	  there	  are	  an	  enormous	  number	  of	  people—and	  I	  am	  one	  of	  
them—whose	  native	  religion,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  is	  Christianity.	  	  .	  .	  .	  	  We	  can	  
turn	  away	  from	  it	  or	  against	  it,	  but	  that	  will	  only	  bind	  us	  tightly	  to	  a	  reduced	  
version	  of	  it.	  	  A	  better	  possibility	  is	  that	  this,	  our	  native	  religion,	  should	  
survive	  and	  renew	  itself	  so	  that	  it	  may	  become	  as	  largely	  and	  truly	  
instructive	  as	  we	  need	  it	  to	  be.	  	  On	  such	  a	  survival	  and	  renewal	  of	  the	  
Christian	  religion	  may	  depend	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Creation	  that	  is	  its	  subject.	  	  
(Sex	  95-­‐6)	  
This	  is	  no	  easy	  fundamentalism.	  	  It	  is	  even	  possible	  that	  Berry’s	  view	  here	  is	  open	  to	  
criticism	  on	  legitimate	  Christian	  grounds;	  it	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  say	  that	  one	  is	  a	  Christian	  
because	  one	  happened	  to	  be	  born	  in	  a	  place	  where	  the	  “native	  religion”	  is	  Christianity,	  and	  
another	  thing	  entirely	  to	  claim	  Christianity	  because	  one	  believes	  it	  is	  the	  truest,	  most	  
comprehensive	  metaphysics.	  	  Whether	  Berry’s	  localism	  trumps	  his	  commitment	  to	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Christianity	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  this	  project.	  	  It	  will	  be	  enough	  to	  note	  that	  
his	  writing,	  as	  will	  become	  apparent,	  is	  full	  of	  recourse	  to	  the	  Bible	  and	  traditional	  
Christian	  texts,	  which	  suggests	  that	  he	  does	  in	  fact	  view	  the	  major	  doctrinal	  claims	  of	  
Christianity	  as	  true.	  	  And,	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  unlike	  Warren,	  who	  argues	  that	  modern	  
Western	  society	  must	  devote	  itself	  to	  a	  humanistic	  replacement	  for	  Christianity,	  Berry	  
argues	  that	  it	  must	  recover	  and	  revitalize	  Christianity	  as	  its	  guiding	  metaphysics.	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  along	  these	  lines,	  that	  his	  deference	  to	  Buddhism	  in	  the	  
passage	  quoted	  above	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  what	  most	  today	  would	  understand	  as	  pluralism.	  	  
He	  certainly	  respects	  and	  values	  other	  religious	  traditions	  throughout	  his	  work,	  but	  in	  his	  
essay	  “Sex,	  Economy,	  Freedom,	  and	  Community”	  he	  explicitly	  opposes	  a	  postmodern	  
pluralism	  based	  on	  any	  “easy	  assumption	  that	  all	  cultures	  are	  equal	  or	  of	  equal	  value	  and	  
capable	  of	  surviving	  together	  by	  tolerance.”	  	  Here	  he	  is	  arguing	  against	  an	  egalitarianism	  
that	  insists	  on	  relativizing	  every	  culture’s	  metaphysics,	  which	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  he	  opposes	  
all	  kinds	  of	  equality:	  “The	  idea	  of	  equality	  is	  a	  good	  one,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  means	  ‘equality	  before	  
the	  law’”(Sex	  172).	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  legal	  equality	  is	  something	  altogether	  different	  from	  
saying	  that	  two	  individuals’	  or	  two	  cultures’	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  truth	  are	  necessarily	  equal,	  
which	  we	  can	  only	  say	  if	  we	  take	  the	  truth	  to	  be	  unavailable	  or	  nonexistent.	  	  Indeed,	  Berry	  
makes	  this	  distinction	  explicitly:	  “If	  I	  merely	  tolerate	  my	  neighbors	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  
all	  of	  us	  are	  equal,	  that	  means	  I	  can	  take	  no	  interest	  in	  the	  questions	  of	  which	  ones	  of	  us	  are	  
right	  and	  which	  ones	  are	  wrong”	  (173).	  	  	  
To	  be	  sure,	  casting	  egalitarianism	  and	  tolerance	  in	  the	  light	  that	  he	  does	  here	  may	  
seem	  off-­‐putting	  to	  some.	  	  But	  his	  suggestions	  as	  to	  the	  replacements	  for	  these	  terms	  are	  
sane	  enough:	  “In	  order	  to	  survive,	  a	  plurality	  of	  true	  communities	  would	  require	  not	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egalitarianism	  and	  tolerance	  but	  knowledge,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  local	  
differences,	  and	  respect.	  	  Respect,	  I	  think,	  always	  implies	  imagination—the	  ability	  to	  see	  
one	  another,	  across	  our	  inevitable	  differences,	  as	  living	  souls”	  (173).	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  both	  
possible	  and	  desirable	  that	  people	  who	  have	  different	  views	  of	  the	  truth	  approach	  one	  
another	  in	  mutual	  respect	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  tolerating	  one	  another.	  	  And	  it	  may	  be	  that	  
only	  on	  the	  grounds	  Berry	  lays	  out	  will	  people	  be	  able	  to	  have	  authentic,	  productive	  
conversations	  about	  the	  truth.	  
In	  Berry’s	  view,	  such	  conversations	  are	  absolutely	  necessary,	  as	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  
truth	  as	  such	  is	  essential	  to	  all	  areas	  of	  his	  thinking—religious,	  ecological,	  economic,	  and	  
literary.	  	  In	  the	  essay	  “Standing	  by	  Words,”	  Berry	  outlines	  a	  teleological	  view	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  nature,	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  “a	  system	  of	  nested	  
systems:	  the	  individual	  human	  within	  the	  family	  within	  the	  community	  within	  agriculture	  
within	  nature,”	  which	  he	  says	  is	  “perhaps	  an	  updated,	  ecological	  version	  of	  the	  Great	  Chain	  
of	  Being”	  (Standing	  46-­‐7).	  	  The	  “system	  of	  systems”	  is	  hierarchical	  in	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  
the	  smaller	  systems	  must	  be	  held	  accountable	  to	  those	  of	  the	  larger	  systems	  in	  order	  for	  
health	  and	  harmony	  to	  exist.	  	  There	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  a	  guiding	  principle	  for	  this	  
accountability,	  and,	  Berry	  argues,	  “There	  is	  no	  reliable	  standard	  for	  behavior	  anywhere	  
within	  the	  system	  of	  systems	  except	  truth.	  	  Lesser	  standards	  produce	  destruction—as,	  for	  
example,	  the	  standards	  of	  public	  relations	  make	  gibberish	  of	  language”	  (48).	  	  Without	  
reference	  to	  truth,	  standards	  become	  self-­‐serving	  and	  oppressive.	  	  Truth,	  however,	  is	  only	  
partly	  knowable	  to	  humans,	  which	  means	  that	  “the	  system	  of	  systems	  is	  enclosed	  within	  
mystery.”	  	  If	  there	  is	  to	  be	  a	  reliable	  metaphysics	  supporting	  the	  teleological	  ethics	  of	  the	  
system	  of	  systems,	  then,	  it	  must	  acknowledge	  that	  “the	  system	  of	  systems	  has	  to	  be	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controlled	  from	  above	  and	  outside”	  (48-­‐9).	  	  It	  must,	  in	  other	  words,	  involve	  faith	  in	  an	  
ineffable	  order	  that	  transcends	  and	  yet	  sustains	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  creation.	  
	   Berry’s	  account	  of	  faith	  in	  “Poetry	  and	  Place”	  is	  instructive	  here.	  	  He	  sees	  the	  rupture	  
of	  modernity,	  which	  he	  locates	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Eliot’s	  “dissociation	  of	  sensibility,”	  as	  
unduly	  separating	  reason	  and	  faith.	  	  In	  his	  view	  ,	  however,	  Milton’s	  sensibility	  is	  less	  
dissociated	  than	  Dryden’s:	  “Dryden’s	  understanding	  of	  faith	  tends	  to	  set	  it	  apart	  from	  
reason,	  as	  if	  the	  two	  occupied	  separate	  spheres.	  	  But	  Spenser	  and	  Milton	  saw	  the	  two	  
spheres	  as	  concentric,	  that	  of	  reason	  being	  smaller	  and	  properly	  subordinate	  to	  that	  of	  
faith”	  (Standing	  140).	  	  The	  modern	  separation	  of	  reason	  from	  faith,	  he	  argues,	  takes	  part	  in	  
a	  related	  “series	  of	  dichotomies—faith	  and	  work,	  spirit	  and	  flesh,	  mind	  and	  body,	  Heaven	  
and	  earth,	  thought	  and	  action,	  management	  and	  labor,	  poets	  and	  executives—that	  are	  
ruinous	  in	  both	  directions”	  (134).	  	  What	  makes	  this	  separation	  destructive	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  
while	  it	  certainly	  exists	  in	  theory,	  usually	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  faith,	  it	  cannot	  exist	  in	  
practice.	  	  The	  empiricist’s	  faith	  in	  the	  ultimate	  epistemological	  authority	  of	  science	  or	  the	  
technologist’s	  faith	  in	  the	  beneficence	  of	  technological	  progress,	  after	  all,	  “is	  just	  as	  much	  a	  
‘faith’	  as	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  or	  beneficence	  of	  God.”	  	  And	  the	  flip	  side	  of	  this	  coin	  is	  that	  
“these	  faiths,	  which	  are	  assuredly	  not	  empirical,	  nevertheless	  have	  empirical	  results”	  (135).	  	  	  
	   Hence	  Berry’s	  preference	  for	  faith	  in	  a	  “divine	  authority”	  that	  is	  “both	  spiritual	  and	  
moral,	  requiring	  humans,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  humans,	  to	  preserve	  two	  kinships,	  one	  with	  God	  
and	  one	  with	  their	  fellow	  creatures	  in	  nature”	  (140).	  	  Indeed,	  Berry’s	  argument	  for	  faith	  in	  
a	  religious	  metaphysics	  rests	  at	  least	  partially	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  empirical	  results	  of	  
humans’	  faith	  in	  things	  like	  the	  beneficence	  of	  technological	  progress	  and	  positivist	  science	  
have	  been	  destructive	  both	  to	  humans	  and	  to	  our	  “fellow	  creatures.”	  	  Belief	  in	  a	  God	  who	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created	  humans	  in	  his	  own	  image	  ultimately	  entails	  an	  account	  of	  the	  telos	  of	  the	  human	  
that	  necessitates	  a	  preservation	  of	  humanity’s	  connection	  both	  to	  God	  and	  creation.	  	  
Ecologists,	  Berry	  argues,	  have	  at	  least	  partially	  grasped	  this:	  “The	  second	  of	  these	  kinships	  
is	  the	  concern,	  in	  our	  time,	  of	  ecologists,	  and	  of	  others	  who	  wish	  to	  place	  their	  work	  under	  
the	  rule	  of	  ecological	  health.”	  	  Still,	  as	  he	  must,	  he	  remarks,	  “Whether	  the	  second	  kinship	  
can	  thrive	  apart	  from	  the	  first	  is	  a	  question	  we	  will	  probably	  be	  forced	  to	  ask”	  (140).	  
	   This	  drive	  for	  preservation	  that	  comes	  from	  the	  religious	  dimension	  of	  Berry’s	  
metaphysics	  leads	  to	  his	  deep	  concern	  for	  propriety,	  which	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  his	  ethical	  
thought.	  	  He	  defines	  propriety	  in	  “Poetry	  and	  Place”	  as	  a	  consideration	  of	  “who	  and	  where	  
we	  are,	  what	  we	  should	  do,	  and	  how	  we	  should	  do	  it”	  (140).	  	  In	  Life	  is	  a	  Miracle	  (2000),	  he	  
devotes	  a	  whole	  chapter	  to	  propriety,	  where	  he	  emphasizes	  its	  ethical	  implications—and	  
its	  ecological	  necessity—in	  modern	  society:	  
The	  idea	  of	  propriety	  makes	  an	  issue	  of	  the	  fittingness	  of	  our	  conduct	  to	  our	  
place	  or	  circumstances,	  even	  to	  our	  hopes.	  	  It	  acknowledges	  the	  always	  
pressing	  realities	  of	  context	  and	  of	  influence	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  Our	  life	  inescapably	  affects	  
other	  lives,	  which	  inescapably	  affect	  our	  life.	  	  We	  are	  being	  measured,	  in	  
other	  words,	  by	  a	  standard	  we	  did	  not	  make	  and	  cannot	  destroy.	  	  It	  is	  by	  that	  
standard,	  and	  only	  by	  that	  standard,	  that	  we	  know	  we	  are	  in	  crisis	  in	  our	  
relationship	  to	  nature.	  	  (13)	  
It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  what	  Berry	  has	  in	  mind	  here.	  	  Climate	  change,	  pollution,	  deforestation,	  
species	  extinction,	  and	  other	  ecological	  disasters	  that	  are	  and	  will	  increasingly	  be	  a	  concern	  
for	  people	  who	  care	  to	  know	  the	  truth	  about	  our	  current	  state	  do	  indeed	  result	  from	  a	  lack	  
of	  human	  propriety	  as	  Berry	  defines	  it.	  	  I	  can	  think	  of	  no	  better	  way	  to	  evaluate	  our	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civilization’s	  decision	  to	  stake	  a	  global	  economy	  on	  the	  continued	  availability	  of	  fossil	  fuels,	  
the	  burning	  of	  which	  is	  changing	  our	  climate	  in	  ways	  that	  threaten	  all	  life	  on	  earth,	  than	  to	  
deem	  it	  a	  failure	  to	  consider	  the	  “fittingness	  of	  our	  conduct	  to	  our	  place	  or	  circumstances.”	  	  
Thus,	  the	  “standards	  we	  did	  not	  make	  and	  cannot	  destroy,”	  in	  one	  sense,	  are	  the	  natural	  
limits	  of	  ecological	  health,	  the	  standards	  by	  which	  life	  on	  earth	  can	  subsist.	  	  In	  another	  
sense,	  however,	  these	  standards	  are	  divinely	  imposed.	  	  	  
Later	  in	  “Poetry	  and	  Place”	  Berry	  returns	  to	  the	  premodern	  concept	  of	  the	  Chain	  of	  
Being,	  which,	  he	  argues,	  gives	  a	  comprehensive	  basis	  for	  propriety:	  
We	  are	  obviously	  subject	  to	  something	  we	  do	  not	  understand—why	  else	  
would	  we	  be	  making	  so	  many	  mistakes?	  	  What	  the	  old	  believers	  in	  the	  Chain	  
of	  Being	  have	  to	  say	  to	  us	  is	  that	  if	  we	  conceive	  ourselves	  as	  the	  subjects	  of	  
God,	  whose	  law	  is	  in	  part	  the	  law	  of	  nature,	  then	  there	  is	  some	  hope	  that	  we	  
can	  right	  ourselves	  and	  behave	  with	  decency	  within	  the	  community	  of	  
creatures.	  	  We	  will	  be	  spared	  the	  clumsiness,	  waste,	  and	  grave	  danger	  of	  
trying	  to	  make	  up	  our	  own	  rules.	  (Standing	  150)	  
Propriety	  in	  its	  fullest	  sense,	  then,	  must	  base	  itself	  in	  a	  divinely	  ordered	  teleological	  
hierarchy.	  	  	  
	   Here	  Berry’s	  concept	  of	  place	  comes	  into	  focus.	  	  Indeed,	  propriety	  can	  only	  exist	  in	  
relation	  to	  a	  place,	  which	  for	  Berry	  designates	  a	  location	  that	  “is	  not	  just	  social	  and	  
geographical”	  but	  also	  “hierarchical.”	  	  Place	  is	  “both	  horizontal	  and	  vertical”	  in	  the	  sense	  
one’s	  location	  in	  physical	  space	  and	  in	  the	  “system	  of	  systems”	  or	  Chain	  of	  Being—in	  
relation	  to	  nature	  and	  God—should	  dictate	  the	  purpose	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  one’s	  actions.	  	  	  
Place,	  then,	  is	  the	  indispensable	  basis	  for	  propriety:	  “How	  you	  act	  should	  be	  determined,	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and	  the	  consequences	  of	  your	  acts	  are	  determined,	  by	  where	  you	  are.”	  	  An	  act	  marked	  by	  
impropriety	  “might	  violate	  local	  conditions	  or	  mores,	  or	  it	  might	  usurp	  divine	  prerogative,”	  
and,	  by	  the	  same	  logic,	  “[n]ot	  knowing	  where	  you	  are,	  you	  can	  make	  mistakes	  of	  the	  utmost	  
seriousness:	  you	  can	  lose	  your	  soul	  or	  your	  soil,	  your	  life	  or	  your	  way	  home”	  (Standing	  
117).	  
	   Of	  course,	  Berry’s	  critics,	  and	  even	  some	  of	  his	  supporters,	  express	  grave	  qualms	  
over	  his	  notion	  of	  place	  as	  a	  limiting	  principle	  of	  human	  action.	  	  Katey	  Castellano,	  in	  an	  
otherwise	  favorable	  account	  of	  what	  she	  calls	  Berry’s	  “Romantic	  conservatism”	  remarks	  
that	  “Berry’s	  desire	  to	  conserve	  tradition	  and	  environment	  .	  .	  .	  is	  open	  to	  charges	  of	  being	  
hierarchical,”	  a	  concern	  which	  she	  links	  with	  his	  “unapologetic	  Christian	  views”	  (86).	  	  As	  I	  
have	  shown	  above,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  question	  that	  Berry’s	  metaphysics,	  and	  therefore	  his	  
attitude	  toward	  tradition	  and	  the	  environment,	  indeed	  are	  hierarchical,	  and	  explicitly	  so.	  	  
Gary	  Davenport,	  in	  a	  review	  of	  Standing	  by	  Words,	  offers	  a	  more	  pointed	  critique	  of	  Berry’s	  
recourse	  to	  the	  Chain	  of	  Being	  to	  support	  his	  concept	  of	  place:	  “He	  is	  at	  great	  pains	  to	  show	  
how	  this	  concept	  arises	  organically	  from	  his	  view	  of	  nature—and	  in	  fact	  he	  is	  successful	  up	  
to	  a	  point.	  	  But	  his	  attempt	  to	  expand	  the	  notion	  of	  place	  in	  the	  geographical	  sense	  to	  
include	  a	  hierarchical	  sense	  as	  well	  .	  .	  .	  forces	  him	  into	  an	  acceptance	  of	  authority	  that	  is	  
sure	  to	  seem	  rigid	  and	  arbitrary	  to	  most	  modern	  readers”	  (113).	  	  What	  we	  hear	  behind	  
Castellano’s	  trepidation	  and	  Davenport’s	  explicit	  critique	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  useful	  
hierarchical	  thought	  can	  be	  in	  a	  time	  when	  such	  thought	  has	  ostensibly	  been	  rejected.	  	  Part	  
of	  the	  answer,	  I	  think,	  is	  that	  hierarchy,	  unfavorable	  as	  the	  word	  may	  sound,	  is	  unavoidable.	  	  
Even	  relativism	  involves	  hierarchy	  in	  that	  it	  assumes	  its	  deflation	  of	  traditional	  
metanarratives	  is	  superior	  to	  those	  metanarratives,	  and	  does	  so,	  we	  might	  add,	  by	  faith.	  
	  
	  66	  
	   Still,	  Davenport’s	  suggestion	  that	  hierarchical	  thinking	  will	  surely	  seem	  “rigid”	  to	  
most	  readers	  reveals	  the	  deeper	  concern	  that	  openly-­‐embraced	  hierarchy	  leads	  to	  
oppression,	  which	  it	  no	  doubt	  has	  in	  many	  instances.	  	  Berry,	  of	  course,	  recognizes	  this	  
problem:	  “It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  human	  hierarchies	  that	  are	  inflexible	  or	  arbitrary	  or	  
oppressive	  are	  evil.	  	  The	  best	  of	  American	  and	  other	  national	  histories	  has	  been	  made	  in	  
opposition	  to	  that	  kind	  of	  hierarchy;	  one	  of	  the	  best	  human	  traits	  is	  the	  impulse	  to	  resist	  it”	  
(Standing	  148).	  	  The	  point	  Berry	  makes	  is	  that	  there	  are	  metaphysical	  hierarchies	  above	  
human	  hierarchies	  that	  are	  not	  arbitrary.	  	  And	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Berry’s	  insistence	  on	  a	  
divine	  ordering	  of	  metaphysical	  hierarchy	  may	  remain	  unconvincing	  to	  many	  of	  his	  
readers,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  even	  these	  readers	  would	  have	  much	  of	  a	  problem	  with	  
his	  insistence	  that	  human	  concerns	  must	  be	  in	  many	  ways	  subordinated	  to	  ecological	  
concerns	  if	  we	  hope	  to	  survive.	  	  Furthermore,	  those	  who,	  like	  Warren	  and	  Gardner,	  argue	  
for	  a	  humanistic	  metaphysics	  will	  certainly	  find	  plenty	  to	  agree	  with	  in	  Berry’s	  insistence	  
on	  the	  need	  for	  a	  preserving	  propriety	  of	  human	  action.	  
Propriety	  in	  Place:	  Literature	  as	  Preserving	  Culture	  
	   It	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  to	  Berry	  that	  humans	  gain	  and	  preserve	  knowledge	  of	  
their	  respective	  places	  and	  of	  ways	  of	  acting	  with	  propriety	  within	  them.	  	  Humans	  are	  able	  
to	  do	  this,	  he	  argues,	  through	  the	  development	  and	  sustenance	  of	  culture.	  	  As	  for	  Eliot	  
culture	  is	  the	  incarnation	  of	  religion,	  for	  Berry	  culture	  is	  the	  way	  humans	  put	  their	  
knowledge	  of	  place	  into	  practice,	  the	  way	  they	  make	  their	  logos	  flesh.	  	  But	  for	  Berry,	  more	  
so	  than	  for	  Eliot,	  culture	  cannot	  be	  understood	  apart	  from	  community.	  	  In	  “Sex,	  Economy,	  
Freedom,	  and	  Community,”	  Berry	  defines	  community	  as	  follows:	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By	  community	  I	  mean	  the	  commonwealth	  and	  common	  interests,	  commonly	  
understood,	  of	  people	  living	  together	  in	  a	  place	  and	  wishing	  to	  continue	  to	  do	  
so.	  	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  community	  is	  a	  locally	  understood	  
interdependence	  of	  local	  people,	  local	  culture,	  local	  economy,	  and	  local	  
nature.	  	  (Community	  .	  .	  .	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  can	  extend	  itself	  beyond	  the	  local,	  but	  
it	  only	  does	  so	  metaphorically.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  national	  or	  global	  community	  is	  
meaningless	  apart	  from	  the	  realization	  of	  local	  communities.)	  	  (Sex	  119-­‐20).	  
Like	  Warren,	  Berry	  holds	  his	  idea	  of	  a	  community	  up	  against	  the	  modern	  notion	  of	  a	  society	  
wherein	  basic	  needs	  are	  met	  by	  mechanistic	  means.	  	  But	  while	  Warren	  in	  Democracy	  and	  
Poetry	  and	  elsewhere	  implies	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  “common	  values”	  might	  transform	  
an	  entire	  society	  into	  an	  authentic	  community,	  Berry	  insists	  that	  authentic	  community	  
must	  be	  local	  and	  particular.	  	  For	  Berry,	  in	  other	  words,	  one	  of	  the	  common	  values	  that	  
make	  a	  society	  a	  community	  must	  be	  the	  common	  interest	  among	  the	  people	  of	  a	  particular	  
place	  in	  surviving	  and	  flourishing	  in	  that	  place.	  
	   Of	  course,	  the	  community	  Berry	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  the	  small	  farming	  community.	  	  It	  is	  
not	  an	  overstatement	  to	  say	  that	  in	  Berry’	  view	  the	  only	  healthy	  society—both	  culturally	  
and	  ecologically—is	  one	  wherein	  the	  primary	  economic	  base	  is	  agrarian	  and	  is,	  thus,	  made	  
up	  primarily	  of	  small	  farming	  communities.	  	  In	  “People,	  Land,	  and	  Community,”	  Berry	  
reasons	  that	  because	  “[h]uman	  community	  is	  virtually	  synonymous	  with	  good	  farming,	  and	  
good	  farming	  obviously	  must	  outlast	  the	  life	  of	  any	  good	  farmer,”	  any	  individual	  farmer	  
who	  expects	  his	  or	  her	  farm	  to	  last	  for	  more	  than	  just	  his	  or	  her	  lifetime	  must	  be	  part	  of	  a	  
local	  community	  of	  “people	  who	  know	  each	  other,	  who	  understand	  their	  mutual	  
dependences,	  and	  who	  place	  a	  proper	  value	  on	  good	  farming”	  (Standing	  72).	  	  As	  the	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community	  continues	  its	  work	  in	  its	  place	  over	  time,	  culture	  develops:	  “In	  its	  cultural	  
aspect,	  the	  community	  is	  an	  order	  of	  memories	  preserved	  consciously	  in	  instructions,	  
songs,	  and	  stories,	  and	  both	  consciously	  and	  unconsciously	  in	  ways.	  	  A	  healthy	  culture	  
holds	  preserving	  knowledge	  in	  place	  for	  a	  long	  time”	  (73).	  	  For	  Berry,	  the	  function	  of	  
culture	  is	  thus	  to	  preserve—to	  maintain	  and	  nurture	  not	  just	  human	  life,	  but	  also	  the	  places	  
in	  which	  humans	  live	  and	  on	  which	  human	  life	  depends.	  	  Culture,	  then,	  is	  the	  accumulation	  
of	  the	  directing	  and	  limiting	  of	  human	  action	  that	  a	  community	  develops	  over	  time	  to	  
ensure	  that	  its	  members	  continue	  to	  act	  with	  propriety.	  	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  something	  
similar	  to	  Warren’s	  concept	  of	  the	  self—the	  individual	  in	  proper	  alignment	  with	  the	  ethical	  
implications	  of	  both	  history	  and	  the	  present	  community—at	  play	  here.	  	  Indeed,	  Berry’s	  
definition	  of	  culture	  is	  dependent	  on	  that	  culture’s	  development	  over	  time,	  “generation	  
after	  generation,”	  so	  that	  successive	  generations	  may	  learn	  “the	  visions	  and	  failures,	  stories	  
and	  songs,	  names,	  ways,	  and	  skills	  of	  their	  elders,	  so	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  individual	  trial-­‐and-­‐
error	  learning	  can	  be	  lived	  with	  and	  repaid”	  (Standing	  100).	  	  	  
In	  Berry’s	  view,	  culture	  thus	  includes	  everything	  from	  farming	  practices	  to	  local	  
mores	  to,	  of	  course,	  literature.	  	  In	  “Poetry	  and	  Place,”	  Berry	  speaks	  of	  poetry	  as	  “a	  part	  of	  
the	  necessary	  cultural	  means	  by	  which	  we	  preserve	  our	  union,	  the	  possibility	  of	  harmony,	  
with	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  ‘higher	  law’”	  (186).	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  statement	  is	  in	  a	  different	  
register	  than	  his	  definition	  of	  culture	  in	  “People,	  Land,	  and	  Community”	  as	  a	  way	  of	  
preserving	  a	  community	  in	  a	  geographical	  place,	  as	  it	  stresses	  poetry’s	  role	  in	  preserving	  
humans’	  metaphysical	  place	  in	  a	  hierarchy.	  	  As	  I	  shall	  address	  later	  on,	  Berry	  does,	  in	  fact,	  
see	  literature	  as	  serving	  a	  role	  in	  a	  local	  geographical	  place	  as	  well	  as	  a	  hierarchical	  place.	  	  
For	  now,	  though,	  it	  will	  be	  enough	  to	  stress	  that	  these	  dual	  axes	  of	  place	  for	  Berry	  are	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inseparable;	  a	  preserving	  relationship	  with	  the	  hierarchical	  axis	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  preserving	  
relationship	  to	  the	  geographical	  axis:	  “If	  one	  knows	  where	  one	  is	  in	  the	  hierarchical,	  the	  
vertical,	  order,	  then	  one	  can	  see	  where	  one	  is	  in	  the	  horizontal	  order,	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  one	  
can	  attain	  seemly	  competences	  of	  whereabouts”	  (163).	  
Thus,	  when	  Berry	  remarks	  earlier	  in	  “Poetry	  and	  Place”	  that	  poetry	  “is	  a	  way	  to	  
learn,	  know,	  celebrate,	  and	  remember	  the	  truth,”	  what	  he	  means	  by	  “truth”	  is	  the	  
metaphysical	  vision	  by	  which	  we	  know	  our	  place(s)	  and	  from	  which	  we	  learn	  to	  act	  with	  
propriety	  in	  them.	  	  Poetry	  that	  rehearses	  this	  vision	  and	  makes	  it	  immediate,	  for	  Berry,	  is	  
both	  beautiful	  and	  edifying.	  	  Poetry	  that	  rejects	  or	  occludes	  it	  is	  unseemly	  and	  pernicious.	  	  
He	  makes	  this	  case	  and	  elaborates	  on	  it	  by	  extensively	  examining	  the	  work	  of	  major	  poets	  
in	  the	  Western	  literary	  tradition,	  praising	  poets	  who	  hold	  the	  individual	  accountable	  to	  the	  
larger	  concerns	  of	  place,	  and	  criticizing	  those	  who,	  like	  the	  Romantics	  and	  some	  
Modernists,	  assert	  the	  absolute	  autonomy	  of	  the	  individual	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  individual	  
poem.	  
Milton,	  for	  one,	  provides	  Berry	  with	  an	  especially	  interesting	  test	  case	  for	  poetry’s	  
role	  in	  preserving	  the	  place	  of	  the	  human	  in	  that	  Paradise	  Lost,	  he	  argues,	  both	  beautifully	  
rehearses	  the	  need	  for	  propriety	  and	  contains	  a	  “momentous	  flaw”	  wherein	  Milton	  
oversteps	  the	  bounds	  of	  propriety	  (Standing	  114).	  	  “Paradise	  Lost	  is	  written	  in	  praise	  of	  this	  
hierarchical	  order	  [of	  place],	  which	  Satan	  violates	  by	  pride	  and	  then	  causes	  Eve	  to	  violate	  
by	  pride,”	  he	  argues	  (118).	  	  Still,	  he	  states	  early	  on	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  poem,	  which	  he	  
thinks	  is	  immense,	  is	  qualified	  by	  Milton’s	  own	  pride	  in	  Book	  III,	  where	  the	  poet	  takes	  us	  
into	  heaven:	  “[Milton]	  allowed	  his	  artistic	  pride	  to	  carry	  his	  inward	  vision	  or	  imagination	  
directly	  into	  heaven,	  and	  so	  was	  forced	  to	  bring	  God	  on	  stage	  in	  person,	  not	  as	  inscrutable	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mystery	  and	  power	  .	  .	  .	  but	  as	  a	  heroic	  king	  conversing	  in	  Homeric	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Son”	  
(118-­‐9).	  	  This	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  propriety	  because	  it	  depicts	  God	  the	  Father	  as	  a	  person,	  as	  a	  
“voluble	  discourser”	  who	  insists	  on	  informing	  the	  Son	  of	  His	  omnipotence,	  whereas	  “[t]he	  
revealed	  God	  of	  the	  Bible	  is	  never	  more	  than	  partially	  revealed	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	  reduced	  
to	  the	  scale	  or	  the	  comprehension	  of	  the	  mortals	  to	  whom	  He	  is	  revealing	  Himself.”	  	  The	  
result,	  Berry	  says,	  is	  that	  the	  passages	  depicting	  heaven,	  while	  they	  “contain	  some	  
magnificent	  verse,”	  ultimately	  “are	  not	  believable”	  (119).	  	  	  
More	  than	  that,	  Milton	  ironically	  “condemned	  this	  sort	  of	  pride	  and	  condemns	  it	  
explicitly	  in	  .	  .	  .	  Book	  VIII”	  (118).	  	  Berry	  here	  refers	  to	  Raphael’s	  admonishment	  of	  Adam:	  
“Heav’n	  is	  for	  thee	  too	  high	  /	  To	  know	  what	  passes	  there;	  be	  lowly	  wise”	  (qtd.	  in	  Berry	  
118).	  	  And	  it	  is	  this	  thematic	  strand	  of	  Paradise	  Lost	  that	  Berry	  praises	  as	  most	  valuable,	  as	  
it	  rightly	  shows	  that	  disobedience	  amounts	  to	  a	  destructive	  impropriety	  with	  regard	  to	  
place.	  	  In	  Satan’s	  “inordinate	  desire”	  to	  “be	  God”	  and	  in	  Adam	  and	  Eve’s	  fall	  to	  the	  Satanic	  
temptation	  to	  “be	  as	  Gods,”	  Berry	  argues,	  the	  poem	  teaches	  us	  that	  “[t]o	  disobey	  is	  to	  break	  
out	  of	  the	  human	  place	  in	  the	  order	  of	  Creation.”	  	  The	  cultural	  significance	  of	  Paradise	  Lost,	  
then,	  is	  its	  teaching	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  obedience	  rests	  upon	  natural	  order,	  and	  that	  the	  
natural	  order	  in	  one	  of	  its	  aspects	  is	  moral	  and	  hierarchical:	  the	  Chain	  of	  Being.	  	  To	  obey	  is	  
to	  remain	  steadfastly	  in	  the	  human	  place	  in	  the	  Chain	  of	  Being”	  (127).	  	  	  
Berry	  argues	  throughout	  “Poetry	  and	  Place”	  that	  the	  iterations	  of	  The	  Chain	  of	  Being	  
in	  Western	  poetry	  from	  the	  Divine	  Comedy	  to	  Paradise	  Lost	  and	  even	  up	  through	  Pope’s	  
Essay	  on	  Man	  are	  what	  make	  such	  poetry	  culturally	  valuable	  even	  today.	  	  However,	  he	  does	  
argue,	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Eliot’s	  dissociation	  of	  sensibility	  though	  perhaps	  in	  a	  different	  
register,	  that	  in	  Paradise	  Lost	  we	  see	  the	  beginning	  of	  what	  would	  become	  a	  major	  
	  
	  71	  
breakdown	  of	  Western	  culture.	  	  When	  Eve	  contemplates	  not	  giving	  the	  fruit	  to	  Adam	  in	  
order	  to	  maintain	  a	  superiority	  over	  him	  and	  then	  quickly	  rejects	  this	  idea,	  Berry	  argues	  
that	  “the	  most	  significant	  thing	  in	  this	  passage,	  so	  far	  as	  the	  history	  of	  culture	  is	  concerned,	  
is	  the	  fleeting	  equation	  of	  superiority—of	  intellectual	  superiority—with	  freedom”	  (128).	  	  
While	  Berry	  gives	  Milton	  credit	  for	  recognizing	  and	  refuting	  this,	  he	  says	  that	  it	  shows	  us	  
that	  “by	  Milton’s	  time,	  it	  had	  become	  possible	  to	  imagine—perhaps	  impossible	  not	  to	  
imagine—a	  mind	  to	  which	  this	  equation	  would	  be	  a	  creed,	  for	  Eve’s	  rejection	  is	  but	  the	  
countermovement	  to	  Satan’s	  boast	  in	  Book	  I	  that	  ‘the	  mind	  is	  its	  own	  place	  .	  .	  .’”	  (128).	  	  A	  
mind	  that	  sees	  itself	  as	  free	  of	  the	  Chain	  of	  Being,	  as	  having	  no	  proper	  place	  but	  the	  place	  it	  
dictates	  for	  itself,	  is	  destined	  to	  live	  without	  regard	  to	  propriety,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  
destructively:	  	  
As	  it	  has	  developed	  from	  an	  imagined	  possibility	  in	  Milton’s	  time	  to	  the	  
romantic	  rebellion	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  to	  the	  commonplace	  of	  self-­‐
centeredness	  that	  it	  has	  become	  by	  now,	  the	  mind	  has	  shaped	  itself	  less	  on	  
the	  wish	  rejected	  by	  Eve	  than	  on	  the	  desperate	  boast	  of	  Satan:	  though	  it	  has	  
sometimes	  made	  a	  cause	  and	  a	  shibboleth	  of	  human	  ‘equality,’	  it	  has	  
consistently	  asserted	  its	  superiority	  to	  its	  circumstances,	  whether	  of	  the	  
human	  condition	  or	  the	  natural	  world.	  	  .	  .	  .	  In	  one	  of	  its	  aspects,	  this	  is	  the	  
mind	  of	  the	  exploiters	  of	  the	  ‘unknown,’	  from	  Cortes	  and	  Pizarro	  down	  to	  the	  
scientists	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  genetic	  engineering,	  space	  conquest,	  and	  war	  in	  
our	  own	  day.	  	  In	  another	  of	  its	  aspects,	  it	  is	  the	  romantic	  Puritanism	  of	  
Shelley.	  	  And	  these	  aspects	  are	  not	  so	  far	  apart	  as	  one	  might	  believe.	  	  (128-­‐9)	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When	  individuals	  or	  groups	  presume	  to	  break	  (as	  opposed	  to	  adapt)	  the	  cultural	  restraints	  
that	  hold	  them	  in	  their	  places,	  destruction—both	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  of	  humans	  and	  
human	  communities—ensues.	  	  As	  Berry	  indicates	  here,	  poetry	  has	  all	  too	  often	  followed	  in	  
the	  footsteps	  of	  the	  imperialists,	  exploiters,	  and	  irresponsible	  “innovators.”	  	  When	  it	  does	  
this,	  it	  no	  longer	  fulfills	  its	  proper	  cultural	  role	  of	  preservation	  of	  the	  human	  place:	  “One	  
cannot	  divide	  one’s	  mind	  from	  its	  earthly	  place	  .	  .	  .	  without	  denying	  the	  mind’s	  care	  to	  the	  
earthly	  place”	  (167).	  
	   Indeed,	  Shelley,	  apart	  from	  a	  few	  deferential	  remarks	  regarding	  his	  poetic	  skill,	  
receives	  a	  harsh,	  but	  justified,	  flow	  of	  invective	  from	  Berry	  in	  “Poetry	  in	  Place.”	  	  No	  doubt,	  
his	  identification	  with	  Milton’s	  Satan	  is	  something	  of	  a	  softball	  for	  Berry’s	  particular	  line	  of	  
critique.	  	  While	  Berry	  acknowledges	  that	  Shelley’s	  error	  is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
Milton’s	  God	  does	  seem	  like	  a	  tyrant,	  he	  argues	  that	  Shelley	  completely	  misses	  “the	  poem’s	  
traditional	  idea	  of	  order	  with	  one	  hand,	  and,	  with	  the	  other,	  makes	  nothing	  of	  Milton’s	  
struggle	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  authority	  and	  obedience,”	  making	  Paradise	  Lost	  	  “much	  less	  
useful	  and	  instructive	  than	  it	  is”	  (165).	  	  More	  importantly,	  though,	  “Shelley’s	  identification	  
of	  (and	  with)	  Satan	  as	  a	  hero	  generalizes	  the	  principle	  of	  rebellion	  beyond	  any	  issue,”	  
which	  is	  certainly	  problematic	  in	  Berry’s	  view	  of	  the	  human	  place	  in	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  
Chain	  of	  Being.	  	  Shelley,	  he	  says,	  advocates	  “a	  kind	  of	  ultimate	  protestantism.	  	  Any	  authority	  
or	  superiority	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  occasion	  to	  rebel	  and	  overthrow”	  (166).	  
	   Berry	  further	  argues	  that	  Shelley’s	  view	  of	  the	  supreme	  authority	  of	  the	  mind	  
results,	  both	  in	  theory	  in	  A	  Defense	  of	  Poetry	  and	  in	  practice	  in	  his	  own	  poetry,	  in	  an	  
“insistence	  upon	  dividing	  imagination	  from	  reason,	  giving	  poetry	  to	  imagination.”	  	  Indeed,	  
Berry	  balks	  at	  Shelley’s	  insistence	  that	  imaginative	  language	  “has	  reference	  to	  thoughts	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alone,”	  remarking,	  “Once	  imagination	  is	  divided	  from	  reason	  and	  from	  the	  material	  world,	  
it	  loses	  its	  power	  over	  them;	  it	  loses,	  or	  begins	  to	  lose,	  even	  its	  power	  to	  refer	  to	  them”	  
(168).	  	  This	  becomes	  clear,	  Berry	  shows,	  in	  Shelley’s	  Epipsychidion,	  wherein	  the	  poet	  
bemoans	  his	  inability	  to	  consummate	  his	  love	  for	  “the	  Noble	  and	  Unfortunate	  Lady	  Emilia	  
V—”	  because	  of	  his	  marriage.	  	  The	  cascade	  of	  epithets	  in	  praise	  of	  this	  Emilia	  in	  the	  poem’s	  
beginning,	  wherein	  Shelley	  refers	  to	  her	  as	  everything	  from	  a	  “High,	  spirit-­‐winged	  Heart”	  to	  
“a	  lute,”	  Berry	  argues,	  ultimately	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  an	  imaginative	  language	  divided	  from	  
reason—a	  language	  that	  fails	  to	  designate	  anything	  specific:	  “The	  critical	  point	  to	  be	  made	  
here	  is	  that	  after	  so	  much	  effort,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  dependably	  a	  single	  thing	  about	  the	  
history,	  the	  appearance,	  or	  the	  character	  of	  the	  unfortunate	  Emilia”	  (169-­‐70).	  	  Berry	  
amplifies	  this	  point	  in	  his	  final	  judgment	  of	  the	  poem,	  arguing,	  “The	  egotism	  of	  the	  poem	  is	  
omnivorous.	  	  The	  lady,	  one	  feels,	  is	  only	  fodder.	  	  Shelley	  exalts,	  idealizes,	  deifies	  her—the	  
better	  to	  envelop	  her	  in	  the	  mist	  of	  his	  self-­‐exalting	  emotion.	  	  She	  is	  never	  in	  any	  sense	  
presented	  in	  the	  poem,	  which	  only	  tells	  us	  how	  grandly	  Shelley	  feels	  about	  her”	  (173).	  	  The	  
poem,	  then,	  falls	  mightily	  short	  of	  Berry’s	  standards	  because	  of	  its	  principled	  violation	  of	  
propriety.	  	  Shelley’s	  mind	  is	  very	  clearly	  its	  own	  place	  here—his	  individual	  thoughts	  and	  
feelings	  and	  their	  flowering	  in	  his	  imagination	  are	  much	  more	  important	  than	  their	  subject.	  	  
It	  is	  no	  wonder,	  as	  Berry	  goes	  on	  to	  recognize,	  that	  the	  poem	  involves	  Shelley’s	  repudiation	  
of	  marriage—a	  cultural	  institution	  which,	  like	  poetry,	  is	  intended	  to	  preserve	  humans	  and	  
their	  places	  in	  that	  it	  places	  bounds	  on	  human	  sexuality	  that	  preserve	  both	  family	  relations	  
and	  community	  relations.	  
	   Berry’s	  criticism	  of	  Shelley	  echoes	  his	  similar	  criticism	  of	  Auden,	  which	  opens	  
“Poetry	  and	  Place.”	  	  Indeed,	  Berry	  situates	  the	  entire	  essay	  as	  a	  refutation	  of	  Auden’s	  claim,	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in	  “In	  Memory	  of	  W.	  B.	  Yeats,”	  that	  “poetry	  makes	  nothing	  happen”—the	  very	  claim	  that	  
Warren	  renounces	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Democracy	  and	  Poetry.	  	  Berry	  argues	  that	  Auden’s	  poem	  
“lacks	  decorum”—a	  term	  he	  uses	  elsewhere	  interchangeably	  with	  “propriety”—because	  
“[i]t	  is	  not	  fitting	  to	  its	  subject”	  (108).	  	  Especially	  egregious	  is	  the	  “self-­‐conscious	  and	  
presumptuous	  modernity”	  Auden	  betrays	  by	  characterizing	  Yeats’s	  death	  as	  a	  power	  
outage:	  “The	  squares	  of	  his	  mind	  were	  empty,	  /	  Silence	  invaded	  the	  suburbs,	  /	  The	  current	  
of	  his	  feeling	  failed”	  (qtd.	  in	  Berry	  108).	  	  Indeed,	  lines	  like	  these,	  along	  with	  Auden’s	  
proclamation	  that	  poetry	  makes	  nothing	  happen	  do	  seem	  oddly	  out	  of	  place	  given	  the	  
poem’s	  ostensible	  purpose	  of	  honoring	  Yeats.	  	  For	  Berry,	  of	  course,	  this	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  
the	  same	  division	  with	  which	  he	  charges	  Shelley—the	  division	  of	  the	  mind	  and,	  therefore,	  
the	  poem	  from	  its	  place.	  “The	  poem,	  the	  ‘art	  object,’	  is	  preferred	  to	  its	  subject.	  	  It	  proposes	  
to	  exist	  for	  its	  own	  sake”	  (110).	  	  The	  poem’s	  concluding	  lines,	  “In	  the	  prison	  of	  his	  days	  /	  
Teach	  the	  free	  man	  how	  to	  praise,”	  while	  they	  seem	  to	  designate	  that	  poetry	  has	  a	  purpose	  
outside	  of	  itself,	  are	  unsatisfactorily	  vague	  in	  Berry’s	  estimation	  (“But	  praise	  what?	  and	  
why?”)	  and	  thus	  fail	  to	  justify	  the	  existence	  of	  Auden’s	  poem	  (107).	  	  The	  idea	  that	  a	  poem	  
could	  exist	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  Berry	  goes	  on	  to	  argue,	  is	  not	  only	  false	  but	  perniciously	  so	  in	  
that	  it	  proposes,	  like	  Shelley	  does,	  an	  unhealthy	  division	  between	  “words	  and	  acts,	  words	  
and	  things,	  poems	  and	  effects”	  that	  rehearses	  a	  division	  of	  the	  human	  from	  both	  aspects	  of	  
place,	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  Satanic	  impropriety	  and	  the	  destruction	  that	  follows.	  	  When	  
poets	  assume	  that	  poetry	  is	  divorced	  from	  the	  realms	  of	  practical	  and	  ethical	  consequence,	  
Berry	  argues,	  we	  see	  exactly	  this	  kind	  of	  degradation.	  	  	  
Berry	  offers	  this	  line	  of	  questions	  for	  poems	  that,	  divorced	  from	  the	  realms	  of	  
practical	  and	  ethical	  consequence,	  assume	  “autonomy”:	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But	  this	  would	  make	  them	  anomalous,	  unique	  in	  all	  creation.	  	  What	  else	  
exists	  for	  its	  own	  sake?	  	  What	  else	  would	  want	  to?	  	  Or	  to	  put	  it	  less	  
affectively,	  what,	  having	  had	  a	  cause,	  can	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  things	  avoid	  
becoming	  itself	  a	  cause?	  	  How,	  once	  a	  thing	  exists,	  can	  it	  be	  prevented	  from	  
having	  an	  effect?	  	  How,	  once	  its	  inevitable	  power	  as	  a	  cause	  is	  granted,	  can	  its	  
effect	  avoid	  being	  either	  bad	  or	  good?	  	  And	  how,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  conscious	  
effort	  to	  make	  it	  good,	  can	  it	  avoid	  being	  bad?	  	  (111)	  
The	  idea	  of	  “art	  for	  art’s	  sake,”	  Berry	  is	  arguing,	  is	  inherently	  false.	  	  Poems	  do	  have	  
consequences,	  even	  poems	  that	  were	  written	  with	  no	  other	  purpose	  in	  mind	  but	  to	  
“accredit	  their	  makers	  as	  ‘poets’”	  (112).	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  is	  insisting	  that	  because	  poems	  
necessarily	  have	  effects,	  they	  can	  certainly	  be	  judged,	  like	  all	  other	  human	  acts,	  in	  ethical	  
terms.	  	  If	  culture	  and	  poetry	  as	  an	  element	  thereof	  are	  properly	  understood	  as	  ways	  “to	  
learn,	  know,	  celebrate,	  and	  remember	  the	  truth”	  of	  the	  human	  place	  in	  a	  hierarchical	  
metaphysics,	  a	  shirking	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  serve	  this	  purpose	  by	  removing	  poetry	  from	  
any	  relationship	  to	  the	  world	  of	  action	  is	  indeed,	  in	  the	  truest	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  decadent.	  
To	  more	  fully	  examine	  the	  assumptions	  behind	  Berry’s	  distaste	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  “art	  
for	  art’s	  sake,”	  and	  to	  begin	  to	  sketch	  his	  vision	  for	  what,	  specifically,	  a	  decorous,	  culturally	  
edifying	  poetry	  looks	  lie,	  it	  will	  be	  instructive	  to	  turn	  briefly	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Perennialist	  
philosopher	  Ananda	  K.	  Coomaraswamy,	  a	  key	  influence	  on	  Berry’s	  thought.	  	  In	  works	  like	  
Christian	  and	  Oriental	  Philosophy	  of	  Art	  (published	  posthumously	  in	  1956),	  Coomaraswamy	  
purveys	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  “normal,	  traditional,	  and	  orthodox	  view	  of	  art,”	  which	  he	  argues	  
existed	  perennially	  in	  traditional,	  meaning	  religious	  and	  pre-­‐industrial,	  societies	  as	  diverse	  
as	  those	  of	  the	  Native	  Americans	  and	  Medieval	  Europe	  (61).	  	  Like	  Berry,	  Coomaraswamy	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argues	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  autonomous	  art—art	  divorced	  from	  use—is	  false	  and	  dangerous:	  
“[T]he	  whole	  doctrine	  of	  art	  for	  art’s	  sake,	  and	  the	  whole	  business	  of	  ‘collecting’	  and	  the	  
‘love	  of	  art’	  are	  no	  more	  than	  a	  sentimental	  aberration	  and	  means	  of	  escape	  from	  the	  
serious	  business	  of	  life”	  (94).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  here	  that	  term	  “art”	  for	  
Coomaraswamy	  (and,	  following	  his	  lead,	  for	  Berry	  as	  well)	  describes	  not	  a	  category	  of	  
object	  but	  rather	  the	  means	  by	  which	  objects	  are	  properly	  made:	  “art	  is	  the	  making	  well,	  or	  
properly	  arranging,	  of	  anything	  whatever	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  or	  arranged,	  whether	  a	  
statuette	  .	  .	  .	  or	  garden”	  (89).	  	  A	  central	  tenet	  of	  his	  philosophy,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  distinction	  
modern	  Western	  civilization	  makes	  between	  works	  of	  “fine	  art”	  and	  objects	  manufactured	  
for	  use	  is	  not	  present	  in	  the	  traditional	  view.	  	  “In	  our	  traditional	  view	  of	  art,”	  he	  says,	  “there	  
is	  no	  essential	  distinction	  of	  a	  fine	  and	  useless	  art	  from	  a	  utilitarian	  craftsmanship.	  	  There	  is	  
no	  distinction	  in	  principle	  of	  orator	  from	  carpenter,	  but	  only	  a	  distinction	  of	  things	  well	  and	  
truly	  made	  from	  things	  not	  so	  made”	  (27).	  	  This	  dissolution	  of	  the	  divide	  between	  fine	  and	  
useful	  art	  in	  Coomaraswamy’s	  philosophy	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  corollary	  that	  every	  work	  of	  
art,	  from	  seemingly	  mundane	  objects	  like	  furniture	  to	  seemingly	  “finer”	  works	  such	  as	  
poems,	  both	  fulfills	  a	  utilitarian	  purpose	  and	  communicates	  meaning.	  	  “From	  the	  stone	  age	  
onwards,”	  Coomaraswamy	  argues	  regarding	  traditional	  cultures,	  “everything	  made	  by	  man,	  
under	  whatever	  conditions	  of	  hardship	  or	  poverty,	  has	  been	  made	  by	  art	  to	  serve	  a	  double	  
purpose,	  at	  once	  utilitarian	  and	  ideological”	  (92).	  	  This	  “ideological”	  function	  is	  to	  rehearse	  
both	  the	  object’s	  and	  its	  user’s	  position—or,	  in	  Berry’s	  terms,	  place—within	  the	  traditional	  
society’s	  metaphysics.	  	  “[T]he	  art	  of	  a	  traditional	  society	  expresses	  throughout	  its	  range	  the	  
governing	  ideology	  of	  the	  group,	  ”	  he	  says,	  noting	  that	  “[t]he	  transubstantiation	  of	  the	  
artefact	  had	  its	  inevitable	  corollary	  in	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  man	  himself.”	  	  Thus,	  for	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Coomaraswamy,	  the	  “sensitive	  worshiper”	  in	  a	  traditional	  Christian	  society	  does	  not	  see	  a	  
crucifix	  simply	  as	  an	  object	  of	  beauty	  but	  instead	  “feels	  its	  power,	  and	  is	  actually	  moved	  to	  
take	  up	  his	  own	  cross”	  (80-­‐1).	  	  	  
Art,	  in	  Coomaraswamy’s	  view,	  is	  necessarily	  placed	  within	  a	  metaphysics	  and	  
involves	  not	  only	  helping	  humans	  make	  the	  things	  they	  need	  for	  subsistence	  but	  also	  
helping	  them	  remember	  their	  place.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  Berry	  adopts	  
Coomaraswamy’s	  view	  explicitly	  in	  “Christianity	  and	  the	  Survival	  of	  Creation”	  to	  help	  
answer	  the	  question	  of	  how	  humans	  should	  use	  the	  things	  of	  creation	  to	  make	  the	  things	  
that	  they	  need.	  	  Indeed,	  Berry	  amplifies	  Coomaraswamy’s	  argument	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  way	  
any	  society—traditional	  or	  industrial—uses	  the	  creation	  to	  make	  what	  it	  needs	  reflects	  its	  
metaphysical	  vision,	  whether	  that	  vision	  true	  or	  false:	  “If	  we	  understand	  that	  no	  artist—no	  
maker—can	  work	  except	  by	  reworking	  the	  works	  of	  Creation,	  then	  we	  see	  that	  by	  our	  work	  
we	  reveal	  what	  we	  think	  of	  the	  works	  of	  God”	  (Sex	  109).	  	  All	  work,	  in	  other	  words,	  has	  both	  
a	  utilitarian	  and	  a	  metaphysical	  significance,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  harmonious	  work,	  the	  former	  
must	  be	  subordinated	  to	  the	  latter.	  	  This	  means	  that,	  if	  humans	  keep	  both	  significances	  in	  
mind	  in	  their	  work—if	  they	  in	  fact	  work	  by	  a	  healthy,	  traditional	  “art”—they	  will	  
necessarily	  seek	  to	  honor	  both	  of	  them:	  “Traditionally,	  the	  arts	  have	  been	  ways	  of	  making	  
that	  have	  placed	  a	  just	  value	  on	  their	  materials	  or	  subjects,	  on	  the	  uses	  and	  the	  users	  of	  the	  
things	  made	  by	  art,	  and	  on	  the	  artists	  themselves.	  	  They	  have,	  that	  is,	  been	  ways	  of	  giving	  
honor	  to	  the	  works	  of	  God.”	  	  It	  follows	  that	  “the	  artistic	  traditions	  understood	  every	  art	  
primarily	  as	  a	  skill	  or	  craft	  and	  ultimately	  as	  a	  service	  to	  fellow	  creatures	  and	  to	  God”	  
(112).	  	  It	  matters	  immensely,	  then,	  that	  the	  artist	  perform	  his	  or	  her	  art—whether	  this	  be	  
farming	  or	  poetry—well:	  “There	  is	  no	  material	  or	  subject	  in	  Creation	  that	  in	  using,	  we	  are	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excused	  from	  using	  well;	  there	  is	  no	  work	  in	  which	  we	  are	  excused	  from	  being	  able	  and	  
responsible	  artists”	  (113).	  	  	  
To	  be	  an	  able	  or	  responsible	  artist,	  Berry	  claims,	  is	  to	  be	  technically	  proficient	  at	  the	  
specific	  art,	  preserved	  by	  traditional	  culture,	  by	  which	  one	  uses	  the	  things	  of	  creation	  to	  
make	  things	  for	  human	  subsistence	  and	  edification.	  	  “An	  artist’s	  first	  duty,	  according	  to	  this	  
view,”	  he	  says,	  “is	  technical”	  (112).	  	  Poetry,	  of	  course,	  is	  no	  exception.	  	  Berry	  makes	  this	  
explicit	  in	  “Poetry	  and	  Place,”	  remarking,	  “Poetry’s	  artificiality,	  its	  technical	  and	  formal	  
difficulty	  .	  .	  .	  will	  prevent	  us	  from	  presuming	  upon	  and	  abusing	  the	  source.	  	  The	  source	  of	  
poetry,	  like	  the	  sources	  of	  all	  other	  domestic	  goods,	  is	  not	  our	  own.	  	  To	  draw	  upon	  it	  
without	  falsifying	  or	  destroying	  it,	  we	  must	  become	  worthy	  of	  it”	  (Standing	  192-­‐3).	  	  This	  
source,	  Berry	  argues	  by	  citing	  the	  tradition	  of	  invocations	  to	  the	  muse,	  is	  “inspiration,”	  
which	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  Warren,	  in	  “Knowledge	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  Man,”	  calls	  “the	  deep	  
engagement	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  world”—the	  as-­‐yet	  unarticulated	  apprehension	  of	  the	  truth.	  	  
And	  the	  technique	  of	  form,	  for	  Berry	  as	  for	  Warren,	  is	  what	  chastens	  and	  orders	  this	  
apprehension,	  what	  makes	  the	  poet	  worthy	  of	  it.	  
Indeed,	  form	  for	  Berry	  is	  at	  least	  in	  part	  what	  differentiates	  poetry	  from	  other	  kinds	  
of	  language.	  	  In	  “Poetry	  and	  Marriage,”	  the	  essay	  that	  precedes	  “Poetry	  and	  Place”	  in	  
Standing	  by	  Words,	  Berry	  compares	  the	  form	  of	  poetry	  to	  the	  “form”	  of	  marriage,	  pointing	  
out	  that	  both	  forms	  necessarily	  involve	  limitation;	  just	  as	  a	  married	  couple	  limits	  their	  love	  
to	  one	  another,	  renouncing	  the	  possibility	  and	  the	  freedom	  of	  sexual	  relationships	  with	  
other	  people,	  the	  poet	  likewise	  commits	  him	  or	  herself	  to	  certain	  limits:	  “Poetry	  is	  made	  of	  
words;	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  keep	  a	  certain	  fidelity	  to	  everyday	  speech	  and	  a	  certain	  fidelity	  to	  
music;	  if	  it	  is	  unspeakable	  or	  unmusical,	  it	  is	  not	  poetry”	  (93).	  	  And	  yet	  these	  limits,	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paradoxically,	  are	  what	  open	  poetry	  up	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  inspiration.	  	  While	  Berry	  allows	  
that	  a	  “set	  verse	  form	  can,	  of	  course,	  be	  used	  like	  a	  cookie	  cutter	  or	  a	  shovel,	  including	  and	  
excluding	  arbitrarily	  by	  its	  own	  rule,”	  he	  also	  argues	  that,	  used	  rightly,	  it	  “can	  be	  used	  also	  
to	  summon	  into	  a	  poem	  .	  .	  .	  its	  unforeseen	  belongings	  and	  thus	  is	  not	  rigid	  but	  freeing—an	  
invocation	  to	  unknown	  possibility”	  (96).	  	  Just	  as	  marriage,	  in	  the	  traditional	  and	  Christian	  
sense,	  makes	  the	  couple	  worthy	  of	  sexuality	  and	  prepares	  them	  for	  the	  “unknown	  
possibility”	  of	  a	  life	  together,	  poetic	  form	  prepares	  the	  way	  for	  a	  coherent	  vision	  of	  
metaphysical	  truth.	  
Furthermore,	  form	  connects	  the	  poet	  to	  a	  vital	  and	  continuing	  tradition.	  	  “Part	  of	  the	  
nature	  of	  a	  form	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  it	  is	  communal—that	  it	  can	  be	  bequeathed	  and	  inherited,	  
that	  it	  can	  be	  taught,	  not	  as	  an	  instance	  (a	  relic),	  but	  as	  a	  way	  still	  usable,”	  Berry	  argues,	  
connecting	  poetic	  form	  to	  his	  idea	  of	  culture	  as	  the	  set	  of	  ways	  by	  which	  a	  community	  
preserves	  “both	  itself	  and	  its	  natural	  place”	  (99,	  100).	  	  When	  Spenser	  tells	  Chaucer	  that	  he	  
intends	  to	  “follow	  here	  the	  footing	  of	  thy	  feete”	  in	  The	  Faerie	  Queen,	  Berry	  argues,	  he	  is	  
acknowledging	  a	  “filial”	  relationship	  in	  a	  living	  tradition,	  following	  Chaucer’s	  form	  not	  
simply	  to	  “obey	  an	  arbitrarily	  imposed	  technical	  requirement”	  but	  to	  preserve	  “his	  place	  in	  
his	  cultural	  lineage”	  (95).	  	  Berry	  certainly	  allows	  that	  forms	  must	  change	  to	  accommodate	  
new	  situations	  and	  new	  subjects,	  so	  long	  as	  such	  change	  is	  “by	  necessity”	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  
“adaptation”	  as	  opposed	  to	  “contrived	  change,	  or	  novelty”	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  (102).	  	  And	  he	  
goes	  on	  to	  allow	  that	  new	  forms,	  such	  as	  Whitman’s	  free	  verse,	  are	  perhaps	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  grapple	  with	  new	  kinds	  of	  subjects	  (in	  Whitman’s	  case,	  the	  newness	  of	  the	  
American	  experience)	  (104).	  	  Still,	  form	  in	  Berry’s	  view	  is	  a	  way	  a	  poem	  preserves	  a	  
coherence	  with	  a	  cultural	  tradition,	  and,	  as	  in	  Warren’s	  view,	  it	  connects	  both	  the	  poet	  and	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the	  reader	  to	  the	  past.	  	  “Forms	  join	  the	  diverse	  things	  that	  they	  contain,”	  he	  argues,	  “they	  
join	  their	  contents	  and	  their	  context;	  they	  join	  us	  to	  themselves;	  they	  join	  us	  to	  each	  other;	  
they	  join	  writers	  and	  readers;	  they	  join	  generations	  together,	  the	  young	  and	  the	  old,	  the	  
living	  and	  the	  dead.”	  	  For	  a	  poet,	  this	  means	  that	  “the	  mastery	  of	  poetic	  form”	  is	  “an	  
entrance	  into	  a	  timeless	  community”	  (105).	  	  
	  And	  yet,	  there	  is	  another	  dimension	  of	  form	  in	  Berry’s	  view	  that	  is	  perhaps	  even	  
more	  important.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  “Poetry	  and	  Marriage,”	  Berry	  argues	  that	  because	  different	  
kinds	  of	  forms,	  such	  as	  poetry	  and	  marriage,	  share	  the	  purpose	  of	  “joining,”	  they	  “tend	  to	  be	  
analogues	  of	  each	  other	  and	  to	  resonate	  with	  one	  another”	  (105).	  	  Thus,	  poetic	  form	  
resonates	  with	  the	  harmonious,	  hierarchical	  “system	  of	  systems”	  that	  comprises	  
metaphysical	  reality,	  which	  is	  itself	  a	  form,	  albeit	  an	  inscrutable	  one.	  	  He	  writes	  in	  “The	  
Responsibility	  of	  the	  Poet”:	  
By	  its	  formal	  integrity	  a	  poem	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  formal	  integrity	  of	  other	  
works,	  creatures,	  and	  structures	  of	  the	  world.	  	  The	  form	  of	  a	  good	  poem	  is,	  in	  
a	  way	  perhaps	  not	  altogether	  explainable	  or	  demonstrable,	  an	  analogue	  of	  
the	  forms	  of	  other	  things.	  	  By	  its	  form	  it	  alludes	  to	  other	  forms,	  evokes	  them,	  
resonates	  with	  them,	  and	  so	  becomes	  a	  part	  of	  the	  system	  of	  analogies	  or	  
harmonies	  by	  which	  we	  live.	  	  Thus	  the	  poet	  affirms	  and	  collaborates	  in	  the	  
formality	  of	  Creation.	  	  (What	  89)	  	  	  
This	  is,	  of	  course,	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  Warren’s	  view	  of	  poetic	  form	  as	  a	  “myth	  of	  
order”—a	  participation	  in	  and	  an	  elucidation	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  order	  that	  transcends	  




Literature	  and	  the	  Local	  Imagination	  
	   It	  may	  seem	  odd	  on	  the	  surface	  that	  William	  Carlos	  Williams,	  given	  his	  antipathy	  for	  
traditional	  form,	  would	  gain	  such	  a	  high	  place	  in	  Berry’s	  thought	  about	  the	  role	  of	  literature	  
as	  to	  warrant	  the	  publication	  of	  2011’s	  The	  Poetry	  of	  William	  Carlos	  Williams	  of	  Rutherford,	  
the	  only	  book	  he	  has	  devoted	  to	  a	  concerted	  study	  of	  a	  single	  writer.	  	  In	  this	  book,	  Berry	  
finds	  himself	  forced	  to	  reconcile	  his	  reverence	  for	  Williams	  with	  his	  view	  of	  form	  as	  tying	  
one	  to	  a	  vital	  cultural	  tradition.	  	  He	  does	  this	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  he	  makes	  a	  place	  in	  
his	  thought	  for	  Whitman.	  	  Williams,	  even	  more	  than	  Whitman,	  found	  himself	  in	  a	  place—
the	  suburb	  of	  Rutherford,	  New	  Jersey,	  which	  was	  quickly	  being	  overtaken	  and	  urbanized	  by	  
industrial	  New	  York—that	  had	  no	  vital	  cultural	  tradition	  and	  yet	  badly	  needed	  one.	  	  “If	  we	  
bear	  in	  mind	  Williams’	  pressing	  need	  for	  a	  language	  and	  a	  poetry	  adequate	  to	  the	  ‘mass	  of	  
detail’	  that	  he	  faced	  daily	  in	  his	  chosen	  place,	  it	  is	  in	  no	  way	  surprising	  that	  he	  rejected	  the	  
traditional	  prosody	  of	  English	  verse,”	  Berry	  argues.	  	  Because	  “the	  traditional	  forms	  of	  lines	  
and	  stanzas	  stood	  obstructively	  between	  him	  and	  the	  experience	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  get	  at,”	  
the	  experience	  of	  a	  “provincial”	  place	  being	  industrialized	  out	  of	  authentic	  existence,	  “[t]he	  
adequate	  forms	  would	  have	  to	  be	  invented—a	  hardship	  that	  Williams	  conscientiously	  
chose”	  (118).	  	  Thus,	  while	  Williams	  could	  not	  work	  with	  traditional	  English	  verse	  forms,	  he	  
had	  to	  devote	  himself	  to	  fitting	  new	  forms	  to	  his	  place.	  	  His	  place,	  Berry	  argues,	  thus	  
actually	  serves	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  form:	  	  “Williams’	  commitment	  to	  life	  and	  practice	  in	  his	  
‘province’	  is	  formative	  and	  a	  kind	  of	  form”	  (130).	  
	   This	  is	  an	  extreme	  example	  of	  the	  need	  he	  allows	  in	  “Poetry	  and	  Marriage”	  for	  
“adaptation”	  of	  form	  to	  new	  circumstances.	  	  And,	  indeed,	  Berry	  uses	  the	  word	  “adaptation”	  
to	  describe	  Williams’	  work,	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  why	  it	  is	  so	  central	  to	  his	  own.	  	  Williams,	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Berry	  argues,	  was	  concerned	  with	  “local	  adaptation,”	  which	  he	  says	  is	  “an	  issue	  of	  history,	  
culture,	  and	  geography	  to	  which	  poetry	  is	  subordinate	  though	  necessary”	  and	  “has	  
everything	  to	  do	  with	  discovering	  where	  one	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  one’s	  place	  (native	  or	  chosen),	  
to	  its	  natural	  and	  human	  neighborhood,	  to	  its	  mystery	  and	  sanctity,	  and	  with	  discovering	  
right	  ways	  of	  living	  and	  working	  there”	  (9).	  	  That	  Williams	  devoted	  his	  life	  not	  only	  to	  
writing	  poetry	  but	  to	  a	  medical	  practice	  in	  the	  “provincial”	  community	  of	  Rutherford	  makes	  
him	  a	  fitting	  patron	  saint	  for	  Berry,	  who	  likewise	  sees	  himself	  as	  a	  non-­‐specialist	  writer	  and	  
farmer	  in	  his	  provincial	  community	  of	  Port	  Royal,	  Kentucky.	  	  Furthermore,	  Berry’s	  praise	  of	  
Williams’	  work	  of	  local	  adaptation	  demonstrates	  how	  poetry	  relates	  to	  the	  geographical—
and	  not	  just	  the	  hierarchical—aspect	  of	  Berry’s	  concept	  of	  place.	  
	   Indeed,	  in	  his	  book	  on	  Williams	  Berry	  brings	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  teleological	  role	  of	  
literature	  to	  completion.	  	  Williams’	  poetry,	  Berry	  argues,	  aims	  to	  fulfill	  the	  cultural	  role	  he	  
describes	  elsewhere	  of	  enabling	  a	  community	  to	  preserve	  itself	  in	  its	  geographical	  place.	  	  It	  
reaches	  that	  end,	  he	  says,	  by	  viewing	  the	  place	  through	  the	  imagination.	  	  Indeed,	  
imagination	  is	  as	  important	  a	  term	  for	  Berry	  as	  it	  was	  for	  Williams.	  	  He	  describes	  it	  in	  this	  
way	  in	  “It	  All	  Turns	  on	  Affection,”	  his	  2012	  Jefferson	  Lecture:	  “To	  imagine	  is	  to	  see	  most	  
clearly,	  familiarly,	  and	  understandingly	  with	  the	  eyes,	  but	  also	  to	  see	  inwardly,	  with	  ‘the	  
mind’s	  eye.’	  	  It	  is	  to	  see,	  not	  passively,	  but	  with	  a	  force	  of	  vision	  and	  even	  with	  a	  visionary	  
force.	  	  To	  take	  it	  seriously	  we	  must	  give	  up	  at	  once	  any	  notion	  that	  imagination	  is	  
disconnected	  from	  reality	  or	  truth	  or	  knowledge.”	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  imagination	  
has	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  place:	  	  	  
To	  have	  a	  place,	  to	  live	  and	  belong	  in	  a	  place,	  to	  live	  from	  a	  place	  without	  
destroying	  it,	  we	  must	  imagine	  it.	  	  By	  imagination	  we	  see	  it	  illuminated	  by	  its	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own	  unique	  character	  and	  by	  our	  love	  for	  it.	  	  By	  imagination	  we	  recognize	  
with	  sympathy	  the	  fellow	  members,	  human	  and	  nonhuman,	  with	  whom	  we	  
share	  our	  place.	  	  .	  .	  .	  As	  imagination	  enables	  sympathy,	  sympathy	  enables	  
affection.	  	  And	  in	  affection	  we	  find	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  neighborly,	  kind,	  and	  
conserving	  economy.	  	  (14)	  
It	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  imagination	  that	  Berry	  praises	  Williams	  for	  exhibiting	  in	  his	  poetry.	  	  While	  
he	  acknowledges	  that	  Williams’	  concept	  of	  the	  imagination	  is	  part	  of	  a	  long	  lineage	  going	  
back	  at	  least	  to	  Coleridge	  and	  Blake,	  he	  argues	  that	  Williams’	  poetry	  is	  distinctive	  because	  
“[t]o	  Williams	  .	  .	  .	  the	  imagination	  was	  by	  definition	  embodied”	  (51).	  	  Berry	  latches	  onto	  
Williams’	  “Say	  it!	  No	  ideas	  but	  in	  things,”	  arguing	  that	  in	  this	  famous	  proclamation	  
“Williams	  is	  speaking	  .	  .	  .	  of	  embodied	  ideas.	  	  He	  could	  have	  evoked	  John	  1:14	  (‘and	  the	  
Word	  was	  made	  flesh,	  and	  dwelt	  among	  us	  .	  .	  .’)”	  (48).	  
	   Again,	  Eliot’s	  definition	  of	  culture	  as	  the	  incarnation	  of	  religion	  looms	  large11.	  	  The	  
“ideas”	  Berry	  sees	  embodied	  in	  Williams’s	  poetry	  are	  certainly	  metaphysical.	  	  Berry	  praises	  
Williams’	  claim	  in	  Spring	  and	  All	  that	  “[t]o	  refine,	  to	  clarify,	  to	  intensify	  that	  eternal	  
moment	  in	  which	  we	  alone	  live	  there	  is	  but	  a	  single	  force—the	  imagination”	  (qtd.	  in	  Berry	  
138),	  saying,	  “Imagination	  is	  the	  power	  to	  see	  things	  in	  their	  ‘eternal	  moment’	  in	  which,	  
only	  in	  which,	  they	  are	  real	  and	  we	  are	  alive.	  	  It	  is	  this,	  the	  convergence	  of	  the	  eternal	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Berry	  acknowledges,	  of	  course,	  Williams’	  long-­‐standing	  disdain	  for	  Eliot’s	  
cosmopolitanism.	  	  Rather	  than	  echoing	  Williams’	  judgment,	  however,	  Berry	  argues	  that	  
Eliot	  and	  Williams	  did	  not	  differ	  ideologically	  as	  much	  as	  some	  might	  think.	  	  Their	  
differences,	  he	  says,	  stem	  mainly	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  Eliot	  “had	  clothed	  himself,	  so	  to	  
speak,	  in	  the	  English	  cultural	  tradition,	  .	  .	  .	  Williams	  felt	  himself	  naked	  in	  New	  Jersey,	  





the	  present,	  that	  is	  possible	  and	  that	  is	  real	  only	  in	  the	  imagination”	  (143).	  	  Through	  the	  
imagination,	  poetry	  thus	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  things—concrete	  things	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  
concrete	  places—in	  their	  “eternal	  moment,”	  which	  includes	  not	  only	  what	  they	  presently	  
are	  (though	  that	  as	  well)	  but	  also	  what	  they	  could	  be:	  	  
Poetry,	  then,	  is	  the	  means	  of	  giving	  to	  realizations	  of	  the	  fleeting	  eternal	  
moment	  a	  kind	  of	  permanent	  presence,	  so	  that	  amid	  the	  confusions	  of	  the	  
ever-­‐accumulating	  mass	  of	  details	  they	  can	  be	  returned	  to,	  not	  as	  ends	  in	  
themselves,	  I	  assume,	  but	  as	  reminders	  of	  an	  indispensable	  possibility,	  a	  
wakefulness,	  belonging	  to	  the	  highest	  definition	  of	  our	  humanity.	  	  (143)	  
As	  it	  is	  for	  Warren,	  poetry	  for	  Berry	  is	  thus	  a	  chastened	  and	  metaphysically	  informed	  vision	  
of	  the	  real	  world.	  	  And	  this	  vision	  is	  indispensable:	  
We	  do	  not	  necessarily	  contradict	  Blake,	  who	  thought	  that	  the	  arts	  were	  our	  
way	  of	  conversing	  with	  Paradise,	  if	  we	  say	  that	  they	  can	  also	  be	  our	  way	  of	  
conversing	  with	  our	  earthly	  places.	  	  Blake	  picked	  up	  one	  end	  of	  that	  string,	  
Williams	  the	  other.	  	  It	  is	  most	  important,	  I	  think,	  to	  see	  that	  the	  two	  ends	  
belong	  to	  the	  same	  string.	  	  What	  we	  know	  of	  Paradise	  we	  learn	  here,	  by	  
looking,	  by	  vision,	  by	  imagination,	  and	  both	  Paradise	  and	  the	  ground	  
underfoot	  are	  always	  beyond	  the	  perfect	  grasp	  of	  our	  arts,	  as	  of	  our	  sciences.	  	  
(147)	  
The	  two	  ends	  of	  this	  string,	  of	  course,	  correspond	  with	  the	  two	  axes	  of	  Berry’s	  concept	  of	  
place.	  	  In	  Berry’s	  view,	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  poetry	  can	  help	  the	  human	  imagine	  his	  or	  her	  place	  
in	  the	  metaphysical	  hierarchy	  of	  creation,	  in	  the	  material	  locality	  of	  creation,	  and	  in	  the	  
correspondence	  between	  the	  two.	  	  This	  imagination	  is	  central	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  place	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because	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  vision—an	  eschatological	  vision,	  even—of	  that	  place	  both	  as	  it	  is	  and	  
also	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  that	  place’s	  improvement	  or	  even	  redemption.	  	  	  
	   This	  imaginative	  vision	  is	  also	  available,	  Berry	  argues,	  in	  fiction.	  	  I	  have	  been	  
referring	  to	  his	  work	  on	  poetry	  thus	  far	  mainly	  because	  he	  has	  produced	  much	  more	  of	  it	  
than	  he	  has	  on	  fiction,	  but	  also	  because,	  like	  Warren,	  he	  sees	  fiction	  as	  functioning	  in	  
roughly	  the	  same	  way	  as	  poetry.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  “Imagination	  and	  Place”	  (2004),	  he	  speaks	  of	  
his	  own	  fiction	  as	  a	  way	  for	  him	  to	  imagine	  his	  place,	  the	  small	  farming	  community	  of	  Port	  
Royal,	  Kentucky,	  in	  terms,	  not	  only	  of	  “[h]ow	  things	  really	  are12”	  but	  also	  of	  “how	  things	  
will	  be,	  how	  you	  want	  things	  to	  be,	  how	  things	  ought	  to	  be,”	  (14).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  fiction	  
as	  in	  poetry	  the	  two	  ends	  of	  the	  imaginative	  string,	  Blake’s	  Paradise	  and	  Williams’	  “ground	  
underfoot,”	  are	  rendered	  for	  the	  reader.	  
	   And,	  indeed,	  we	  see	  this	  borne	  out	  in	  Berry’s	  fiction.	  	  Like	  Thomas	  Hardy	  and	  
William	  Faulkner,	  both	  of	  whom	  Berry	  cites	  as	  influences,	  all	  of	  his	  fiction	  is	  set	  in	  an	  
imagined	  place13—Port	  	  William,	  Kentucky,	  which	  is	  a	  thinly-­‐veiled	  version	  of	  his	  real-­‐life	  
home,	  Port	  Royal.	  	  This	  has	  allowed	  him,	  he	  says	  in	  “Imagination	  in	  Place,”	  to	  present	  a	  
redemptive	  vision	  of	  his	  own	  place:	  “I	  have	  made	  the	  imagined	  town	  of	  Port	  William	  .	  .	  .	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  honor	  the	  actual	  place	  where	  I	  have	  lived.	  	  By	  means	  of	  the	  imagined	  place,	  
over	  the	  last	  fifty	  years,	  I	  have	  learned	  to	  see	  my	  native	  landscape	  and	  neighborhood	  as	  a	  
place	  unique	  in	  the	  world,	  a	  work	  of	  God,	  possessed	  of	  an	  inherent	  sanctity	  that	  mocks	  any	  
human	  valuation	  that	  can	  be	  put	  upon	  it”	  (15).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  He	  makes	  this	  remark	  in	  reference	  to	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  “the	  standard	  of	  
realism.”	  
13	  I	  take	  Berry’s	  adoption	  of	  an	  imagined	  place,	  following	  Hardy’s	  Wessex	  and	  Faulkner’s	  
Yoknapatawpha,	  as	  the	  setting	  for	  his	  entire	  fictional	  oeuvre	  to	  be	  analogous	  to	  his	  
description	  of	  Spenser’s	  adaptation	  of	  Chaucer’s	  forms	  to	  preserve	  his	  place	  in	  an	  ongoing	  
“cultural	  lineage”	  or	  poetic	  tradition.	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   Nowhere	  is	  this	  more	  clear	  than	  in	  Remembering,	  a	  novel	  originally	  published	  in	  
1988	  and	  then	  again	  in	  2002	  as	  part	  of	  the	  collection	  Three	  Short	  Novels.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  novel	  
embodies	  Berry’s	  dual	  concept	  of	  place	  by	  depicting	  protagonist	  Andy	  Catlett’s	  struggle	  
with	  the	  temptation	  to	  abandon	  his	  life	  as	  a	  farmer	  in	  Port	  William	  and	  its	  ultimate	  
resolution	  into	  a	  redemptive	  imagination	  of	  his	  place.	  	  (Andy,	  a	  writer	  who	  moves	  back	  
home	  to	  become	  a	  farmer,	  is	  Berry’s	  most	  autobiographical	  character.)	  	  Remembering	  is	  
anomalous	  in	  Berry’s	  fiction	  because	  most	  of	  the	  story	  happens	  away	  from	  Port	  William,	  
following	  Andy	  in	  his	  travels	  to	  present	  at	  academic	  agriculture	  conferences.	  	  In	  the	  very	  pit	  
of	  his	  despair—due	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  self-­‐pity	  over	  the	  loss	  of	  his	  hand	  in	  a	  farming	  
accident,	  the	  resulting	  estrangement	  from	  his	  wife	  Flora,	  and	  frustration	  over	  the	  trials	  of	  
being	  a	  small	  farmer	  in	  the	  age	  of	  agribusiness—he	  decides	  to	  walk	  the	  streets	  of	  San	  
Francisco.	  	  On	  his	  walk,	  he	  begins	  to	  imagine	  leaving	  his	  wife,	  his	  family,	  and	  his	  farm	  in	  
Port	  William	  forever:	  	  	  
Andy	  is	  filled	  with	  a	  yearning	  toward	  this	  place.	  	  He	  imagines	  himself	  living	  
here.	  	  .	  .	  .	  He	  would	  live	  alone,	  and	  slowly	  he	  would	  come	  to	  know	  a	  
peacefulness	  and	  gentleness	  in	  his	  own	  character,	  having	  no	  one	  to	  quarrel	  
with.	  	  He	  would	  have	  a	  job	  that	  he	  could	  walk	  to	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  walk	  
home	  from	  in	  the	  evening.	  	  It	  would	  be	  a	  job	  that	  would	  pay	  him	  well	  and	  
give	  him	  nothing	  to	  worry	  about	  before	  he	  went	  to	  it	  or	  after	  he	  left	  it.	  	  	  .	  .	  .	  	  In	  
his	  travels	  he	  would	  meet	  beautiful,	  indolent,	  slow-­‐speaking	  women	  as	  




What	  Andy	  is	  imagining	  here,	  of	  course,	  is	  autonomy.	  	  By	  yearning	  to	  reject	  his	  place	  in	  Port	  
William	  and	  within	  his	  marriage,	  Andy’s	  mind	  yearns	  to	  be	  its	  own	  place.	  	  His	  imagination,	  
unlike	  Williams’,	  loses	  touch	  with	  the	  “ground	  underfoot.”	  	  	  
But	  after	  a	  flood	  of	  memories	  of	  his	  ancestors	  in	  Port	  William,	  he	  ultimately	  decides	  
to	  return.	  	  When	  he	  does,	  he	  finds	  that	  his	  family	  has	  gone	  to	  visit	  a	  nearby	  neighbor	  and	  
decides	  to	  take	  a	  walk	  in	  the	  woods	  surrounding	  his	  farm.	  	  On	  the	  walk,	  he	  lays	  down,	  falls	  
asleep,	  and	  dreams	  a	  much	  different	  vision:	  	  A	  “man,	  dark	  as	  shadow”	  leads	  him	  to	  the	  top	  
of	  a	  hill	  where	  he	  sees	  “Port	  William	  and	  its	  countryside	  as	  he	  never	  saw	  or	  dreamed	  them”	  
in	  that	  “[o]ver	  town	  and	  fields	  one	  great	  song	  sings,	  and	  is	  answered	  everywhere;	  every	  
leaf	  and	  flower	  and	  grass	  blade	  sings”	  (221).	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  sees	  the	  people	  of	  the	  town:	  
“He	  sees	  that	  they	  are	  dead,	  and	  they	  are	  alive.	  	  He	  sees	  that	  he	  lives	  in	  eternity	  as	  he	  lives	  
in	  time,	  and	  nothing	  is	  lost.	  	  Among	  the	  people	  of	  that	  town,	  he	  sees	  men	  and	  women	  he	  
remembers,	  and	  men	  and	  women	  remembered	  in	  memories	  he	  remembers,	  and	  they	  do	  
not	  look	  as	  he	  ever	  saw	  or	  imagined	  them”	  (221).	  	  	  
Andy’s	  dream	  is	  a	  Dante-­‐inspired	  eschatological	  imagination	  of	  the	  eternal	  Port	  
William,	  a	  Port	  William	  alive	  in	  connection	  with	  its	  past	  and	  with	  its	  potential	  future,	  if	  only	  
its	  members	  will	  remain	  in	  it	  and	  devoted	  to	  the	  preserving	  work	  of	  culture	  their	  ancestors	  
have	  passed	  to	  them.	  	  This	  is	  no	  pastoral	  escape,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  nostalgia—it	  is	  a	  respect	  and	  a	  
love	  for	  a	  place	  and	  its	  possibilities	  that	  calls	  Andy	  to	  action	  in	  the	  present:	  “He	  would	  go	  to	  
them,	  but	  another	  movement	  of	  his	  guide’s	  hand	  shows	  him	  that	  he	  must	  not.	  	  He	  must	  go	  
no	  closer.	  	  He	  is	  not	  to	  stay.	  	  Grieved	  as	  he	  may	  be	  to	  leave	  them,	  he	  must	  leave.	  	  He	  wants	  to	  
leave.	  	  He	  must	  go	  back	  with	  his	  help,	  such	  as	  it	  is,	  and	  offer	  it”	  (221).	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We	  see	  here	  that	  Andy’s	  imagination	  ties	  him	  to	  his	  place,	  as	  we	  can	  assume	  Berry’s	  
does	  to	  his,	  and	  the	  enacting	  of	  it	  gives	  the	  reader	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  imagining	  
one’s	  place	  and	  devoting	  oneself	  to	  it.	  	  It	  is	  significant,	  I	  think,	  that	  Andy	  returns	  not	  only	  to	  
his	  place	  but	  to	  his	  marriage.	  	  That	  is,	  he	  returns	  back	  to	  an	  acceptance	  of	  limits,	  to	  forms	  
Berry	  speaks	  of	  elsewhere	  as	  analogous	  to	  literary	  form.	  	  Before	  the	  moment	  of	  his	  decision	  
to	  return	  to	  Port	  William,	  he	  realizes	  that	  his	  first	  vision—where	  he	  imagines	  leaving	  the	  
forms	  of	  marriage	  and	  place	  as	  freedom—is	  empty	  because	  it	  is	  an	  abstraction:	  	  “All	  
distance	  is	  around	  him,	  and	  he	  wants	  nothing	  that	  he	  has.	  	  All	  choice	  is	  around	  him,	  and	  he	  
knows	  nothing	  that	  he	  wants”	  (161).	  	  By	  choosing	  to	  return	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  his	  life	  in	  Port	  
William,	  he	  is	  able	  to	  have	  the	  vision	  on	  the	  hilltop,	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  possibilities	  those	  
forms	  open	  to	  him	  and	  for	  which	  they	  prepare	  him.	  	  	  
And	  his	  vision,	  again,	  shows	  him	  that	  “he	  lives	  in	  eternity	  as	  he	  lives	  in	  time”—that	  
he	  is,	  in	  fact,	  part	  of	  the	  eternal	  “song”	  of	  Port	  William	  that	  connects	  him	  to	  the	  work	  of	  his	  
forebears	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  future.	  	  As	  John	  Leax	  has	  remarked,	  “Andy’s	  memory	  is	  
fruitful,	  able	  to	  shape	  his	  return	  and	  his	  future,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  personal	  memory;	  
it	  is	  a	  memory	  participating	  in	  a	  communal	  memory	  that	  contains	  him	  quite	  apart	  from	  his	  
actions.	  	  It	  is	  always	  there.	  	  His	  task	  is	  to	  choose	  it”	  (70).	  	  Andy’s	  choice	  is	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  
cultural	  work	  of	  Port	  William,	  and	  the	  novel’s	  purpose	  is	  to	  help	  the	  reader	  imagine	  that	  
possibility.	  
It	  is	  this	  same	  imagining,	  and	  even	  in	  some	  of	  the	  same	  terms,	  that	  we	  find	  in	  The	  
Wheel,	  a	  collection	  of	  poems	  published	  in	  1982.	  	  In	  “The	  Law	  That	  Marries	  All	  Things,”	  
Berry	  writes,	  “In	  law	  is	  rest	  /	  if	  you	  love	  the	  law,	  /	  if	  you	  enter	  singing,	  into	  it	  /	  as	  the	  water	  
in	  its	  descent.”	  	  And	  then:	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Or	  song	  is	  truest	  law,	  
and	  you	  must	  enter	  singing;	  
it	  has	  no	  other	  entrance.	  
	  
It	  is	  the	  great	  chorus	  
of	  parts.	  	  The	  only	  outlawry	  
is	  in	  division.	  	  (New	  Collected	  284)	  
This	  is	  the	  same	  song	  Andy	  Catlett	  sees	  in	  his	  imaginative	  vision	  of	  Port	  William—the	  
eternal	  song	  of	  creation	  that	  joins	  the	  dead	  to	  the	  living,	  the	  song	  the	  living	  “sing”	  by	  taking	  
up	  the	  work	  of	  the	  dead	  in	  their	  place.	  	  The	  way	  to	  join	  this	  song	  is	  to	  work	  by	  the	  art	  of	  the	  
dead,	  to	  carry	  on	  their	  preserving	  culture,	  which	  allows	  for	  a	  propriety	  of	  place.	  	  
	   Berry	  is	  speaking	  of	  the	  work	  of	  his	  farming	  community	  here,	  and	  he	  is	  also	  
speaking	  of	  the	  continued	  cycle	  of	  birth	  and	  death.	  	  “But	  if	  a	  man’s	  life	  /	  continue	  in	  another	  
man,	  /	  then	  the	  flesh	  will	  rhyme	  /	  its	  part	  in	  the	  immortal	  song,”	  he	  writes	  in	  “Rising”	  
(277).	  	  And	  in	  “Letter,”	  he	  makes	  this	  claim	  of	  himself:	  	  “I	  pass	  the	  thread	  of	  my	  song	  again	  /	  
and	  again	  through	  the	  web	  of	  my	  life	  /	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  dead	  before	  me,	  /	  the	  old	  
resounding	  in	  the	  new”	  (288).	  	  What	  we	  come	  to	  see	  here	  and	  increasingly	  throughout	  The	  
Wheel	  is	  that	  by	  choosing	  “song”	  as	  his	  governing	  metaphor	  for	  the	  intersection	  of	  eternity	  
with	  the	  present,	  he	  is	  not	  only	  talking	  about	  birth	  balancing	  death	  and	  the	  communal	  
memory	  of	  agricultural	  practices	  but	  also	  about	  poetry.	  	  	  
Indeed,	  throughout	  The	  Wheel,	  we	  hear	  “the	  old	  resounding	  in	  the	  new”	  as	  we	  catch	  
noticeable	  glimpses	  of	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  “song”	  that	  is	  the	  poetic	  tradition	  he	  honors	  
in	  his	  nonfiction.	  	  Even	  more	  so	  than	  in	  Remembering,	  Dante	  looms	  large	  in	  “Elegy,”	  the	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longest	  poem	  in	  the	  collection	  and	  part	  of	  a	  cycle	  dedicated	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  his	  friend	  
Owen	  Flood.	  	  The	  poem	  gives	  us	  an	  imaginative	  meditation	  wherein	  Berry	  visits	  a	  Paradise	  
in	  which	  he	  finds	  Owen	  along	  with	  other	  members	  of	  his	  community	  who	  have	  passed	  
away:	  “Those	  were	  my	  teachers.	  	  And	  there	  were	  more,	  /	  beloved	  of	  face	  and	  name,	  who	  
once	  bore	  /	  the	  substance	  of	  our	  common	  ground.	  /	  Their	  eyes,	  having	  grieved	  all	  grief,	  
were	  clear”	  (270).	  	  One	  also	  hears	  echoes	  of	  Milton’s	  Raphael,	  explaining	  the	  Creation	  to	  
Adam,	  as	  Owen	  says:	  
The	  Creator	  is	  divided	  in	  Creation	  
for	  the	  joys	  of	  recognition.	  	  We	  knew	  	  
that	  Spirit	  in	  each	  other	  once;	  
it	  brings	  us	  here.	  	  By	  its	  divisions	  
and	  returns,	  the	  world	  lives.	  
Both	  mind	  and	  earth	  are	  made	  
Of	  what	  its	  light	  gives	  and	  uses	  up.	  (275)	  
And,	  n	  the	  end,	  Berry,	  like	  Andy,	  is	  moved	  from	  his	  vision	  of	  eternity	  to	  return	  to	  and	  take	  
up	  his	  place	  in	  the	  present:	  “He	  raised	  his	  hand,	  turned	  me	  to	  my	  way.	  /	  And	  I,	  inheritor	  of	  
what	  I	  mourned,	  /	  went	  back	  toward	  the	  light	  of	  day”	  (276).	  
	   In	  the	  collection’s	  later	  poems,	  Berry	  adds	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  communal	  dance	  to	  his	  
unifying	  trope	  of	  the	  eternal	  song	  of	  creation.	  	  The	  collection’s	  titular	  poem,	  “The	  Wheel,”	  
begins	  at	  a	  country	  dance	  to	  the	  “strokes	  of	  the	  fiddle	  bow,”	  but	  quickly	  becomes	  a	  
metaphor	  for	  the	  harmonious	  community	  “as	  couples	  join,	  /	  and	  couples	  join	  couples,	  their	  
movement	  lightening	  their	  feet”	  (298).	  	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  strongly	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
couples	  dancing	  to	  “the	  music	  /	  Of	  the	  weak	  pipe	  and	  the	  little	  drum”	  and	  “Lifting	  heavy	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feet	  in	  clumsy	  shoes,	  /	  Earth	  feet,	  loam	  feet,	  lifted	  in	  country	  mirth	  /	  Mirth	  of	  those	  long	  
since	  under	  earth,	  Nourishing	  the	  corn”	  in	  Eliot’s	  East	  Coker	  (Four	  24).	  	  Indeed,	  like	  Eliot’s	  
dancers,	  Berry’s	  are	  connected	  with	  their	  ancestors,	  for	  “the	  dead	  return”	  and	  “step	  into	  the	  
steps	  of	  the	  living	  /	  and	  turn	  with	  them	  in	  the	  dance”	  (New	  Collected	  298).	  
	   “The	  Wheel,”	  however,	  is	  dedicated	  not	  to	  Eliot,	  but	  to	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren.	  	  And	  it	  
contains	  a	  paradox	  worthy	  of	  him:	  
.	  .	  .	  Soon	  
They	  are	  one—rapt	  in	  a	  single	  
rapture,	  so	  that	  even	  the	  night	  
has	  its	  clarity,	  and	  time	  
is	  the	  wheel	  that	  brings	  it	  round.	  
In	  this	  rapture	  the	  dead	  return.	  
Sorrow	  is	  gone	  from	  them.	  
They	  are	  light.	  	  They	  step	  
into	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  living	  
and	  turn	  with	  them	  in	  the	  dance	  
in	  the	  sweet	  enclosure	  	  
of	  the	  song,	  and	  timeless	  
is	  the	  wheel	  that	  brings	  it	  round.	  	  (298)	  
The	  wheel	  of	  the	  dance,	  which	  corresponds	  with	  the	  “Wheel	  of	  Life”	  of	  “eastern	  religion”	  
which	  Sir	  Albert	  Howard	  cites	  in	  the	  collection’s	  epigraph,	  is	  both	  time—in	  the	  succession	  
of	  generations	  that	  necessarily	  involves	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  self	  and	  the	  past—and	  
timeless	  in	  the	  eternal,	  metaphysical	  reality	  that	  comprehends	  history.	  	  	  
	  
	  92	  
Thus,	  we	  see	  in	  The	  Wheel	  Berry’s	  metaphysical	  vision,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  vision	  for	  
literature,	  embodied.	  	  The	  entire	  collection	  involves	  the	  imagination	  of	  his	  place	  and	  his	  
community	  in	  its	  eternal	  sense,	  the	  sense	  that	  gives	  a	  vision	  of	  its	  true	  value	  and	  
possibility—the	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  can	  begin	  to	  think	  about	  acting	  with	  propriety.	  	  But	  the	  
eternal	  “song”	  of	  which	  living	  and	  the	  dead	  are	  a	  part	  carries	  a	  teleological	  weight.	  	  The	  
song,	  after	  all,	  is	  “The	  Law	  That	  Marries	  All	  Things,”	  which	  the	  living	  must	  choose	  to	  “enter	  
singing,”	  for	  “it	  has	  no	  other	  entrance.”	  	  Thus,	  The	  Wheel	  likewise	  gives	  us	  the	  deeper	  
foundation	  for	  propriety	  that	  is	  a	  vision	  of	  hierarchical	  place,	  a	  place	  in	  the	  eternal	  order	  of	  
creation	  in	  which	  the	  “Creator	  is	  divided.”	  	  And	  Berry’s	  deliberate	  inclusion	  of	  the	  voices	  of	  
his	  poetic	  tradition—Dante,	  Milton,	  Eliot,	  and	  Warren—serves	  not	  only	  to	  place	  him	  in	  a	  
strong	  “cultural	  lineage”	  but	  also	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  poetry	  itself	  participates	  in	  the	  
human	  contribution	  to	  the	  eternal	  song	  of	  creation.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  for	  Warren	  poetry	  helps	  
make	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  which	  is	  itself	  is	  a	  self-­‐referential	  metaphor,	  for	  Berry	  the	  song	  of	  
poetry	  can	  exist	  because	  creation	  itself	  is	  a	  song.	  
Conclusion	  
I	  have,	  of	  course,	  yet	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  irony	  of	  casting	  Berry’s	  work	  as	  literary	  
criticism	  given	  his	  disdain	  for	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  within	  the	  contemporary	  academy,	  
which	  he	  holds	  results	  from	  universities’	  blind	  following	  of	  industrial	  logic.	  	  Indeed,	  Berry	  
would	  not	  likely	  accept	  the	  title	  of	  “literary	  critic”	  willingly,	  insofar	  as	  such	  a	  term	  
designates	  one	  who	  specializes	  in	  academic	  literary	  scholarship.	  	  In	  the	  preface	  to	  his	  essay	  
collection	  Sex,	  Economy,	  Freedom	  &	  Community,	  he	  satirically	  renders	  what	  he	  takes	  to	  be	  
an	  assumption	  of	  the	  contemporary	  university	  regarding	  the	  humanities:	  “The	  so-­‐called	  
humanities	  probably	  do	  not	  exist.	  	  But	  if	  they	  do,	  they	  are	  useless.	  	  But	  whether	  they	  exist	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or	  not	  or	  are	  useful	  or	  not,	  they	  can	  sometimes	  be	  made	  to	  support	  a	  career”	  (xiii).	  	  And	  in	  
“Notes:	  Unspecializing	  Poetry,”	  he	  writes,	  less	  snidely	  but	  no	  less	  critically,	  “In	  the	  present	  
organization	  of	  intelligence—based	  on	  the	  ‘university’	  of	  departmented	  or	  encapsulated	  
specialties—the	  literary	  understanding	  elaborates	  itself	  within	  itself,	  becoming	  necessarily	  
more	  and	  more	  abstruse,”	  arguing	  that	  “[t]he	  only	  way	  for	  this—or	  any—discipline	  to	  
advance	  without	  becoming	  more	  ingrown	  and	  purposeless	  is	  to	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  its	  
relation	  to	  other	  disciplines”	  (Standing	  83).	  	  Much	  of	  the	  recent	  push	  for	  
“interdisciplinarity”	  is	  unsatisfying	  in	  Berry’s	  view.	  	  He	  argues	  in	  Life	  is	  a	  Miracle	  that	  many	  
such	  pushes,	  like	  Edward	  O.	  Wilson’s	  Consilience,	  insist	  on	  seeing	  “all	  the	  disciplines	  linked	  
or	  unified	  .	  .	  .	  strictly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  science,”	  a	  motive	  which	  Berry	  denounces	  as	  
imperialistic	  (31).	  	  	  
What	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  instead	  is	  an	  academy	  of	  disciplines	  that	  see	  themselves	  as	  
“subjects	  of	  one	  conversation”	  which	  has	  its	  main	  reference	  to	  the	  reality	  outside	  the	  walls	  
of	  the	  university:	  	  
The	  correct	  response	  [to	  the	  problem	  of	  meaningless	  specialization],	  I	  think,	  
is	  to	  ask	  if	  science	  and	  art	  are	  inherently	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another.	  	  It	  seems	  
obvious	  that	  they	  are	  not.	  	  To	  see	  that	  they	  are	  not	  may	  require	  
extracurricular	  thought,	  but	  once	  we	  have	  cracked	  the	  crust	  of	  academic	  
convention	  we	  can	  see	  that	  ‘science’	  means	  knowing	  and	  that	  ‘art’	  means	  
doing,	  and	  that	  one	  is	  meaningless	  without	  the	  other.	  	  Out	  of	  school,	  the	  two	  
are	  commonly	  inter-­‐involved	  and	  naturally	  cooperative	  in	  the	  same	  person—




Berry’s	  equation	  of	  “art”	  with	  “doing”	  here	  is	  obviously	  Coomaraswamy’s,	  which	  means	  
that	  we	  might	  include	  the	  poet	  as	  one	  for	  whom	  knowing	  and	  doing	  are	  necessarily	  at	  work	  
at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  Furthermore,	  we	  hear	  echoed	  here	  his	  assertions	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  
knowing	  that	  literature	  gives	  to	  the	  reader,	  whether	  in	  or	  out	  of	  school,	  ought	  not	  be	  
separated	  from	  the	  reader’s	  actions.	  	  Contrary	  to	  what	  Auden	  may	  have	  thought,	  Berry	  
argues	  that	  literature	  can	  and	  does	  make	  things	  happen.	  	  It	  can	  either	  assist	  in	  the	  
preserving	  knowledge	  of	  place	  that	  leads	  to	  propriety,	  or	  it	  can	  tear	  down	  that	  knowledge,	  
leading	  to	  ostensibly	  autonomous	  but	  necessarily	  destructive	  action.	  
	   This	  eminently	  practical	  strain	  of	  Berry’s	  thought	  on	  literature	  is	  what	  I	  believe	  
recommends	  it	  to	  the	  general	  reading	  public	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  academy.	  	  Despite	  Berry’s	  
harsh	  criticism	  of	  academic	  literary	  studies	  (which	  I	  will	  acknowledge	  is	  certainly	  not	  
universally	  applicable),	  he	  never	  says	  that	  literary	  scholarship	  is	  unnecessary.	  	  Indeed,	  he	  
argues	  that	  it	  may	  be	  necessary,	  but	  it	  can	  only	  be	  so	  if	  it	  acknowledges	  literature’s	  efficacy	  
outside	  of	  the	  academy,	  among	  the	  general	  reading	  public:	  “That	  [literature’s]	  real	  habitat	  
is	  the	  household	  and	  the	  community—that	  it	  can	  and	  does	  affect,	  even	  in	  practical	  ways,	  
the	  life	  of	  a	  place—may	  not	  be	  recognized	  by	  most	  theorists	  and	  critics	  for	  a	  while	  yet.	  	  But	  
they	  will	  finally	  come	  to	  it,	  because	  finally	  they	  will	  have	  to.	  	  And	  when	  they	  do,	  they	  will	  
renew	  the	  study	  of	  literature	  and	  restore	  it	  to	  importance”	  (What	  84).	  	  And,	  as	  I	  have	  
shown,	  one	  cannot	  come	  to	  an	  account	  of	  literature’s	  practical	  role	  in	  human	  places	  





My	  project	  has	  been	  to	  explore	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Robert	  Penn	  Warren’s	  and	  
Wendell	  Berry’s	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  literature	  are	  of	  practical	  use	  both	  to	  literary	  
scholars	  and	  the	  general	  reading	  public	  because	  they	  are	  grounded	  in	  metaphysical	  
thought.	  	  As	  I	  have	  said,	  my	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  general	  reading	  public	  sees	  literature	  as	  
more	  or	  less	  helpful	  to	  them,	  or	  else	  they	  would	  likely	  not	  read	  it.	  	  It	  follows	  that	  if	  we	  think	  
literature	  is	  or	  can	  be	  edifying,	  an	  account	  of	  what	  literature	  is	  for,	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  
which	  it	  is	  edifying,	  is	  desirable	  for	  any	  literary	  scholarship	  that	  aims	  to	  be	  of	  use	  to	  the	  
general	  reading	  public.	  	  And	  the	  question	  of	  literature’s	  function,	  leading	  as	  it	  does	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  the	  telos	  of	  the	  human,	  must	  ultimately	  base	  itself	  on	  a	  metaphysics,	  which	  I	  
have	  defined,	  following	  John	  Gardner,	  as	  “a	  coherent,	  convincing,	  necessary	  system	  of	  
general	  ideas	  and	  feelings	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  every	  element	  of	  our	  experience	  is	  illuminated”	  	  
(171).	  
	   Both	  Warren	  and	  Berry	  give	  coherent	  accounts	  of	  their	  views	  of	  metaphysical	  truth,	  
which	  enable	  them	  to	  work	  out	  literature’s	  role	  in	  making	  that	  truth	  immediate	  to	  its	  
readers.	  	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  there	  are	  many	  similarities	  between	  their	  views	  of	  literature.	  	  
Both	  of	  them	  reject	  the	  division	  made	  by	  Auden	  and	  others	  between	  literature	  and	  human	  
action.	  	  Both	  of	  them	  see	  literary	  form	  as	  having	  specific	  practical	  implications.	  	  And	  both	  of	  
them	  see	  literature	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  negotiate	  a	  healthy	  relationship	  with	  a	  
community	  and	  with	  the	  past.	  	  	  
Furthermore,	  both	  Warren	  and	  Berry	  avoid	  following	  Matthew	  Arnold	  into	  the	  trap	  
of	  seeing	  literature	  as	  a	  surrogate	  metaphysics	  by	  following	  Eliot’s	  lead	  in	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  
helpful	  imaginative	  embodiment	  of	  metaphysical	  truth.	  	  They	  do,	  of	  course,	  have	  different	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accounts	  of	  what	  that	  truth	  includes.	  	  Warren’s	  metaphysics,	  like	  John	  Gardner’s,	  include	  
“humanity	  grandiosely	  conceived”	  (24),	  a	  concept	  of	  human	  truth	  based	  on	  an	  
understanding	  of	  history	  and	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  human	  action	  we	  find	  
there.	  	  Berry’s	  include	  a	  hierarchical	  teleology	  based	  on	  a	  belief	  in	  God.	  
It	  would	  be	  too	  easy,	  I	  think,	  to	  conclude	  from	  these	  differences	  that	  Warren’s	  view	  
is	  primarily	  of	  value	  to	  the	  nonreligious	  or	  that	  Berry’s	  view	  is	  primarily	  of	  value	  to	  the	  
religious.	  	  While	  it	  may	  certainly	  be	  true	  that	  some	  people	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  agree	  more	  
or	  less	  with	  either	  one	  of	  them,	  they	  both	  offer	  unique	  perspectives	  that	  may	  nevertheless	  
have	  wide	  appeal	  and	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  metaphysical	  
positions	  are	  theistic.	  	  For	  instance,	  Warren’s	  account	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  historical	  study	  
and	  its	  efficacy	  in	  specifically	  literary	  study,	  albeit	  for	  reasons	  differ	  in	  important	  ways	  
from	  those	  of	  the	  New	  Historicists,	  affirm	  what	  is	  best	  about	  the	  contemporary	  focus	  on	  
historical	  context	  in	  literary	  criticism.	  	  And	  while	  Warren	  certainly	  escaped	  the	  worst	  
excesses	  of	  the	  New	  Criticism,	  Berry’s	  constant	  insistence	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  connection	  
between	  the	  scholarship	  of	  the	  university	  and	  the	  work	  done	  outside	  of	  it	  gives	  a	  fuller	  
picture	  of	  a	  literary	  criticism	  that	  vehemently	  opposes	  escapist	  aestheticism	  while	  
vehemently	  guarding	  the	  practical	  importance	  of	  aesthetic	  concerns.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Warren’s	  view,	  because	  it	  limits	  itself	  to	  a	  
humanist	  metaphysics,	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  broad	  appeal	  within	  the	  academy.	  	  While,	  as	  a	  
Christian	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  I	  cannot	  accept	  Gary	  Davenport’s	  position	  that	  Berry’s	  
theism	  is	  irrelevant	  in	  the	  postmodern	  world	  (113),	  I	  certainly	  understand	  that	  there	  are	  
numerous	  scholars	  and	  readers	  who	  do	  not	  accept	  a	  theistic	  metaphysics	  and	  who	  would	  
therefore	  disagree	  with	  Berry	  on	  numerous	  points.	  	  But	  while	  Warren’s	  view	  may	  be	  more	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immediately	  appealing,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Berry’s	  view	  of	  literature	  could	  be	  valuable	  
even	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not	  accept	  a	  theistic	  metaphysics	  remains	  open.	  	  Perhaps	  one	  place	  to	  
start	  is	  to	  say	  that	  while	  Berry	  certainly	  has	  his	  critics,	  some	  literary	  scholars	  nevertheless	  
have	  found	  his	  thought	  useful	  regardless	  or	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  religious	  views.	  	  His	  ecological	  
thought	  and	  cultural	  criticism,	  for	  instance,	  has	  certainly	  been	  influential	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
ecocriticism14.	  	  And	  critics	  like	  Katey	  Castellano,	  despite	  her	  uneasiness	  with	  Berry’s	  
“unapologetic	  Christian	  views,”	  nevertheless	  finds	  value	  in	  Berry’s	  thought	  because	  his	  
“conservative,	  conservationist	  vision”	  is,	  “however	  counterintuitively,	  a	  radical	  resistance	  
to	  capitalism”	  (86-­‐7).	  	  This,	  of	  course,	  may	  not	  be	  all	  that	  counterintuitive	  if	  we	  realize	  that	  
in	  reference	  to	  Berry	  the	  term	  “conservative”	  should	  not	  in	  any	  way	  align	  him	  with	  versions	  
of	  contemporary	  political	  conservatism	  that	  support	  global	  industrial	  capitalism,	  of	  which	  
he	  is	  vocally	  critical,	  but	  instead	  marks	  a	  thoughtful	  belief	  that	  some	  things—such	  as	  
community,	  religion,	  and	  traditionally	  coherent	  culture—are	  worth	  conserving.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  Castellano’s	  remark	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  Berry	  shares	  much	  common	  
ground	  even	  with	  leftist	  literary	  critics.	  	  	  
	   More	  importantly,	  to	  say	  that	  Berry’s	  thought	  on	  literature	  is	  of	  limited	  use	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  theistic,	  hierarchical	  metaphysics	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  religious	  and	  
nonreligious	  people	  can	  have	  meaningful,	  productive	  conversations	  on	  things	  of	  
importance.	  	  As	  Warren’s	  work	  shows,	  it	  is	  certainly	  possible	  for	  someone	  who	  doubts	  or	  
denies	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  to	  find	  common	  ground	  with	  those	  who	  assert	  it.	  	  And	  it	  is	  
certainly	  plausible	  that	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  see	  nature	  as	  divinely	  ordered	  could	  
nevertheless,	  on	  ecological	  and	  humanistic	  terms,	  agree	  that	  human	  action	  should	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Dana	  Phillips’s	  “Is	  Nature	  Necessary?”	  in	  The	  Ecocriticism	  Reader:	  
Landmarks	  in	  Literary	  Ecology	  (U	  of	  Georgia	  P,	  1996).	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placed	  within	  the	  hierarchies	  of	  ecological	  health	  and	  human	  ethical	  truth.	  	  Along	  these	  
lines,	  Berry’s	  writing	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  ethical	  urgency,	  at	  least	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  
ecological	  concern	  of	  a	  good	  part	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  years	  since	  Warren’s	  work,	  that	  
may	  recommend	  itself	  to	  literary	  scholars	  of	  all	  stripes	  who	  see	  literature	  as	  relevant	  to	  the	  
particular	  problems	  of	  our	  time.	  
	   Regardless,	  my	  main	  point	  still	  stands:	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  useful,	  literary	  scholarship	  must	  
forthrightly	  concern	  itself	  with	  questions	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  
disagreement	  as	  to	  the	  truth	  among	  literary	  scholars	  and	  among	  readers	  is	  unavoidable	  
(and	  perhaps	  not	  altogether	  undesirable),	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  literary	  criticism	  
should	  avoid	  talking	  in	  metaphysical	  terms.	  	  The	  examples	  of	  Warren	  and	  Berry	  show	  that	  
critics	  have	  much	  to	  gain	  by	  talking	  in	  good	  faith	  about	  their	  views	  of	  the	  truth	  and	  the	  
implications	  those	  views	  have	  on	  the	  purposes	  they	  see	  literature	  serving.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  if	  
conversation	  occurs	  along	  these	  lines,	  we	  will	  find	  much	  common	  ground.	  	  And	  this,	  in	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